A Major Shift in Korea's CPTPP Trade Strategy
Beyond the U.S.-China Dichotomy: Toward Inclusive Trade
Domestic Acceptance Is Key, Beyond Diplomatic Decisions
The Cost Must Not Be Shifted onto Farmers and Fishers
Accepting Cross-Border

South Korea has been considering joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) since 2013, but a final decision has continuously been postponed. In December 2021, the Moon Jae-in administration officially announced its intention to pursue membership, and the following year approved the plan to seek accession, but the process stalled at the parliamentary reporting stage, with the government repeating a cautious, principle-based stance for an extended period. This delay of more than ten years is rooted in a dilemma between strategic necessity, domestic protectionist resistance, and diplomatic obstacles.


[Inkyu Jung Column: Trade-Off] Choosing CPTPP for a World Where "the United States Alone Is Not Enough" View original image

However, with the recent rapid changes in the trade environment, the external conditions surrounding accession have become more favorable than ever before. The universal tariff policies of a potential second Donald Trump administration, and uncertainty in the Middle East, have paradoxically raised the value of a stable, rule-based trading order. The CPTPP itself is also expanding its membership: the United Kingdom joined in 2024, accession negotiations with Costa Rica were concluded in May this year, and eleven countries, including China, Indonesia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), are already seeking entry. In these circumstances, the longer South Korea delays its decision, the less opportunity it will have to participate in shaping the CPTPP's rules and the greater the risk of being relegated merely to a "rule-taker."

It is also encouraging that the longstanding diplomatic obstacle of Korea–Japan relations has begun to improve. In January, the intent to pursue membership was reaffirmed at the Korea–Japan summit, and Japan has been sending positive signals. The government's resumption in August, after four years, of public consultations and procedures for gathering opinions reflects adjustments to this changed environment.


The problem is that, despite the improved external environment, the true bottleneck lies not in diplomatic negotiations but in domestic acceptance. The fact that both of the previous administrations halted just before reporting to the National Assembly proves this point. The key is the opposition of the agricultural and fisheries sectors and the effectiveness of the government's compensation measures. Sensitive issues such as concerns over resuming imports of Fukushima seafood, compensation for agricultural and fisheries losses, and fisheries subsidy reforms remain unresolved. Ultimately, the success or failure of accession depends less on diplomatic negotiation skills than on the effectiveness of the structural transformation package offered to the agricultural and fisheries sectors and the political determination of the nation’s highest leadership.


Judged solely by the expected tariff reduction effects, the benefits of accession may appear limited, since South Korea already connects with most CPTPP member countries through individual Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) or the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). However, the real value of joining lies beyond tariff reductions. A key example is the stabilization of supply chains through rules for cumulative origin. This year, when Mexico raised tariffs on countries without FTAs, our companies’ local burdens soared, but CPTPP accession could provide a comprehensive solution to such trade barriers.


From a historical perspective, the significance becomes even clearer. When the Roh Moo-hyun administration announced the start of Korea–US FTA negotiations in 2006, it was a national strategic choice, not just about opening markets, but about proactively connecting the Korean economy to the vast US market and the world’s best-in-class trade rules. At that time, the government used openness to drive industrial advancement and national competitiveness, but this process saw deep social conflict over agriculture, livestock, pharmaceuticals, and the investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) system. The Korea–US FTA taught the lesson that trade policy must be integrated with "distribution policy" and not remain just a growth strategy.


The CPTPP pursued by the Lee Jaemyung administration must not become a simple extension of the Korea–US FTA. If the Korea–US FTA was about "proactive access to the US market," CPTPP accession should be a choice suited to a world where the United States alone is not sufficient. CPTPP demands an exceptionally high tariff elimination rate of 99% and, as a market-access agreement, encompasses 21st-century trade order issues such as the free flow of digital data, regulation of state-owned enterprises, labor and environment, and supply chain rules of origin. Moreover, new member countries are not allowed to renegotiate existing rules, and acceptance of the highest levels of market openness is a prerequisite for joining. Accession is thus a heavy decision—hence it must be strategic.


A world map displayed in the dealing room of KB Kookmin Bank in Yeouido, Seoul, in December 2021, when the government officially expressed its intention to pursue comprehensive and progressive membership in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Photo by Yonhap News Agency

A world map displayed in the dealing room of KB Kookmin Bank in Yeouido, Seoul, in December 2021, when the government officially expressed its intention to pursue comprehensive and progressive membership in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Photo by Yonhap News Agency

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Therefore, accession to the CPTPP today is about South Korea deciding "to which rule-based order, under what conditions, and with how much initiative" it will belong in an era of US–China strategic competition and supply chain fragmentation. The critical issue is not incorporation or market opening itself, but securing a voice in shaping the rules. Four trade policy strategies are needed to achieve this.


First, the burden of market opening must not be unilaterally shifted onto farmers and fishers. A government-wide structural transformation package is required, encompassing expanded direct income support, transformation into smart agriculture, reform of the distribution system, and generational transition support. Second, in digital trade rules, it is essential to secure "legitimate public policy objectives (LPPO)." Even as cross-border data movement and data localization bans are accepted, the regulatory space for personal information protection, consumer safety, artificial intelligence (AI) ethics, and fair platform competition must be clearly defined and maintained. Third, a balance must be struck between managing risks related to China and diversifying supply chains. CPTPP participation should not lead to unnecessary economic bloc alignment at the cost of South Korea's economic relationship with China. Economic security risks must be rigorously managed, but not at the expense of our companies’ access to the Chinese market or their ability to choose supply chains. Fourth, transparent social dialogue in accordance with trade procedure rules must be promoted. Only meaningful consultative structures involving farmers and fishers, small and medium-sized enterprises, labor, digital industries, and civil society can prevent national division.


CPTPP accession must be a decisive action for an era of multipolarity and fragmentation, when there is no longer a single global center. The alliance with the United States remains important, but the trade strategy cannot simply echo US demands. While the reality of South Korea’s economic ties with China must be acknowledged, it would be a mistake to allow excessive reliance on any single country. The path for South Korea is not a binary choice between "the United States or China." It is about supporting openness while preserving regulatory sovereignty, diversifying supply chains without becoming a subcontractor in any economic bloc, and expanding digital trade without sacrificing the value of personal data protection and labor—a model of "inclusive trade." CPTPP accession is the proving ground for this approach.



[Inkyu Jung Column: Trade-Off] Choosing CPTPP for a World Where "the United States Alone Is Not Enough" View original image

Jung In-kyu, Professor of International Trade at Inha University and former Head of Trade Negotiations


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