Failure to enact social reforms amid chronic fiscal deficits
France may be South Korea's portrait 10 years from now as it faces demographic change
Time to act on pension reform and fiscal rules

Hong Seokcheol, professor in the Department of Economics at Seoul National University

Hong Seokcheol, professor in the Department of Economics at Seoul National University

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The large-scale protests that have recently spread across France were ostensibly sparked by problems with educational infrastructure, including poor school facilities, and rising living costs. Beneath the surface, however, lie chronic fiscal deficits, structural limitations in the pension and welfare systems, and the resulting imbalance in the allocation of resources between generations. These protests, which have spread from France to several other European countries, are by no means a distant concern. South Korea, facing rapid demographic change, is the country that should be most concerned about France's crisis. Perhaps today's France is a portrait of South Korea 10 years from now.


In 2000, France's government debt stood at around 60% of gross domestic product (GDP), in line with the European Union's (EU) recommended fiscal rules. But 25 years later, the debt ratio has nearly doubled, reaching 119% this year. Much of the increase was due to massive fiscal spending to stimulate the economy in response to the 2008 global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic from 2020 to 2022. Of course, debt rises during crises in other advanced economies as well. What stands out is that France failed to pay down its debt even as the economy recovered. Since 2001, France has not recorded a primary budget surplus - the fiscal balance excluding interest payments - even once in more than 20 years. Unlike Germany and the Nordic countries, which ran fiscal surpluses during the boom years in the mid-2010s and reduced their debt ratios to below 60%, France maintained fiscal deficits of 2% to 3% of GDP even during economic expansions.


The chronic deficits stem from the downward rigidity of fiscal spending. Various subsidies, employment support programs, and expanded public-sector staffing introduced to overcome economic downturns became entrenched interests after the crises ended, locking in public spending at one of the highest levels among member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). At the same time, as the baby-boom generation began retiring in earnest, pension and public healthcare spending started rising automatically each year, sharply shrinking the government's room to cut discretionary spending. It is not that France ignored the need for reform. Each attempt to raise the pension eligibility age or reform the labor market ran into strikes by powerful unions, public opposition, and political gridlock in a divided parliament, repeatedly causing the country to miss the golden opportunity to restore fiscal health.


When the French government, with its fiscal capacity exhausted, began austerity measures in public services, including education, in 2024 to cover its deficits, discontent on the ground erupted. High school students took to the streets, and citizens exhausted by high prices and financial hardship joined them, turning the demonstrations into nationwide protests. As France entrenched public spending centered on older generations, the foundations of young people's lives crumbled. The poverty rate among young people in France is 18.6%, far higher than among older people (10.6% for those aged 65 to 74 and 9.9% for those aged 75 and over). Young people's sense of deprivation, driven by the unfair distribution of economic burdens and welfare benefits across generations, has reached a tipping point. These protests starkly show how social conflict can erupt when the opportunities and public infrastructure of future generations are sacrificed to protect the vested interests of older generations in an era of low growth and population aging.


South Korea's government debt ratio is currently at about the same level as France's in the early 2000s. But the country's underlying conditions - entrenched fiscal deficits, declining potential growth, interest groups consolidating their vested interests, failed political reforms, and widening generational inequality - have already begun to resemble France in the years after 2010. Of even greater concern is that South Korea does not issue a reserve currency and is experiencing the world's most rapid demographic change.


The pension and welfare-related fiscal pressures that France experienced over several decades will hit South Korea in a far more compressed and severe form. If we miss the final golden opportunity to reform the pension system, improve the efficiency of mandatory spending, legislate fiscal rules, and reform the labor market, we will inevitably face even more intense generational conflict and a more severe fiscal crisis than France.



Hong Seokcheol, professor in the Department of Economics at Seoul National University


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