Kim Jung-kwan, Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy, attended the plenary session of the Industry, Trade, Resources and SMEs Committee held at the National Assembly on the 22nd and gave a speech. On this day, Minister Kim reported the progress and detailed contents of the investment negotiation with the United States confidentially. Photo by Dongju Yoon

Kim Jung-kwan, Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy, attended the plenary session of the Industry, Trade, Resources and SMEs Committee held at the National Assembly on the 22nd and gave a speech. On this day, Minister Kim reported the progress and detailed contents of the investment negotiation with the United States confidentially. Photo by Dongju Yoon

View original image

As the government reported its first major strategic investment initiative in the United States to the National Assembly, the issue of “commercial reasonableness” has come to the forefront once again. Given the burden this places on the public, it is essential to thoroughly review both the recovery of invested capital and the participation of domestic companies. However, focusing solely on commercial viability risks overlooking the true nature of these negotiations. The 350 billion dollar investment in the United States was largely a necessary response to ease American tariff pressure, rather than a business initiative aimed at securing high returns. The overall negotiations should not be assessed based solely on the return from individual projects.


The Korea-U.S. Strategic Investment Act reflects these realities. It allows for exceptions to the standard of commercial reasonableness if there are unavoidable reasons such as national security or supply chain stability. In these cases, projects that are not sufficiently commercially viable can be pursued with the approval of the National Assembly. Projects with confirmed profitability should proceed only after carefully assessing risk and the structure for recovering the investment, while projects that lack profitability require an explanation of the expected costs and benefits, followed by a decision from the National Assembly.


Endless rounds of verification must be avoided. If reporting to the National Assembly or negotiation schedules are continuously delayed, the uncertainty falls squarely on the companies involved. The National Assembly needs to be clear about what aspects must be verified and set definite deadlines for reaching a conclusion. It must also avoid the practice of assigning blame to working-level officials simply because results fall short of expectations, as long as decisions were made through predetermined procedures and due process.


The more pressing question is what Korea will secure in exchange for shouldering a massive financial burden. Beyond expanding domestic firms’ access to the U.S. market and participation in supply chains, progress in Korea-U.S. security cooperation must also be considered. Issues such as nuclear-powered submarines, uranium enrichment and reprocessing, or matters related to U.S. Forces Korea cannot be directly bartered for any specific investment. However, the extent to which anticipated results in industry, trade, and security materialize during the period of Korea’s economic commitment will be the major standard in assessing the overall cost-benefit outcome.



Commercial reasonableness should remain a guiding principle, but should not be used as a pretext to halt negotiations. Projects lacking profitability must be vetted according to procedures prescribed by law, and a corresponding level of strategic interests should be demanded. The government and National Assembly must carefully assess what Korea gains in return for the sacrifices made—and by when these outcomes will be realized.


This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.

© The Asia Business Daily. All rights reserved. Unauthorized AI training and use prohibited.

Today’s Briefing