[Defense Brief] Wartime OPCON Transfer Must Be Free from Political Logic View original image

Operational control in wartime—commonly referred to as wartime OPCON—refers to the authority to command the operations of South Korean forces and U.S. reinforcement troops on the Korean Peninsula in the event of an emergency. It is a matter of determining who holds command authority. Currently, if a wartime situation arises, the United States commands the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command, while South Korean forces provide support. Operational control is divided into peacetime OPCON and wartime OPCON.


The history of wartime OPCON dates back to the early stages of the Korean War. On July 14, 1950, then-President Syngman Rhee transferred South Korea’s “operational command authority” to General Douglas MacArthur, the commander of the United Nations (UN) forces. This transferred authority was later slated for transition back to South Korea, as agreed during the summit between then-President Roh Moo-hyun and U.S. President George W. Bush on September 16, 2006. On February 23 of the following year, then-Minister of National Defense Kim Jangsoo and U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates agreed to set the transfer date for April 17, 2012.


The situation changed with the inauguration of the Lee Myung-bak administration. Conservative factions began calling for a postponement of the OPCON transfer. When the sinking of the Cheonan warship occurred on March 26, 2010, discussions on delaying the OPCON transfer intensified. Then-President Lee Myung-bak and U.S. President Barack Obama held a summit in Toronto on June 26 of that year and agreed to defer the transfer date by three years and seven months, setting it for December 1, 2015. The main reasons for delaying the transfer were the growing threats to security and stability on the Korean Peninsula, which were cited independently as a result of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile development, as well as the sinking of the Cheonan and other military provocations by North Korea.


Even after the inauguration of the Park Geun-hye administration, there was renewed sentiment in favor of further postponing the OPCON transfer. In 2013, then-Minister of National Defense Kim Kwanjin proposed to U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel that the OPCON transfer be based not on a timeline, but on conditions. At the South Korea-U.S. annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) held in Seoul in 2016, both sides agreed to pursue a conditions-based transition and to conduct working-level consultations regarding the conditions and timing of the transfer. Subsequently, President Park Geun-hye and President Obama officially announced a “review of the timing and conditions for OPCON transfer.” Under the current administration, the stance has shifted again. The objective is now to complete the OPCON transfer within the current term.


For the South Korean military to regain wartime OPCON, it must first secure independent response capabilities against North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats. The Korean-style three-axis system must be established. The three-axis system consists of “Kill Chain, KAMD (Korea Air and Missile Defense), and KMPR (Korean Massive Punishment and Retaliation).” Kill Chain refers to proactive operations aimed at preemptively detecting and neutralizing the source of North Korea’s nuclear and missile launches. KAMD is the defense operation of intercepting enemy missiles in the air before impact. KMPR is the retaliatory operation of annihilating enemy leadership and command after sustaining an attack.


Verification is also necessary. This is why joint South Korea-U.S. military exercises are essential. Despite their importance, this year, combined exercises involving about 20,000 troops from both countries were suspended, following President Donald Trump's order to significantly reduce the Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) joint exercises. Even ongoing outdoor maneuver drills were canceled. If training scale reductions or suspensions continue from next year onward, there will inevitably be major changes not only to North Korea’s nuclear deterrence capabilities but also to the security landscape across Northeast Asia.


North Korea’s military capabilities must also be considered. North Korea has already advanced and deployed its nuclear weapons and missiles in real operations. Diplomatically, thanks to U.S. President Donald Trump, North Korea’s international status has risen. President Trump has expressed willingness to hold a summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un within the year and has even explicitly mentioned the size of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. It is somewhat unusual for the U.S. government to officially specify North Korea's nuclear weapons stockpile. Since Chairman Kim has made recognition of North Korea as a nuclear-armed state a precondition for resuming dialogue, concerns are once again being raised that the U.S. may be effectively abandoning its long-standing “denuclearization” principle maintained since suspicions over North Korea’s nuclear development first arose.



This is not a debate about whether to delay or accelerate the OPCON transfer. Security is not a matter for political or ideological debate. Agreements should not shift depending on the preferences of a particular administration. Rather than getting entangled in political logic, the OPCON transfer should move forward in accordance with the criteria for its effectiveness and the pre-agreed consultative procedures between South Korea and the United States.


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