[Beyond the Scene] Future Response Fund Slush Fund Controversy: How to Avoid Following the Housing Fund's Path
External oversight should be built into the deliberation and approval process for fund management.
As the year-end budget season approaches, controversy is mounting over the Future Response Fund. The key questions are whether the government can spend money collected from excess tax revenues at its discretion, without parliamentary oversight, and whether sustainable funding will be available in the future, given that the current revenue is temporary and tied to cycles in specific industries. It may be too early to make a firm prediction, but I believe the fund is likely to pass with the broad framework of the original proposal intact, given the firm policy direction of an administration in its second year in power and the ruling party’s majority in the National Assembly.
Critics of the Future Response Fund take issue with the government having excessive discretion. They warn that it could become a slush fund for the government. Broad government discretion, conversely, means lax parliamentary oversight. The Housing and Urban Fund offers a glimpse of how a fund with insufficient external checks can be used. At KRW 228 trillion in assets, including liabilities, as of the end of 2024, it is the third-largest fund after the National Pension Fund and the Foreign Exchange Stabilization Fund, and the largest fund earmarked for specific policy programs. Its annual funding and management total alone amounts to KRW 100 trillion.
The fund is financed mainly by deposits into housing subscription savings accounts and National Housing Bonds. Although the money is borrowed from the public, the management process is far from transparent. When drawing up the fund’s management plan for 2025, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport initially planned to spend KRW 14 trillion 81.6 billion on housing purchase and rental deposit loans—the Didimdol and Beotimmok loan programs. In fact, it spent only KRW 435.8 billion. The unspent rate reached 97%.
This does not mean that the Didimdol and Beotimmok loans, used primarily by lower-income households, were not made. Rather than lending directly from the fund, the government mainly used an interest subsidy scheme that draws on banks’ funds. Loans made under this scheme can entail spending over a period of 20 to 30 years, and their costs can fluctuate widely depending on interest rates, making them difficult to predict. Despite the significant impact this decision would have on the fund’s financial position, it was made without prior parliamentary review or approval. The results were reported only afterward.
The Newborn Special Loan, introduced in 2024, also drew considerable criticism. The income limit for the Didimdol loan for home purchases was initially set at KRW 60 million in combined annual income for a couple, but was raised to KRW 85 million for newlyweds in the second half of 2022. The Newborn Special Loan had a limit of KRW 130 million in combined annual income from the time it was launched. Borrowers aged 34 or younger could qualify for low-interest loans even with annual incomes of up to KRW 200 million.
That is not to say the government’s efforts to tackle the low birth rate are incomprehensible. But it is questionable whether money accumulated penny by penny from the public to improve housing rights for ordinary people should be used to support newlyweds with annual incomes of KRW 200 million. If the government was concerned about the low birth rate, I believe it should have allocated a separate budget rather than using the fund. The public, who are the fund’s actual owners, still do not know what considerations or evidence underpinned that decision at the time.
In the year after its launch, the Newborn Special Loan saw nearly KRW 1 trillion disbursed each month, attracting such strong demand that it accounted for roughly one-third of all borrower loans from the fund. Given that the fund’s reserve assets, which could have served as a buffer, rapidly dwindled and the government hastily revised the fund management plan, one can only surmise that the decision was made without thorough review or fiscal projections.
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Recent efforts to reform the Housing and Urban Fund’s decision-making structure are evidence that opaque decisions had become widespread. Bills to require that deliberation and approval processes be documented in minutes and made public, to include outside experts on the Fund Management Committee, or to require reports to the National Assembly at regular intervals on the fund’s management and spending have been introduced in the current National Assembly. For the Future Response Fund to be legitimate, I believe it must be equipped with procedural transparency and external oversight mechanisms to the same extent.
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