Board of Audit and Inspection: “National Information Resources Service Fire Was Man-Made... Unregistered Contractor Used for Illegal Subcontracting”

Only One of Eight Battery Racks Powered Down; No Insulation During Work by Unregistered Contractor

Estimated Total Loss at 351.1 Billion Won Including Social Costs

Fire Response Manual Kept Only on Manager’s PC

Water-Based Firefightin

The Audit and Inspection Board has concluded that the fire at the Daejeon Center of the National Information Resources Service—which crippled 709 of the nation’s key information systems last year—was a “man-made disaster” caused by mismanagement. The incident was traced to the outsourcing of a lithium battery relocation project to an unlicensed contractor and the failure to adhere to even basic safety measures. After the fire broke out, the National Information Resources Service further exacerbated the damage by failing to follow its own manual, which required cutting off power and preparing waterproof tarps. Moreover, concerned about potential damage to the IT network, the agency requested that firefighters refrain from using water to extinguish the blaze, which delayed suppression efforts and worsened the extent of the losses.

On the 28th, fire, police, and National Forensic Service officials were moving to conduct a joint investigation at the fire site of the National Information Resources Service in Yuseong District, Daejeon. On the 26th, a fire occurred in a lithium-ion battery for an uninterruptible power supply (UPS) at the National Information Resources Service, which houses government computer systems, causing a large-scale disruption of government computer services. 2025.9.28 Yonhap News Agency

According to the Audit and Inspection Board’s announcement on the 7th, it detected a total of 18 violations and improper practices in its audit of the “Circumstances, Response, and Recovery Status of the National Information Resources Service Fire,” and requested disciplinary action for those responsible. The fire erupted around 8:16 p.m. on September 26 last year, in room 7-1 of the Daejeon Center’s computer room, when sparks ignited between battery racks No. 4 and 5 during the process of relocating lithium batteries. The fire was only fully extinguished at about 6 p.m. the following day, nearly 22 hours later. The computer room was completely destroyed, and services for 709 information systems were halted. The National Forensic Service believes that the primary cause was the failure to power down and insulate the cables on the battery racks, which are basic safety steps that should have been followed.

The audit revealed vulnerabilities at every stage of the project. In response to the 2022 fire at the Pangyo Data Center, the National Information Resources Service recognized the risks of having lithium batteries in the computer room and, in June of last year, ordered a battery relocation project worth KRW 3,040 million. However, one member of the joint contractors further subcontracted its portion of the work to another company, and this company again entrusted battery transport and the dismantling and reinstallation of racks to two firms that had not even registered as electrical construction businesses.

Despite having been notified that no staff from the joint contractor would be present at progress meetings and that only outside personnel would be involved, the National Information Resources Service failed to verify the actual contractor or whether it was registered for electrical work. There was also no requirement to prepare a work plan, nor was manufacturer technical support for the batteries obtained. As a result, dismantling was carried out with only one of the eight battery racks powered down. The Audit and Inspection Board concluded that sparks were generated because the end terminals of the cables were not properly insulated.

Poor Fire Response... Rejection of Fire Department’s Pre-Fire Safety Inspection

President Lee Jae Myung is speaking at the Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters meeting related to the fire at the National Intelligence Resources Service, held on the 28th at the Central Disaster Situation Room of the Government Seoul Building. 2025.09.28 Yonhap News Agency

The response to the fire was also inadequate. The agency’s own fire response manual stipulates that, in the event of a battery fire, all power to the computer room should be shut off and waterproof tarps prepared before firefighters arrive. However, these basic measures were not taken during the 10 minutes before the fire brigade arrived. Instead, when the fire department attempted to tackle the blaze using indoor fire hydrants, the National Information Resources Service requested that they refrain from using water to avoid damage to the computer network. As a result, full-scale water-based suppression only began at 11:13 p.m.—nearly three hours after the fire broke out.

The fire response manual itself was essentially useless. Although a revised fire response manual was drafted in October 2024, it was neither distributed to staff nor made widely accessible; it remained only on the responsible manager’s computer. The agency’s own fire drill last year was a mere formality, lasting around 10 minutes and only involved testing smoke detectors, without any training on lithium battery fires.

It was also confirmed that the National Information Resources Service refused a fire safety inspection prior to the incident. In May 2024, the section chief instructed staff to deny access to Yuseong Fire Station officers conducting a fire safety inspection, citing the computer room’s status as a secure area. As a result, the 7-1 computer room where the fire occurred, as well as computer rooms on floors 2 through 5, were not inspected. The Audit and Inspection Board requested disciplinary action against those responsible and notified the National Fire Agency to consider legal action.

Disaster Recovery System Also Inadequate

On the morning of the 29th, police officials are moving the lithium-ion batteries for the uninterruptible power supply (UPS) that caught fire at the National Information Resources Service in Yuseong District, Daejeon. Earlier, on the 26th, a lithium-ion battery fire occurred at the National Information Resources Service, which houses government computer systems, causing a large-scale disruption of government IT services. September 29, 2025. Photo by Yonhap News.

The fire also exposed the serious inadequacies of the disaster recovery system for government IT infrastructure. At the time of the fire, only 54 out of 709 systems—just 7.6%—had separate disaster recovery platforms in place. Of these, only seven systems, or 0.98% of the total, were actually used for recovery. There were no existing disaster recovery plans specifying restoration priorities or target times. As a result, of the 58 systems designated for top-priority restoration, 12 took longer than three weeks to recover, with 10 of them requiring close to a month to return to normal service.

Backup management was also lax. Of 690 backup storage units, 237 were housed in the same computer rooms as their original data. Some systems lost both original and backup data in the fire. Additionally, it was found that 501 systems—representing 72.6% of all information systems—had not conducted a single restoration drill since 2015.

The National Information Resources Service estimated direct facility damages at KRW 10.7 billion based on replacement value. However, after the Audit and Inspection Board commissioned the Korean Association for Public Administration to analyze social costs such as administrative service disruptions and data loss, the total damages were assessed at KRW 35.11 billion. Of this, KRW 12.55 billion was attributed to losses of work-related files—such as those stored in G-Drive—while the opportunity cost to citizens due to interruption of government services was calculated at KRW 8.85 billion.

The Audit and Inspection Board concluded, “From fire prevention and initial response to incident management and disaster recovery, the most fundamental standards and principles were not upheld.” The agency determined that if even these basics had been followed, the fire might have been prevented or its impact greatly reduced, and thus classified this incident as a man-made disaster caused by mismanagement. The Board recommended at least minor disciplinary action for the managers and section chief who mishandled the project, and severe disciplinary action equivalent to suspension for the team leader. The National Information Resources Service was also directed to pursue sanctions against the contractors involved and to seek compensation for damages.

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.