[Governance Reform] Minutes Altered to Secure Chair’s Reappointment; Just 1 Dissent in 6,100 Board Votes... The Reality of “Rubber-Stamp Boards”
Special Inspection of Governance at Eight Bank Holding Companies
Boards' Checks on Executives Effectively "Paralyzed"
A special review by financial authorities of the governance practices of eight bank holding companies (KB, Shinhan, Hana, Woori, NH NongHyup, BNK, iM and JB) found that their boards’ ability to keep management in check had effectively broken down. Of the 6,100 votes recorded at board and subcommittee meetings last year, outside directors voiced opposition just once. The findings have exposed the boards as little more than rubber stamps.
According to the “Findings of the Special Review of Governance Practices at Eight Bank Holding Companies,” announced by the Financial Services Commission and the Financial Supervisory Service on Nov. 12, boards’ ability to keep management in check was not functioning properly in the operation of the outside director system. The financial authorities reviewed the records of votes and minutes from board and subcommittee meetings held by the eight bank holding companies last year. Of the 6,100 votes recorded, individual directors opposed an agenda item in just one vote. The review also found that board minutes were inadequately managed: in some cases, board secretariats did not record outside directors’ remarks at their discretion when meetings were not recorded, while in others, remarks were added to the minutes after meetings at the request of individual directors.
The review found that management could exert considerable influence over outside directors by providing them with financial benefits. Despite serving on a non-full-time basis, outside directors received compensation totaling nearly KRW 100 million, as well as benefits such as cars, drivers and health checkups. In some cases, financial support continued even after they left their posts. In addition to base salaries of KRW 48 million to KRW 55 million, they received position allowances and meeting fees. Although many were already paid allowances to cover costs for each meeting they attended, they also received cars and drivers. Some holding companies appointed former outside directors as advisers or consultants within the group, continuing to pay them up to KRW 80 million a year, or provided indirect support in the form of donations to academic societies, research institutes and universities with which they were affiliated.
The appointment process for outside directors lacked transparency. Although the incumbent chair was not formally permitted to take part in the appointment process, the review found numerous cases in which the chair’s former academic advisers and alumni were appointed without rigorous scrutiny of their independence. These directors then took part in succession procedures and directly or indirectly supported the incumbent chair’s reappointment. The appointment process itself was also unclear. Most holding companies had not established specific review principles or criteria for appointing outside directors, or applied them only as a formality. Only a few had explicitly set and used diversity targets for board composition, such as gender and professional background.
Board evaluation systems and candidate pool management were also inadequate. Although external recommendations accounted for a large share of candidates in the standing pool for outside directors, those ultimately appointed were concentrated among internally recommended candidates. Two of the eight bank holding companies had no cases of appointing a candidate recommended by an external institution. The review also found cases in which candidates recommended by outside directors were appointed after only a short period, without sufficient verification or observation. One bank holding company added a candidate recommended by an outside director to its standing pool and included the candidate in the final shortlist on the same day, without a detailed evaluation, qualification checks or reference checks. It then recommended the candidate as a final nominee 10 days later.
Objectivity and transparency were also lacking in procedures for CEO succession. The review found that, after one bank holding company had begun its succession process, it amended its internal governance rules on the day before selecting its first-round candidate pool (longlist), changing the age limit for continued service and thereby extending the period during which the incumbent chair could remain in office if reappointed. In other cases, the review found that the review period and schedule for the succession process were managed in ways that favored the incumbent chair’s reappointment. For example, one bank holding company required external candidates to submit applications to participate in the succession process within five business days, prompting most of them to withdraw.
Evaluations were not conducted objectively. When succession procedures for the incumbent chair’s reappointment were underway, every committee member voted to rank the incumbent chair first at every stage. Records documenting the basis for the evaluations were also inadequate, as was the management of minutes by the executive director recommendation committee.
Systems for managing a standing pool of candidates capable of competing for the next CEO position were also deficient. Candidates were not regularly vetted or developed. The internal candidate pool was managed mainly around the heads of subsidiaries, whose appointments could be heavily influenced by the incumbent chair. These candidates were often at a disadvantage compared with the incumbent chair in terms of work experience and opportunities to interact with the board. The external candidate pool was skewed toward retired executives from other companies and former government officials, and often included people who were unlikely to be viable competitors. As a result, candidates frequently declined to participate in succession procedures.
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The review also found cases in which former CEOs continued to receive financial support after leaving their posts. Most holding companies appointed former chairs as advisers or consultants and paid them substantial compensation over long periods without objectively evaluating their advisory work. For example, Holding Company A paid its former chair a large special merit payment upon retirement and then appointed the former chair as an adviser. It paid an average of KRW 700 million a year for four years without adequately verifying the chair’s advisory work. Holding Company B appointed its former chair as an adviser and paid an average of KRW 400 million a year for two years, but did not discuss or review the appropriateness of renewing the appointment.
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