IAEA: South Korea Officially Notifies Intent to Begin Nuclear-Powered Submarine Consultations

The South Korean government has officially notified its intent to begin consultations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to conclude an agreement essential for the introduction of nuclear-powered submarines. The government plans to launch the first submarine in the mid-2030s. Along with this announcement, the IAEA assessed that the new uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon in North Korea is either already operational or very close to coming online.

Raphael Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Photo by AFP Yonhap News

On September 7 (local time), at a press conference held at IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria, Rafael Grossi, Director General of the IAEA, stated that the South Korean government had officially conveyed its intention to start consultations related to nuclear-powered submarines to the Secretariat.

The subject of the consultations is a separate arrangement pursuant to Article 14 of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA). Director General Grossi conveyed that South Korea reaffirmed its commitment to abide by its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the CSA, and the Additional Protocol. He added, "South Korea has already submitted the relevant declaration documents to the IAEA Secretariat," and that he looks forward to continued consultations in the spirit of transparency.

The NPT, to which South Korea is a party, stipulates that non-nuclear-weapon states are prohibited from diverting nuclear material such as uranium for weapons development. To verify this, signatory countries must conclude a CSA with the IAEA and accept safeguards such as inspections. Article 14 of the CSA allows states without nuclear weapons to use nuclear material for non-prohibited military purposes via a separate arrangement with the IAEA. A representative example is a nuclear-powered submarine that uses nuclear fuel.

Through this agreement, the South Korean government is expected to preempt concerns about the potential diversion of nuclear materials to weapons and to demonstrate transparency to the international community. To this end, both parties will specifically discuss the period and conditions under which safeguards do not apply to nuclear material for submarines, procedures for reporting, and measures to protect military secrets. Once the arrangement is prepared, it will be submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors for further procedures. In May, South Korea announced its goal to launch its first nuclear-powered submarine by the mid-2030s and bring it into operational service by the late 2030s.

Director General Grossi previously stated in June that discussions with South Korea under Article 14 of the CSA were at an initial stage. Two months prior, during his visit to South Korea, the issue of safeguards in the process of introducing nuclear-powered submarines was discussed. At that time, South Korea and the IAEA agreed to cooperate closely under the principle of non-proliferation.

Director General Grossi was also asked about the operating status of the new uranium enrichment facility that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un inspected in June. He said, "The recent IAEA report on North Korea includes several elements that lead us to believe the facility is either operational or very close to operation." He explained that this building is similar in scale and infrastructure to the enrichment plant at Kangson and, judging from photos taken in June this year, appears to be equipped with the same type of centrifuges North Korea previously disclosed in other enrichment facilities.

The IAEA reports that the 5 MW (megawatt) reactor at Yongbyon remains in operation during its seventh inspection cycle. There are also indications that the Yongbyon light-water reactor, which had been shut down for some time, resumed operation at the end of April. Director General Grossi expressed deep concern, emphasizing that North Korea's continued expansion of weapons-grade nuclear material production is a clear violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions.

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.