Swope: Commercial Satellites Face Targeting Risks, South Korea Must Strengthen Space Resilience

Clayton Swope, Deputy Director of the CSIS Aerospace Security Project
World Emerging Security Forum (WESF)

"Companies that are building satellites and operating them should be fully aware of the challenges and responsibilities they are taking on."

Clayton Swope, Deputy Director of the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), is being interviewed by The Asia Business Daily at the Grand Hyatt Seoul. Photo by Jo Yongjun

Clayton Swope, Deputy Director of the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), stated that commercial satellite operators must recognize the risks associated with delivering capabilities that can be utilized for military purposes.

Swope emphasized that even satellites providing only a partial service to governments or militaries could become targets during conflict. "They should be aware that in a conflict, they will be targeted just like a government system—potentially even more easily than a government asset," he said. Swope shared these views during an interview with The Asia Business Daily at the Grand Hyatt Seoul, where he was attending the World Emerging Security Forum (WESF) on September 9, 2026.

Swope also serves as a senior fellow in the Defense and Security Department at CSIS. Prior to joining CSIS, he led national security and cybersecurity public policy for Amazon's satellite communications business and worked on cloud policy. He previously served as a senior advisor to a member of the U.S. House of Representatives in the fields of national security, space, foreign affairs, and technology policy. He also spent over 14 years at the Central Intelligence Agency, mainly within the Directorate of Science and Technology.

Swope described space as an "enabling backbone" for modern joint operations, supporting communications, positioning, navigation and timing (PNT), intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), real-time tracking and targeting, and missile warning and tracking. In the event of a conflict between states, he explained that both sides would likely attempt early on to degrade or destroy each other's ability to leverage space.

Regarding North Korea, Swope said he is more concerned about Pyongyang acquiring space capabilities from nations like China or Russia than about what one or two North Korean reconnaissance satellites could do independently. He also cited the Korean Positioning System (KPS) as a means to improve resilience, suggesting South Korea and the United States should build multiple redundant layers that include governmental, commercial, and allied capabilities.

Clayton Swope, Deputy Director of the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), is being interviewed by The Asia Business Daily at the Grand Hyatt Seoul. Photo by Jo Yongjun

Q. Commercial satellites have played a critical role in the war in Ukraine, not only in communications but also in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Should we now consider access to space indispensable to modern warfare?

A. I believe space-based services and capabilities are enormous enablers for operations on Earth. Warfare on the ground truly depends on access to space. If one nation involved in conflict has access to space and its adversary does not, that creates a significant asymmetric advantage for the one with access. Conversely, if neither side has access, both are at a disadvantage, but it would be a level playing field. I liken it to the First World War: Germany only built 20 tanks while the Allies built 8,000. The massive disparity provided the Allies with a substantial edge. A parallel can be drawn to modern conflicts—a nation with access to space enjoys an overwhelming advantage over one that does not.

Q. Would countries that fail to establish an advantage in space increasingly struggle to win wars on the ground?

A. I do think that if one side is expected to have access to space, the other must secure the same, or it faces a significant disadvantage. In modern conflicts, if your opponent can leverage space for communications, intelligence, surveillance, and for services like positioning, navigation, and timing through systems such as GPS and KPS, while you cannot, you are severely handicapped.

Q. As countries become more dependent on commercial satellite services for military operations, what risks do private companies face?

A. In many segments of the space economy, the primary customer is a government body, often specifically the military. Companies build systems for Earth observation and remote sensing, and their main clients may be government agencies or militaries, so companies building and operating satellites must understand precisely what they are getting involved with. They are essentially providing capabilities for military use. This differs from previous eras, when governments owned and controlled such systems. Some space-based services—such as connectivity and communications offered by systems like Starlink—serve many non-government and non-military customers, which creates different dynamics. Nevertheless, even those providing only a portion of their services to governments or militaries must understand that, in times of conflict, they could be targeted like government systems—perhaps even more so than government-owned assets.

We've already observed cyberattacks, jamming, and spoofing. Such disruptions affect not only government satellites but also non-governmental and commercial ones. These activities are currently underway.

To me, it's clear that during conflict, nations seek to deprive adversaries of access to space, even if that means targeting commercial satellites.

Q. How should private companies account for that risk?

A. Companies must factor such risk into their business assessments and remain conscious of it. This is not an issue unique to U.S. companies—currently, Chinese companies are also providing remote-sensing services, and Korean interest in such commercial satellite operations is growing. European and Japanese firms are involved as well. Consequently, this risk spans various countries and firms worldwide.

