[Jeong Ingyo's Trade-Off] U.S.-China Tariff Truce Extended by Two Months... What Did Trump Gain?
Limits exposed by Xi's ability to retaliate
Criticized for giving China time to respond
Ahead of high-stakes negotiations after the midterms
Seen as a temporary, time-limited breather
After meeting in Busan in October last year and in Beijing this May, U.S. President Donald Trump invited Chinese President Xi Jinping to Washington last month for a third summit. Neither of the first two meetings went according to either side's plans. So why stage another one? What was Trump, who calls himself a “master negotiator” and has pressured opponents from a position of strength, actually trying to achieve in the three meetings?
Trump once again presented the outcome in favorable terms, but the assessment in Washington is cynical. China hawks, as well as political circles and the media, have condemned it as “a loss on points and a self-defeating retreat” and “showmanship that exposed his weakness.” The central argument is that Trump's bluffing hit its limits against Xi's capacity for real retaliation, while his “punching down” tactic of targeting only weaker opponents and his image as a “master of the deal” both collapsed. Critics also say the outcome was an unequal stopgap that gave Xi Jinping, the Chinese president, more time to respond without securing anything for the United States.
The most notable result was that the “trade truce,” originally due to expire on November 10, 2026, was extended by just two months, until January 10, 2027. Even with the threat of steep tariffs as his strongest pressure tactic, Trump failed to resolve China's failure to fulfill its agricultural purchase commitments or its controls on rare earths, while the package of arms sales to Taiwan remains frozen. This has drawn bipartisan criticism that Trump, who imposed 50% tariffs on U.S. ally Canada, adopted a submissive stance and clung to talks when confronted with China's critical-minerals leverage.
The first reason Trump's pressure failed was China's ability to retaliate. In response to U.S. restrictions on advanced semiconductors and artificial intelligence (AI), tariffs, and additions to the Entity List, China has steadily built up its countermeasures through retaliatory export controls, the codification of unilateral sanctions, and the weaponization of critical resources. Shortly after the Beijing summit, on June 8, 2026, the U.S. Department of Defense added Alibaba, Baidu, BYD, and others to its list of Chinese military companies (1260H). On June 22, China added 10 U.S. companies linked to the defense industry, including MP Materials, to its export control list and blocked exports of dual-use items. Then, after the United States tightened regulations in the communications, certification, and drone sectors in August and added more than 40 Chinese companies to the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act list, China restricted the operations of seven U.S. companies, tightened reviews of drone exports, and stopped using U.S. certification bodies. China's retaliatory tools have expanded beyond critical minerals to encompass business operations, certification, and technology products.
The second reason was the asymmetry in the agenda. Trump viewed a summit not as a careful diplomatic process for resolving structural problems, but as a venue for short-term gains, where he could secure visible “deals” such as promises to buy agricultural products and Boeing aircraft or tariff suspensions to tout to the media. Xi, by contrast, rejected unilateral concessions and focused on strategic stability, seeking to formalize an equal relationship between major powers, described as a “new type of great-power relations,” and to manage tensions between the two countries within a framework that both sides could control. With their goals so different, no matter how much Trump applied pressure, Xi could draw out the process and demand equal standing. As a result, assessments that each summit produced little in the way of tangible gains were repeated.
The third reason was the domestic political situation. Trump has repeatedly stirred up uncertainty by rocking the boat himself, then tried to turn the tide with “dramatic summits” when backed into a corner. With his approval rating falling into the 30% range amid the prolonged war with Iran and high inflation, and the burden of a national debt approaching $40 trillion, the midterm elections just a month away took priority over national strategy. As tariffs and export controls fueled mounting alarm among manufacturers and Big Tech companies, Trump invited large numbers of tech executives, including Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, to a dinner in an effort to reassure markets. The response was lukewarm, however, and the move did little to win over farmers and businesses.
Trump may have shown that he was managing relations with China, but whether that amounted to a strategic achievement for the United States is another question. The real measure is whether China's behavior changed on critical-mineral supply chains, technological superiority, Taiwan's security, and implementation of trade agreements. Xi, meanwhile, used his visit to Washington, D.C., to send a clear message at home and abroad: China is an equal member of the G2 and will not yield to U.S. pressure.
That said, the summit cannot be viewed as a failure alone. The United States needs China's rare earths, agricultural market, and manufacturing demand, while China cannot afford the cost of severing ties with U.S. markets, technology, and finance. Caught in the paradox of holding tools of pressure while needing to manage the costs those tools impose on their own economies, both countries use summits less to reach major agreements than to delay confrontations they cannot afford. The United States has not stopped competing; it is managing competition through summit diplomacy. It is more accurate, however, to say that Trump has adjusted his goals and methods in response to China's actions and U.S. economic needs than to say he carefully designed this process.
Does the two-month extension of the truce mean that the United States has strong or weak bargaining power? The answer is both. By not locking in a long-term truce, the United States retained the leverage of reimposing tariffs. China wanted a truce lasting more than a year, but Trump rejected that proposal, citing China's insufficient fulfillment of its commitments. He also wanted to push the issue until after the midterm elections and assess whether the “grand deal” China had offered would deliver real value. Yet the United States could not let tensions escalate indefinitely because of its dependence on China's rare earths and critical minerals. The short truce is both a way for the United States to project its bargaining power and a signal that it has not secured terms favorable enough to finalize a long-term agreement.
Ultimately, the two-month extension of the tariff truce through January 10, 2027, is a reprieve, not peace. The fact that the truce, which began in Busan, passed through Beijing and Washington, D.C., without resolving the core issues shows the gap between the United States' negotiating objectives and its actual results. It is merely a temporary measure adopted by the two countries to prevent renewed conflict and keep negotiations going without reaching agreement on a long-term trade order. These two months are a precarious, time-limited pause, with both sides keeping their swords drawn ahead of the real high-stakes showdown expected after the midterm elections.
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Jung Inkyo, Professor of International Trade at Inha University and former Minister for Trade
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