Oligopoly and Monopoly Destroy Market Mechanisms

Economic Monopolies Face the Sword, Political Monopolies Face Silence

The Two Major Parties Force a 'Lesser Evil' Choice

Loss of Incentives to Improve Policy Quality

Democracy’s 'Resource Allocation Function' Paralyzed

Can Real Change Come Only with the Collapse of the Current Party Order?

The Cabinet meeting is broadcast through YouTube. One issue that frequently emerges through these broadcasts is President Lee Jaemyung's criticism of monopoly and oligopoly problems in the market.


In economics, oligopoly and monopoly are classic examples of market failure that undermine the very mechanisms of the market. They artificially restrict supply, prevent the formation of fair prices, and eventually drive up prices, lower quality, and result in inefficient allocation of resources—ultimately harming consumer welfare as a critical defect. Modern legal systems generally deploy institutional enforcement mechanisms such as antitrust laws to prevent such oligopoly and monopoly phenomena, punishing collusion and dismantling monopolistic market structures. In Korea, regulatory authorities such as the Fair Trade Commission also promote competition and regulate the abuse of monopolistic power. As instructed by the president, penalties for such behavior must become even stricter, and rewards for whistleblowers should be further increased going forward. However, there is a type of monopoly problem that is even more influential and deeply rooted than those in the market: the political monopoly structure commonly found in our daily political environment, especially the system dominated by two major parties.


The appointment consent bill for Supreme Court nominee Sungsoo Kim passed the plenary session of the National Assembly on the 17th. Among 268 members present, the nominee's appointment consent bill was approved with 227 votes in favor, 28 against, and 13 abstentions. September 17, 2026 Photo by Dongju Yoon

The appointment consent bill for Supreme Court nominee Sungsoo Kim passed the plenary session of the National Assembly on the 17th. Among 268 members present, the nominee's appointment consent bill was approved with 227 votes in favor, 28 against, and 13 abstentions. September 17, 2026 Photo by Dongju Yoon

View original image

From an economic perspective, the political marketplace is also a kind of exchange system in which policies and visions are offered to voters in return for votes. Political monopoly refers to a situation where certain political groups or the two major parties effectively restrict the choices available to voters and establish barriers to entry for new political forces, thereby monopolizing power. Economist Joseph Schumpeter defined democracy as 'the free competition for power among political leaders.' Just as free competition among firms in the marketplace enhances consumer welfare, vigorous competition for power in the political marketplace provides voters with the best possible policy services. However, when political monopoly takes hold, political suppliers lose the incentive to respond to voter demands by improving the quality of their policies.


Another major negative consequence of political monopoly is the restriction of voter choice. A political monopoly system enforces a binary selection structure. Under such a structure, the choices available to voters are extremely limited. Much like monopoly firms that can turn a profit without improving their products, monopolistic parties maintain their hold on power—not by innovating to improve people’s lives, but by intensifying negative politics. Theoretically, this is explained by ‘Duverger’s Law’: when single-member districts are combined with first-past-the-post voting, voters are compelled to choose strategically between the two leading parties to avoid wasting their votes, even if that choice is simply the lesser of two evils. Inevitably, this entrenches a two-party monopoly system, sharply reduces voters’ sense of political efficacy, and deepens political distrust. In a structure where power is determined by 'choosing the lesser evil,' political parties survive by adopting 'demonization strategies' that rally their base by attacking the opposition. The two major parties define each other not as partners in governing but as adversaries that must be destroyed, thereby maximizing their political gain.


Unlike the monopoly issues observed in market economies, solutions for political monopoly problems are much harder to find. That is because those who should be the main agents of reform—political powerholders themselves—are the very beneficiaries of this monopolistic structure. According to Public Choice Theory in economics, politicians and parties act as rational economic agents seeking to maximize their own interests—in this case, power retention and expansion. In this light, 'rent-seeking behavior'—politicians’ efforts to maintain power by leveraging their lawmaking and budgetary authority in monopolistic situations—is entirely predictable. Forces that monopolize the political marketplace transform from being representatives of civil society into 'distributors of national resources and self-sufficient power groups,' raising institutional barriers to block potential competitors. In this process, the two major parties may fiercely criticize each other, but when it comes to preventing new parties from entering the arena, they display perfect collusion—a form of adversarial symbiosis. As a result, even when political power changes hands, the dominant parties remain the same and the overall vested interest structure of the political sphere does not change.


This significantly impairs both efficiency and accountability in state governance. In this regard, the phenomenon of political monopoly is far more dangerous and deadly than economic monopoly. While economic monopoly results only in the price increase of certain goods, political monopoly leads to the destruction of public interest at the national level, extreme polarization of social conflict, and the regression of democracy itself. As long as the oligopolistic structure of the political marketplace exists, the decline of voter welfare and misallocation of resources—namely national capability—become an almost structural inevitability.


Kim Minseok, leader of the Democratic Party of Korea, is speaking at a National Assembly members' workshop held at Inspire Resort in Yeongjong-gu, Incheon, on August 28, 2026. Photo by Kim Hyunmin

Kim Minseok, leader of the Democratic Party of Korea, is speaking at a National Assembly members' workshop held at Inspire Resort in Yeongjong-gu, Incheon, on August 28, 2026. Photo by Kim Hyunmin

View original image
On the 22nd, the Grand National Party hosted the "Lee Jae-myung Administration’s Mismanagement Public Report Meeting" on the steps in front of the National Assembly Building. Attending lawmakers, including Representative Donghyuk Jang and Floor Leader Jeongsik Jeong, are shouting slogans at the event. 2026.09.22 Photo by Dongjoo Yoon

On the 22nd, the Grand National Party hosted the "Lee Jae-myung Administration’s Mismanagement Public Report Meeting" on the steps in front of the National Assembly Building. Attending lawmakers, including Representative Donghyuk Jang and Floor Leader Jeongsik Jeong, are shouting slogans at the event. 2026.09.22 Photo by Dongjoo Yoon

View original image

The monopoly of politics is the outcome of a structural failure created by the intersection of human nature, which is reluctant to surrender vested interests, and the institutional flaws that accommodate it. Just as monopoly firms stop innovating and squeeze consumer wallets through high prices, monopolistic parties cease policy innovation and fuel ideological animosity and partisan conflict to secure power from the people. Voters are trapped in a system where they are compelled to choose between two extreme monopolistic suppliers. Like consumers forced to buy subpar products for lack of alternatives, voters without political alternatives must cast their ballots even knowing they're not voting for the best option. Free and fair competition among firms is essential for a healthy market economy; by the same token, fair competition in the political marketplace is indispensable for a healthy democracy. However, those benefiting from the monopolistic status quo can never be expected to solve the phenomenon of political monopoly themselves.


The political marketplace's monopoly is a fatal form of 'market failure' that erodes the efficacy of democracy. It restricts voter choices in ways that are far more insidious and structural than economic monopolies, and it paralyzes democracy’s resource allocation function. Real change may not be possible until the existing party order collapses entirely.



[Kim Sangcheol's Economic Focus] Who Regulates the Political Monopoly? View original image

Sangcheol Kim, Economic Commentator


This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.

© The Asia Business Daily. All rights reserved. Unauthorized AI training and use prohibited.

Today’s Briefing