At some stage, we must acknowledge that we have created this dilemma ourselves by purchasing commercial services like Earth observation data to enhance resilience, defensive measures, and national security—believing it adds value.

But simultaneously, companies now need to recognize the burden that they might become military targets in a conflict.

Q. How do you see the cybersecurity risks facing commercial satellites?

A. Satellites provide services that are viewed as critical infrastructure—telecommunications, for example. Whether the network is satellite-based, uses fiber-optic cables, or is a computer network, such infrastructure is a prime target for hackers, state-sponsored actors, or criminals looking to exploit vulnerabilities for financial or other motives.

This risk extends from the ground into space; any system that would be a target for cyberattack on Earth is equally a target in orbit. The distinction between government-owned and company-owned matters little to hackers. Their objectives may range from information theft to causing physical damage.

This is a major issue across all critical infrastructure, extending from Earth's surface into space. We ought to treat space with the same urgency, addressing it as an integral part of our broader concerns about vulnerabilities in cyberspace.

I would add the electromagnetic spectrum, jamming, and spoofing—which are particularly critical for satellites, as the only means of communication with them is via radio-frequency signals.

Q. Are cyberattacks, jamming, and spoofing likely to become more important because they can disrupt space-based services without physically destroying satellites?

A. In full-scale conflict between two nations, a wide range of tactics could be used, ranging from destructive kinetic weapons to jamming, spoofing, and cyberattacks.

When considering gray-zone tactics—such as cyberattacks, jamming, and spoofing—they often occur when two nations are in conflict while a third party is somehow involved.

For example, that third country may be providing a service to one belligerent, or may be involved via a separate relationship. Even if it wishes to remain neutral, its involvement persists. These are cases where gray-zone tactics become prevalent, and presently, they do not appear to provoke an immediate escalation.

We now observe such tactics in the electromagnetic spectrum. Even countries not directly involved in the Ukraine conflict—like the Baltic states, Finland, and nations surrounding the Black Sea—experience constant jamming and spoofing of GPS signals. These activities currently occur below the threshold that would trigger an escalatory response.

Q. The war in Ukraine is often described as a drone war, but drone operations themselves rely heavily on satellite communications and GPS. How should we understand the role of space in modern warfare?

A. I believe we should regard space as an enabling backbone for current joint military operations. This encompasses not only drone missions but also operations at sea and on land.

Space underpins communications, positioning, navigation, timing, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Essential activities such as real-time tracking and targeting and missile warning and tracking are all made possible by space, which serves as the backbone of these functions.

Without space, the capabilities of joint forces—including drone operations—are markedly reduced.

It may not be appropriate to label this a "space war," but moving forward, space will play a huge role in every conflict.

Q. Does growing dependence on space also create new vulnerabilities?

A. It reminds me of today’s concerns about supply-chain risks.

It’s one thing to consider where something is manufactured, but more important is to scrutinize where each component is made and the origin of various parts that comprise the final product. This approach is necessary to analyze our dependence on space. We need to identify all activities essential for national security and defense, determine all the touchpoints connected to space, and understand those relationships. Ultimately, we must determine how to protect and defend these dependencies—a formidable challenge requiring a broad scope of defense.

Q. At what point should a cyberattack or jamming operation that disrupts satellite services be considered an armed attack warranting a military response?

A. That is a difficult question for which there is no single answer, as it depends greatly on specific circumstances and scenarios.

In any conflict where escalation is possible, space assets will be targeted. During crises where escalation needs to be contained, decision-makers act with greater caution. The principle applies across all military domains: you strive to avoid unintentional escalation.

Physical or kinetic attacks—such as launching a missile or dropping a bomb—constitute clear escalation in any domain, and the same rule applies to space.

Q. Given the role commercial satellite networks have played in Ukraine, could they play a similarly important role in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait? Would China try to disable those networks early in a conflict?

A. One historical comparison stands out: one of the first hostile acts Great Britain committed against Germany at the outset of World War I was to sever the undersea cables connecting Germany to the rest of the world.

I believe that in any major conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the People's Liberation Army would seek to cut off Taiwan's communications—satellites play a significant part here. In addition to their economic and societal contributions, satellites possess immense military utility. Blinding the opposing military is critical, and much of the information a military requires comes from space-based systems.

Thus, in addition to cutting communication links, blinding Taiwan would be a key objective—both of which are closely related to space.

That also encompasses positioning, navigation, and timing. It's not solely about situational awareness, but also about knowing one's position. Countless types of munitions, as well as ground, naval, and air forces, depend on signals from space for navigation.

Would such actions be undertaken at the outset? I don’t think every step would be taken immediately. The most readily available measures are jamming, spoofing, and exploiting vulnerabilities in cyberspace.

