[Jung Inkyo's Trade-Off] Trump's Russian Diesel Deal Undermines Trust in Multilateral Economic Sanctions
Rising Oil Prices Add to U.S. Cost-of-Living Burden
Seeking Votes Ahead of the Midterms
Russian Diesel Imports Authorized Under "General License No. 135"
No Corresponding Concessions from Russia
Ultimately, It Amounts to Funding Puti
This fall's energy crisis has exposed vulnerabilities in refined-fuel supplies, extending beyond crude oil shortages. Disruptions to shipping caused by the war in the Middle East, combined with Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries, sharply worsened the diesel supply situation. In its September report, the International Energy Agency said net diesel and gasoil exports from the Gulf region and Russia in August fell by 1.6 million barrels per day from six months earlier, in February. Rising prices for diesel, a key fuel for logistics and agriculture, have added to the cost of living through higher transportation and food prices.
U.S. President Donald Trump, facing midterm elections on November 3, chose to strike a deal with Russia. After speaking by phone with Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 9, Trump announced that Russia would immediately supply more than 300,000 metric tons of diesel to the United States and global markets, followed by an additional 500,000 metric tons in November and 1 million metric tons afterward. He also added that Russia could supply another 3 million metric tons, depending on refinery conditions. On the same day, the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued General License 135, authorizing the sale, transportation, and unloading of Russian diesel, as well as its import into the United States.
U.S. President Donald Trump seated across from Russian President Vladimir Putin. AI-generated image.
View original imageThe policy goal of lowering energy prices ahead of an election is understandable. The problem is the diplomatic and security costs incurred to achieve it. If the United States, which led the sanctions effort, opens the door to a deal without publicly securing reciprocal concessions from Russia, it sends allies the signal that U.S. domestic politics take precedence over shared principles. This is not an issue that can be judged solely by the economic benefits of increased supply. The damage to the leverage built up to deter the war and to allied trust must also be weighed.
Russia stands to gain considerably. First, diesel sales could increase foreign-currency earnings and bolster the financial resources available to sustain the war. With local governments facing mounting fiscal pressure from recruitment bonuses and war-related spending, additional energy revenue would benefit Russia. Second, the U.S. policy shift undermines the consistency of sanctions coordination. Finally, Russia can use the deal in its propaganda to argue that the West needs its fuel despite damage to its refineries.
By contrast, the price-stabilizing effect the United States may gain remains uncertain. The initial 300,000 metric tons amount to about 2.25 million barrels, less than the U.S. transportation sector's daily diesel consumption. It is hard not to ask how large a strategic cost was accepted in pursuit of an uncertain price-stabilizing effect.
A more serious problem is the policy contradiction between existing sanctions and new ones. A new sanctions law targeting countries that buy Russian energy was enacted in September. Yet, following the announcement of the diesel deal, President Trump issued an executive order on October 16 exempting the deal from sanctions, restrictions, and tariffs under that law. This is not a case of a pending bill being derailed; it is a case of the administration holding back the enforcement of a pressure tool established by Congress. It has become much harder to explain the consistency of U.S. policy when asking third countries that buy Russian energy to cooperate.
The central aim of sanctions against Russia is to make it harder for the country both to obtain strategic technologies and to finance the war. The effectiveness of sanctions depends not only on the strength of the measures, but also on the ability to prevent sanctions evasion and on the cooperation of participating countries. That is why the Biden administration coordinated a price cap with Europe and the Group of Seven (G7), while expanding export-control coordination with partners such as South Korea.
The principle needed, therefore, is to maintain a system of cohesion that is explainable and jointly managed. Temporary authorizations to address humanitarian needs and supply shocks are possible within a sanctions framework. But for an exception to serve shared objectives, its scope, duration, terms, and review criteria must be clear. Above all, major participants must share the reasons for and costs of a policy change. Experts at the Council on Foreign Relations also voiced concern about the deal's impact on transatlantic ties, reflecting the view that the United States changed the terms of joint pressure without sufficiently consulting Europe.
Europe has borne the costs of shifting supplies and the burden on industry as it has substantially reduced its reliance on Russian energy. Although it has not completely severed ties with Russian fossil fuels, it has institutionalized its efforts to reduce dependence while maintaining pressure through sanctions. In this context, if the United States pursues a separate deal on the grounds of domestic prices, questions about the fairness of sharing the burden are inevitable. Other participants may also have greater incentive to seek exemptions for themselves, weakening the political will to jointly curb sanctions evasion. Multilateral coordination can falter through this cumulative erosion of trust.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Donald Trump. AI-generated image
View original imageThis is also why bipartisan opposition has emerged in the U.S. Congress. Twelve senators, including Republicans, called for the deal to be scrapped in a joint letter on October 13. The legal controversy should be considered separately, but the concern that sanctions relief must be linked to changes in Russia's behavior carries weight. The U.S. administration says the deal could bring Russia to the negotiating table. If so, it must specify what concessions it will demand, how compliance will be verified, and what measures will be restored in the event of noncompliance. Offering an incentive without clearly stating the conditions diminishes the value of the negotiating leverage itself.
It is too early to predict that this deal alone will cause the collapse of the entire multilateral sanctions regime. But the growing uncertainty over whether the United States may change shared rules in response to domestic political needs is a serious problem. Policy predictability also matters to companies that have complied with sanctions and given up business. Inconsistent enforcement raises the cost of future cooperation and weakens the United States' ability to persuade others when it asks them to join new economic security measures. The credibility of sanctions comes not from tough rhetoric, but from clear conditions and consistent enforcement.
The success of multilateral sanctions depends not only on their scope, but also on the ability to prevent sanctions evasion and on the cooperation of participating countries. When evaluating U.S. requests for cooperation, allies, including South Korea, should examine not only the shared objectives but also the criteria for exemptions, burden-sharing, and procedures for changing policy. Strategic autonomy comes not from rejecting cooperation, but from the ability to carefully design its terms.
Hot Picks Today
"Two Spend 500,000 Won in a Flash, Yet Wait Two Hours?" ... 'Dreamland' Shunned by Kids and Foreign Tourists
- The Era of Getting 200 Million Won After 30 Years Is Over... A Japanese Bank's "Perpetual Department Head" Who Just Clocked In Cries Out
- Spain Hit by Its Worst Tragedy... Lee Kangin, Moreno and Real Madrid Join Soccer World in Mourning
- They Said, “Make It Your Home for Life” - Then Suddenly Kicked 200 Passengers Off... What Happened to the Around-the-World Cruise?
- "130 Rice Bowls Sold Out in a Day"... 'Unfiltered Face' Adds 8 Million Won to Night Market Sales: China's Bungeunwoo
Jung In-kyo, Professor of International Trade at Inha University and former Minister for Trade
© The Asia Business Daily. All rights reserved. Unauthorized AI training and use prohibited.