Bank ATMs in downtown Seoul on the 12th, when the government and the Democratic Party of Korea announced measures to improve financial company governance, including gradually tightening voting requirements for the executive candidate recommendation committee and shareholders' meetings as bank holding company CEOs serve more consecutive terms. Yonhap News Agency

Bank ATMs in downtown Seoul on the 12th, when the government and the Democratic Party of Korea announced measures to improve financial company governance, including gradually tightening voting requirements for the executive candidate recommendation committee and shareholders' meetings as bank holding company CEOs serve more consecutive terms. Yonhap News Agency

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The government has announced a corporate governance reform plan requiring approval from at least two-thirds of the voting rights represented at a shareholders' meeting for the reappointment of a bank holding company chair, and at least three-quarters for a third consecutive term or later. It also plans to require the CEO candidate recommendation committee to consist entirely of independent directors and to prevent the incumbent chair from interfering in the nomination process.


In ownership-dispersed structures without a controlling shareholder, such as bank holding companies, executives can easily exert greater influence. The aim of preventing "self-perpetuating terms" and "entrenchment"—where a chair fills the board with people loyal to them, and that board then supports the chair's reappointment—is justified. The problem lies not so much in long-serving chairs themselves as in structures that hinder fair competition and scrutiny.


This reform plan followed President Lee Jae-myung's criticism last December of the financial sector's "corrupt inner circle." It is an improvement over the initially discussed proposal to ban third consecutive terms, but it remains unclear how far the government should go in imposing uniform standards on private financial companies. Rather than direct intervention by financial regulators, it would be better to have independent boards and shareholders hold executives in check and encourage sound practices to take root. No matter how detailed the legal rules are, there is no guarantee they will work properly in practice.


What matters is rigorously assessing candidates' management performance and accountability for financial incidents, while giving external candidates a fair chance to compete. A culture must also take root in which directors voice dissent when necessary and take responsibility for their decisions. Shareholders and institutional investors, too, should play a watchdog role through thorough scrutiny and by exercising their voting rights. The channels for nominating independent directors should also be broadened in ways that strengthen the board's diversity and independence.



The government should pursue the announced institutional reforms, but not stop at checking whether companies comply with the rules. It should encourage financial companies to establish transparent succession procedures and responsible board practices on their own. Expanding the role of institutional investors such as the National Pension Service must not lead to government appointees being parachuted into financial companies. If the government's influence simply replaces the chair's personal influence, the purpose of the reform will be undermined.


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