If escalation rises—to the point where munitions are being launched—then yes, space infrastructure and satellites would become targets.

The satellites most vulnerable to kinetic attacks would likely be those owned and operated by the Taiwanese government or Taiwanese companies. There might be initial reluctance to strike the satellites of other nations, such as those of the United States or other foreign countries, unless they are directly involved in the conflict. However, Taiwanese-owned and operated satellites would likely be top-priority targets.

Q. How do you assess China's space capabilities in the context of U.S.-China strategic competition?

A. I consider China to be the second-most significant space power globally across various sectors, including national security, civilian space, exploration, and the economy.

Looking at basic metrics like annual launch numbers, China ranks second only to the United States.

The trend I am following most closely is China's ability to scale up its launch cadence using reusable rockets. They have already tested two rockets that can land vertically, similar to SpaceX’s Falcon 9. The question is whether they can produce these rockets at scale and further increase their launch rate.

The next question is whether China can rapidly manufacture satellites and assemble large constellations akin to Starlink. China is currently planning at least five major constellations—some have already seen satellite launches.

Whether they can complete these constellations and operate multiple systems similar to Starlink—providing both communications and potentially Earth observation—is also crucial.

These two elements—a robust cadence of reusable rocket launches and mass satellite manufacturing—are what enabled SpaceX to dominate the sector.

China is still in the process of developing such capabilities. Once these two factors are in place, China may begin to reach parity with SpaceX or the United States in some fields, such as connectivity.

Q. North Korea continues to develop its space capabilities, while concerns are also growing over cyber operations attributed to Pyongyang. Should we be concerned about North Korea combining its space capabilities with cyber and electronic warfare?

A. First, regarding cyber capabilities: these are especially worrisome as they are relatively easy to deploy—they require little specific hardware and can be launched from almost anywhere. The cyber threat encompasses space but also extends to terrestrial infrastructure supporting space operations and to satellites themselves.

Second, there is the threat of jamming and spoofing, particularly targeting GPS and other positioning, navigation, and timing signals.

This is why I believe the Korean Positioning System (KPS), which South Korea is seeking to develop, is essential for resilience. If any system becomes unavailable—regardless of the cause—there must be an alternative.

This redundancy benefits not just Korea but also the alliance, the United States, and other regional partners. Concerning further space capabilities, North Korea is indeed striving to launch and operate satellites, though its success so far has been limited.

When I think about North Korea’s possible satellite capabilities—intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance—I am more concerned about them acquiring such services from abroad. For example, could they purchase them from a Chinese or Russian provider? Russia is building a Starlink-like satellite constellation. Would they sell access to North Korea? Rather than focusing exclusively on North Korea’s indigenous satellite and launch development, it is important to look at the possibility of them buying such space-based services from sympathetic countries. That is a greater concern to me than the threat posed by just one or two North Korean reconnaissance satellites.

Q. The South Korea-U.S. alliance has traditionally focused on terrestrial operations. What space security capabilities does South Korea most urgently need to develop?

A. I think the starting point is to analyze how South Korea currently uses space for defense and national security.

By reviewing how national defense and security are practiced today and identifying areas that depend on space-based services, it becomes clear where improvements are needed.

I understand the alliance has typically prioritized terrestrial operations, but such an examination will highlight how vital space is even to those domains. Therefore, space capabilities should not be considered in isolation from terrestrial operations.

For both the U.S. and South Korea, the key focus remains recognizing and leveraging the value that space delivers to security.

Q. Should space security cooperation, including satellite intelligence sharing, space domain awareness, and responses to cyber and electronic warfare threats, become a core priority for the South Korea-U.S. alliance?

A. Yes—the same argument applies as with cybersecurity, since it affects everything. I view space as analogous to cybersecurity.

If I rely on a particular space-based service or capability, I imagine it as Swiss cheese—with holes—and I stack together several layers for resilience. One layer might be a Korean capability, another from the United States, another from private companies, and yet another from a European or Japanese government or commercial source. By layering multiple sources of resilience, you hope the vulnerabilities don't align. That's how space resilience should be structured.

Therefore, even if you say, "I don't want to rely on a U.S. company for ISR," or "I don't trust SpaceX or Starlink with that capability," you aren't necessarily reliant on a single layer; it's just one element among several.

I would give the same advice to the United States: seek as many redundancies as possible, so that if some layers fail, there are still alternatives delivering the needed capability.

This is the approach the alliance—and specifically South Korea—should adopt to build deeper resilience for joint operations reliant on space.

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.