Denuclearization as a Long-Term Task... Gradual Reduction of Threats
Proposal to Formalize a Ban on Nuclear and ICBM Tests
Kim Jong Un May Opt for Talks After U.S. Midterm Elections
Negative on the Need for South Korea's Nuclear Armament

Victor Cha, the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and an expert on North Korean issues in the United States, observed that if a summit between North Korea and the United States is held, North Korea is unlikely to immediately abandon its nuclear weapons. He predicted that denuclearization would be left as a long-term task, while greater emphasis would be placed on addressing short-term solutions. However, he does not believe this process needs to lead to South Korea pursuing its own nuclear arms. Cha stressed that South Korea should strengthen its defense capabilities to become a more independent ally of the United States, but this does not necessarily require nuclear weapons.


Victor Cha: "No Need for South Korea to Pursue Nuclear Arms Even if US-North Korea Summit Succeeds" [Interview] View original image

In a virtual interview with The Asia Business Daily on August 19 (local time), Cha stated, "The long-term goal of the United States has always been the denuclearization of North Korea," but also noted, "Denuclearization is important, but in any future talks, it will not be the immediate goal." Cha pointed out President Donald Trump's statement that North Korea possesses "57 very powerful nuclear weapons," analyzing that "President Trump is approaching the matter in a very realistic and pragmatic manner."


He added, "If you consider even the last two years of the first Trump administration, there has been virtually no substantive diplomacy for nearly nine years, so now the aim is to do what can be done to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table."


"Formalizing a Ban on Nuclear and ICBM Tests Is the First Step"

From this perspective, Cha explained, the North Korea-U.S. summit could be seen as a new starting point for denuclearization, and the focus should be on limiting further expansion and threats from North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, rather than the complete elimination of its existing weapons. He stressed, "The first step is to codify a ban on nuclear tests," and predicted, "This would mean no further nuclear tests or intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches, and no proliferation of nuclear weapons or missiles to U.S. adversaries."


Cha explained that, in subsequent phases, more specific arms-control measures could be discussed, such as halting the additional production of fissile material, capping the number of warheads, and separating warheads from missiles. However, he emphasized that "these issues require much more detailed negotiations and will take time," and added, "What is necessary right now is to secure a promise that there will be no further nuclear tests and no sales of weapons to adversaries of the United States."


He further analyzed that the Trump administration already seems to perceive North Korea’s suspension of nuclear and ICBM tests as a form of "cooperation." Although this approach could be interpreted as de facto recognition of North Korea as a nuclear state, Cha noted, "Critics may say this acknowledges North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, but what is more important is reducing the threat to the United States and its allies."


He went on to say, "From the U.S. perspective, the success criteria are for North Korea to make a pledge not to conduct additional tests and to move toward some form of peace declaration."


"South Korea Does Not Necessarily Need to Pursue Its Own Nuclear Arms"

Cha predicted that even if high-level diplomacy between North Korea and the United States resumes, South Korea is likely to be excluded from the process.


He commented, "I believe North Korea will try to exclude South Korea from any discussions or agreements." He assessed that the current Lee Jaemyung administration seems to prioritize the resumption of North Korea-U.S. dialogue itself over South Korea’s participation as a direct negotiating party.


Cha explained, "It appears that President Lee sees any engagement with North Korea as a positive development," and added, "This will not be an obstacle to meetings between President Trump and the North Korean leader."


However, he emphasized that the U.S. choosing to manage rather than eliminate North Korea's nuclear program does not mean South Korea should pursue its own nuclear arms.


He stated that reducing the likelihood of North Korea’s military power being used on the Korean Peninsula through a North Korea-U.S. agreement "should not trigger concerns that the United States will abandon South Korea or that South Korea must pursue nuclear weapons."


Instead, Cha suggested that South Korea needs to strengthen its conventional capabilities and intelligence/satellite imaging capabilities in order to develop an autonomous defense posture.


He said, "During the terms of President Trump and President Lee, South Korea can become a more capable ally, but also a more independent ally, which does not necessarily mean having nuclear weapons."


"Kim Is Not Likely to Agree to Immediate Talks"

From the North Korean perspective, holding a summit could serve as a means of managing President Trump’s unpredictability. Cha explained, "President Trump is even more unpredictable in this term than in the first, and from that angle, North Korea has its own reasons for seeking some form of agreement."


Given that President Trump, during his second term, appears more aggressive and unpredictable regarding the use of force, Cha suggested North Korea might be willing to engage in talks as a way of managing such risk. He added, "North Korea does not want to be included on the list of countries against which the United States has used military force."


Cha further noted that North Korea’s desire to avoid excessive dependence on either China or Russia is another reason it seeks improved relations with the United States. He explained, "Having the United States as a third option is also factored into North Korea’s calculations." However, Cha does not expect North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to agree to immediate talks.


He analyzed, "The ideal timing for North Korea would be to wait until after the U.S. election this November, when President Trump may have become weaker than he is now." He did not interpret the recent hawkish comments from Kim Yo Jong, the vice department director of the Workers’ Party of Korea, as closing the door to talks.



Comparing Kim Yo Jong to a ‘bad cop’ and Kim Jong Un to a ‘good cop,’ Cha analyzed that Kim Yo Jong’s comments are meant to emphasize that “there is no particular reason to rush.” He also suggested that the reduced pressure from sanctions compared to the past may have prompted her recent statements, explaining, "North Korea is currently facing substantially less economic pressure because it is receiving support from Russia and China."


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