While Separating Investigation and Prosecution Agencies,
Special Prosecutors Still Hold Both Powers
Where Are the Intentions of 'Dispersing Power' and 'Checks and Balances'?

[Reporter’s Notebook] Does the Principle of Prosecutorial Reform Stop at Special Prosecutors? View original image

Not long ago, while having a meal in Seocho-dong, a lawyer initiated a conversation. "There are just too many special prosecutors these days." At first, I thought he was referring to the sheer number of special prosecution teams. Since the Lee Jaemyung administration took office, five special prosecutors have been launched in succession, with discussions ongoing about additional ones. However, the real issue he raised was not just about the numbers. "If the problem with the prosecution is that it holds both the authority to investigate and to indict, why do special prosecutors still retain both powers?"


On October 2, the public prosecutor's office will close. Under a new criminal justice system, investigations into seven major crime areas—including corruption, economic crime, narcotics, and defense—will be handled by the Serious Crimes Investigation Agency, while indictment and prosecution will fall under the purview of the Prosecution Office. The central justification driving this prosecutorial reform was the dispersion of power: the goal is to separate investigative and prosecutorial bodies so that they can keep each other in check. Yet this principle halts at the door of the special prosecutor system. The special prosecutor conducts investigations directly. After investigation, they decide on indictments and even see the case through to trial. In other words, the very investigative and prosecutorial authorities set to be removed from the prosecution remain concentrated in the hands of special prosecutors. Of course, there are differences. Unlike the permanent public prosecution, special prosecutors are temporarily established for specific cases. Their scope is also strictly defined by law.


Nevertheless, the question does not disappear. If the problem is the combination of investigative and prosecutorial powers, why is it acceptable for special prosecutors? What is the rationale for considering it dangerous with prosecutors but safe with special prosecutors? Moreover, special prosecutors are hardly free from politics. The National Assembly passes the law and determines the subject of investigation. Each time a political controversy erupts, a special prosecutor appears. Entrusting such a body with both powerful authorities—investigation and prosecution—should, if anything, lead us to consider even more rigorous checks and balances.



The criticism directed at the prosecution in the past stemmed from the structure in which a single agency could conduct investigations, decide on indictments, and then bring the cases to court. The idea behind prosecutorial reform is that concentration of power makes it difficult to filter out misjudgments or excessive investigations. Reform should not end with simply splitting a single organization. It must involve establishing standards for dividing and balancing the investigative and prosecutorial powers of the state so that they can check each other. What must be eliminated is not the name "prosecution," but unchecked power itself.


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