[Reporter's Notebook] Agreement After "33 Meetings": The Question Meta Poses to Korean Corporate Boards
The Meta board’s response to the so-called “billionaire tax” being pursued in California recently was striking. California plans to put Proposition 40, which would impose a one-time tax of 5% of the wealth of ultra-high-net-worth individuals with net worth exceeding $1 billion, to a vote in November.
What made the board’s response striking was that it changed the CEO’s decision through persistent discussion. When Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg considered moving his residence to another state over concerns about a hefty tax bill, the board decided to issue new Class C shares with no voting rights and distribute one share to every existing shareholder for each share they owned. This would allow Zuckerberg to retain his existing voting rights while selling some of the shares to prepare for future tax liabilities. On the surface, this may look no different from the so-called “rubber-stamp boards” often criticized at Korean companies.
What deserves attention is how the decision was reached. The independent special committee under the board demanded that Zuckerberg lose his powerful voting rights if he left the company or significantly reduced his shareholding. When he rejected the demand, the committee secured a condition preventing him from selling the newly issued shares. It also obtained a commitment from him to reside in the area where the company is headquartered, in principle for eight years, as long as he remains involved in its management. In the process, the special committee held a total of 33 formal meetings over eight months with legal and financial advisers.
Can we expect to see the same at Korean corporate boards? Recent Financial Supervisory Service data show that, of the 6,100 votes cast by outside directors at the eight major financial holding companies last year, only one was a vote against. And the issue goes beyond voting. There have also been cases in which current CEOs’ former academic advisers or alumni were appointed as outside directors without sufficient scrutiny of potential conflicts of interest. In other cases, companies changed succession procedures in ways that favored incumbent CEOs, or members of compensation committees took part in decisions about their own pay. These cases raise questions about board independence and its ability to check management.
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A low number of dissenting votes alone does not prove that a board has failed to do its job. What matters is not whether it supported management’s decisions, but whether it independently considered if those decisions were in the best interests of the company and its shareholders. Meta’s example poses a question to Korean companies that continue to face criticism for having “rubber-stamp boards”: Can our boards actually negotiate with management?
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