MCIA Lacks Prosecution Powers: What If It Handles Leniency? The Dilemma of Applying the "Voluntary Surrender" Doctrine
The MCIA, which cannot indict, has little choice but to invoke "voluntary surrender"
Limits on ranking-based differentiation and confidentiality
And the dilemma of duplicate applications to police and SJPOs
Applying Supreme Court precedents would limit control over leniency
Do the legal roots of the leniency program for reporting collusion lie in the system that allows offenders to turn themselves in, or in prosecutors' discretion to prosecute? As the Prosecution Agency and the Major Crimes Investigation Agency (MCIA) clash over which agency should receive leniency applications, a legal debate over the program's nature may be brewing.
According to legal sources on Oct. 26, the MCIA's push to secure a channel for receiving leniency applications is driven by the need for "swift investigations." In collusion cases, it is vital to prevent the destruction of evidence by immediately launching compulsory investigative measures, such as search and seizure, if one of the co-conspirators first comes forward with decisive evidence. The rationale is that the MCIA, which holds investigative authority, must receive reports directly to avoid missing the right moment to investigate.
However, the MCIA has no authority to decide not to indict or to seek a reduced sentence, so it cannot promise immunity on the basis of prosecutorial discretion. As a result, it has no choice but to rely on Article 52 of the Criminal Act, which allows people to report their own crimes to investigative authorities and seek a reduction or exemption from punishment. The problem is that applying the legal principles governing voluntary surrender, as established in accumulated Supreme Court precedents, directly to leniency could render the program ineffective. This is because cartel leniency and voluntary surrender under the Criminal Act differ significantly in their legal nature and how they work.
First, there are major differences in the timing and requirements for reporting. Leniency is available only if a company presents new evidence for the first time before the investigative authorities become aware of the collusion. By contrast, according to a Supreme Court ruling issued in December 1994, the requirements for voluntary surrender under the Criminal Act can be met even after a crime has been discovered or while a person is wanted, and the person is not required to disclose new criminal facts.
The gap is also evident in the degree of control after a report is made. Under the leniency program, if a company retracts its statement after reporting or discloses the report to a third party, it immediately loses its place in the immunity ranking for violating its duty to cooperate fully and maintain confidentiality. However, in an October 2004 ruling, the Supreme Court held that even if a defendant who had voluntarily surrendered later reversed their testimony in court and denied the crime, the effect of the surrender remained valid and the sentence could be reduced. There is also no duty to keep a voluntary surrender confidential. Leniency encourages fractures within a cartel through a strict "first-come, first-served" ranking system, with immunity from prosecution for the first applicant and a reduced sentencing recommendation for the second. Voluntary surrender, by contrast, provides the same reduction in punishment regardless of rank, even if co-conspirators turn themselves in one after another at a later stage.
The procedural dilemma is also considerable. If voluntary surrender is interpreted as the basis for applying for a reduction or exemption from punishment, the validity of a leniency application would have to be recognized even if a colluding company submitted it to a local police station or a special judicial police officer (SJPO) rather than to the MCIA. Under the Criminal Act, voluntary surrender can be made to any investigative authority, and there is no legal basis for the prosecution authority to recognize applications received by the MCIA while excluding those received by the police. This could lead to a flood of duplicate applications to multiple investigative authorities and create severe confusion in determining their order of priority.
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The Prosecution Agency recently amended its internal rules to explicitly state that the legal basis for leniency is prosecutors' discretion to prosecute under Article 247 of the Criminal Procedure Act and Article 51 of the Criminal Act, taking these legal limitations into account. Under the rules, the Prosecution Agency considers leniency to be, in essence, an expression of intent to seek immunity from prosecution or a reduced sentencing recommendation from the authority responsible for prosecution. It therefore holds that the Prosecution Agency, as the authority with final decision-making power, must assign provisional rankings from the outset of the application process to firmly safeguard the legal standing of reporting companies.
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