[Interview] "It Was China, Not the U.S., That Undermined the Trade Order... Korea Must Beware the Memory Industry Threat"
Chad Bown, Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute
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"It was not the United States but China that broke down the rules-based trading order. We simply have not properly acknowledged that fact."
Chad Bown, Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE), countered the assessment that U.S. President Donald Trump's tariff policies destroyed the existing international trade order in an interview with The Asia Business Daily in Yeouido, Seoul on the 2nd. Bown is a world-renowned expert in trade and industry who previously served as Chief Economist at the U.S. Department of State during the Biden administration.
Bown stated, "While staying in Korea this week, I have heard from many experts and scholars about how the disappearance of the rules-based trading system would be such a loss for Korea," but added, "That system has actually not worked properly for Korea for a long time." He pointed out that, in the past, when Chinese companies heavily subsidized by their government were encroaching on Korea's shipbuilding and battery markets, the existing system—including the World Trade Organization (WTO)—was virtually rendered inoperative.
Chad Bown, Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE), is interviewed by The Asia Business Daily on the afternoon of the 2nd at the Conrad Hotel in Yeouido, Seoul. He said, "The rules-based trading system has not worked properly for Korea for a long time." Photo by Cha Minyoung
View original imageBown highlighted Chinese memory companies Changxin Memory Technologies (CXMT) and Yangtze Memory Technologies (YMTC), warning that Korea's memory industry could face similar threats and urging a prompt response.
While he gave a positive assessment of Korea's ongoing discussions about joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), Bown indicated that it would not serve as a fundamental solution. Bown emphasized, "The hardest question is ultimately how we can create rules that both we and China can accept," and continued, "China is simply too large a presence in global trade. In the end, we must find rules that can stabilize our relationship with China."
The following is a Q&A with Research Fellow Bown.
- In your new book, "How to Win a Trade War," you mention that people are barely aware of the existence of rules when the system works properly. Today, tariffs, export controls, and supply chains dominate daily discussions. Is the existing trade order collapsing, or is a new order emerging?
▲It is clear that the existing order is collapsing, but we are still far from seeing a new order emerge. It may be more accurate to call it "disorder" rather than "order." The globalization that lasted until 1913 collapsed with the outbreak of World War I, and it took about 34 years for a new trade order to be established. The fundamental problem is not Trump, but China. The old trade system was not designed with competition against companies from countries like China in mind. If countries do not discuss this issue together, it will be difficult to move forward.
- If the WTO-centered rules-based trading system is not working, what kind of system do we need going forward?
▲This week, many experts and scholars have told me how the disappearance of rules-based trading would be a significant loss for Korea. But the rules-based system has already not worked properly for Korea for a long time. It was China, not the United States, that broke it down, and we simply have not acknowledged this. The United States has filed more than 20 WTO disputes against China. Korea has filed zero. Regardless, while the United States, Korea, Europe, and other democracies may try to build a rules-based system, a joint approach to China is needed. The hardest question is, ultimately, how to create rules that both we and China can accept. China is too big a presence in global trade. We need to find rules that can stabilize relations with China.
- If the Republican Party suffers a major defeat in the November midterms, could U.S. trade policy change?
▲It is unlikely that the Democratic Party will secure enough seats to overturn the current trade policies through legislation. Thus, a major shift in trade policy is not very likely. It is still too early to predict the election outcome. Not only economic conditions, but also diplomacy, Iran, and cultural issues will all have an impact.
- Do you think the current tariff policies will remain in place even after the end of a potential second Trump administration?
▲That is very likely. Even after Trump's first term, the Biden administration did not remove tariffs on China. This is because of concerns over China's market dominance and the perceived need to diversify supply chains away from China. There are even more tariffs now. Especially if Section 301 tariff measures withstand legal challenges, it will be difficult for any future administration to remove them due to fiscal and political reasons.
- Korean companies made massive investments in the United States based on the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and other incentives, but policies changed when the administration changed.
▲Companies now see the U.S. policy environment as much more uncertain. Many incentives under the IRA have disappeared, and tariffs keep changing. To make large investments, companies need to know how they will be able to access the market in the future. For a Korean company, it is important to understand not only what tariffs will be applied to inputs brought from Korea to the United States, but also what tariffs might apply in the future to products that competitors procure from China.
- In tariff negotiations with the U.S., Korea competed against Japan, Taiwan, and others. If a trade war is a situation where everyone loses, can getting hurt less than competing countries still be considered a "victory"?
▲The most important thing for Korean companies was essentially to receive the same tariff treatment as key competing countries. Korea's tariffs were set at about 15%, as were those for Europe. In that respect, it was a success. Of course, since U.S. companies pay no tariffs, the conditions are different from theirs. However, compared to major overseas competitors, Korea has achieved a similar position. In many cases, "winning" a trade war means minimizing losses. From that perspective, Korea has achieved a decent outcome.
- President Trump has negotiated trade, investment, and security as a single package. For a middle-power country like Korea, is it advantageous to separate these issues?
▲For countries like Korea, Japan, Canada, and Australia, in principle, it is better to handle these issues separately. Dealing with trade according to its own rules prevents militarily strong countries from leveraging their military strength as a bargaining chip in economic negotiations. However, we now live in a world where that is no longer a choice. When China was smaller and posed fewer military concerns, separation was possible. Now, with China's rise, other countries are also required to spend more on defense. While Trump's diplomatic style may be extreme, the challenge itself will continue regardless of the next president.
- Korea has strengths in the memory semiconductor and battery sectors, including high bandwidth memory (HBM). What should Korea do to maintain its competitiveness?
▲It depends on the industry, but continued R&D and innovation are essential. The fundamental concern is that China may employ strategies to dominate certain markets regardless of a company's profitability or productivity. For example, Korea's shipbuilding sector lost market share not because Chinese companies were necessarily more competitive, but due to government subsidies. In memory semiconductors as well, the capabilities of CXMT and YMTC are increasing. Korea needs to respond with policy measures before China increases its market share to the point of using it as a tool for economic coercion.
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- What does CPTPP membership mean for Korea?
▲Joining the CPTPP could help with new market access. In Mexico's case, tariffs are being raised to target China, which could also affect Korea, given that there is no free trade agreement. By joining the CPTPP, Korea would gain a similar effect to having an FTA with Mexico. However, the CPTPP does not address fundamental issues such as China's dominance in key minerals or critical input markets. To address that, support for production outside of China and discriminatory tariffs on Chinese products will be needed.
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