Taiwan's remarkable semiconductor report card
Value added in other manufacturing industries lags
Hopes for trickle-down effects are little more than a bubble

Kim Minseong, Professor of Economics at Sungkyunkwan University

Kim Minseong, Professor of Economics at Sungkyunkwan University

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The rapid growth of the artificial intelligence (AI) industry has propelled semiconductors to the forefront of the global economy. Korea and Taiwan are at the center of this shift. Semiconductor exports have surged in both economies, driving economic growth, but Taiwan is far more dependent on semiconductors. Taiwan’s experience offers a useful point of reference as we consider the future of an economy like ours, where growth centered on semiconductors may become even more pronounced.


Taiwan’s growth record is remarkable. From 2015 to 2024, real GDP per capita rose by about 36%, compared with an increase of about 23% in Korea. Taiwan’s growth was led by electronics, including semiconductors. According to Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs, in 2024 the electronic components manufacturing industry accounted for 29% of total manufacturing sales and 68% of operating profits. Both figures were more than three times those of Korea.


National accounts, however, reveal another change. Taiwan’s household net disposable income fell from 60.0% of GDP in 2015 to 55.6% in 2024, while the share of net disposable income going to businesses rose from 11.4% to 14.4%. This cannot be interpreted as a deterioration in income distribution without further context. Retained corporate earnings can lead to investment and may also increase household wealth through dividends or rising stock prices. In fact, the value of securities held by Taiwanese households more than doubled over the same period.


Through what channels do the gains from the semiconductor industry spread through the national economy? The first is spillover to other industries. As semiconductor production increases, so does demand for materials, equipment, construction, logistics and other sectors. Taiwan has also seen these inter-industry effects, but value added in other manufacturing industries grew much more slowly than in electronics. The second channel is through income and consumption. Corporate earnings boost household income and consumption through wages, performance bonuses and dividends, benefiting the service sector as well. Taiwan’s real consumption per capita increased by about 25% from 2015 to 2024, but that was less than the increase in real GDP per capita. The extent to which corporate profits translate into consumption depends on how income is distributed and on household spending behavior.


Corporate ownership structures also matter. At the end of 2024, foreign investors held about 45% of the market capitalization of Taiwan’s listed shares, compared with about 32% in Korea’s KOSPI market. Even when corporate value rises, the gains do not all accrue to the people of the country where the company is based. Of course, there is no reason to regard foreign investment itself as good or bad. Koreans also invest overseas, and in both countries, gross national income (GNI) is higher than GDP. Value added generated domestically does not necessarily match the income and wealth accruing to the country’s residents.


The ripple effects of the semiconductor boom are also being felt in Korea. According to research by the Bank of Korea, after semiconductor companies paid performance bonuses, consumption in areas with many workers in related industries, such as Icheon, Hwaseong and Cheongju, was up to 4% higher than in comparison areas. However, the semiconductor industry is known to be capital-intensive and to have a relatively limited employment-generating effect. Even when exports and corporate profits surge, the spillover to the national economy as a whole may be limited.


Taiwan’s experience shows that even when the success of the semiconductor industry leads to rapid growth across the economy, the gains do not necessarily spread to other industries and households to the same extent. Growth in other manufacturing industries was relatively slow, the household share of income declined as the corporate share rose, and consumption growth fell short of production growth. Taiwan’s experience, of course, does not offer a precise forecast of Korea’s future. Still, it is worth noting that there may be limits to how far the gains from a semiconductor boom can spread throughout the national economy.


So what should be done? Artificially redistributing corporate profits or steering investment is not necessarily the answer. Policy interventions aimed at amplifying market-driven spillovers could instead distort the allocation of resources. Strengthening the competitiveness of the semiconductor industry is important, but relying solely on its success is unlikely to ensure sustained growth across the entire national economy. Rather than depending on the success of a particular industry, it is important to create conditions in which other industries can raise their productivity and grow on their own. A starting point is to encourage the entry of new businesses and promote competition, improve unfair business practices between companies, and remove obstacles to technological innovation and the accumulation of human capital.



Kim Minseong, professor of economics at Sungkyunkwan University


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