[Editorial] Ensuring Independence for the Special Inspector: The System Must Take Root

On August 24, President Lee Jaemyung nominated lawyer Choi Gilsoo as the candidate for special inspector, a position tasked with monitoring misconduct by the president’s spouse, relatives within the fourth degree, and senior officials at the level of chief presidential secretary or higher. If Choi is appointed following a National Assembly confirmation hearing, the special inspector system will be revived for the first time in approximately ten years since the resignation of Lee Seoksoo, the inaugural special inspector, in September 2016. In the meantime, both the ruling and opposition parties have effectively neglected the system after taking power, weighing its political advantages and disadvantages. The remaining challenge is to ensure its substantial independence and establish it as a system that functions regardless of changes in administration.

It is commendable that President Lee fulfilled his campaign promise. For a president, establishing a body that monitors his own relatives and key aides is undoubtedly a burden. However, it is a commitment made to the public, and as President Lee stated during his press conference marking 30 days in office last July, “It would be best for everyone to prevent and block the possibility [of misconduct by relatives and aides] in advance.” Given this, it is noteworthy that he has moved forward, even if belatedly.

It is not appropriate to doubt lawyer Choi’s independence solely because he was recommended by the ruling party. The ruling party, too, must discard the mentality that he is “one of our own.” The president must clearly declare a principle of not intervening at all in matters of personnel, budget, data access, or the selection of inspection targets for the special inspector. In these systems, the intent and organizational culture of those in charge often matter as much as explicit regulations. The special inspector does not have investigative or prosecutorial powers. The standard inspection period is one month, and an extension requires the president’s approval. This structure allows the person who appoints the inspector to also determine the duration of the investigation.

Oversight of power must be institutionalized, not dependent on individual goodwill. If the existence of such oversight changes with each administration, it would undermine the original purpose of its establishment. This is an opportunity for both the ruling and opposition parties to improve the legislation, specifically regarding deadlines for recommendation and appointment, penalty clauses, and conditions for extending inspection periods. Should lawyer Choi be appointed, he is urged to fulfill his duties with integrity and without yielding to internal or external pressure. This is ultimately the shortest path to healthy governance.

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.