Concerns over the "Stock Price Suppression Prevention Law"

Will it become a "manual" rather than real prevention?

The incentive structure for major shareholders must change first

Focus should be on reviving "entrepreneurial spirit"

On June 29, I contributed a column to The Asia Business Daily titled, "Behind the Record Bull Market: The Korean Stock Market Losing Its Sense of Moderation," where I argued that even in times of abundance, we must not neglect to improve our farmland—in other words, we should not stop efforts to reform. Although the semiconductor sector has improved and stock prices have surged, I do not believe this addresses the deep-rooted structural issue of "insufficient long-term investment capital" in the Korean stock market. I also pointed out problems with speculative products, such as single-stock leveraged exchange traded funds (ETFs), and emphasized that measures to address undervaluation—such as the Price-to-Book Ratio (PBR) Enhancement Act (the "Stock Price Suppression Prevention Act")—should be implemented in a truly effective manner.


[Seojunsik Column: Achieving Tax Justice, Revitalizing the Stock Market, and Economic Recovery—Catching All Three] View original image

To help readers understand the Stock Price Suppression Prevention Act, let me provide a real-world example involving Company Y. Company Y’s total market capitalization, combining both common and preferred shares, is around 240 billion won, which is only 45% (PBR 0.45) of its total equity (book value of liquidation) of 540 billion won. What stands out is that the company's headquarters building, booked at just 20 billion won, is estimated to have a market value of at least 300 billion won. By conservatively adding this hidden asset value, the company’s actual liquidation value would be 840 billion won. The problem is that for a long time, Company Y has all but ceased its core business operations and instead survives mainly on income from financial products, as well as interest, dividends, and rent from its building assets. Due to poor management, the building has an unusually high vacancy rate. Over the past five years, net profit has averaged only 11 billion won—a figure far too low relative to its assets.


Based on this information alone, there is no legal basis for claiming that the company has intentionally suppressed its stock price. However, under current law, where the low stock price is accepted at face value for inheritance and gift tax assessment, controlling shareholders gain significant tax savings. If one uses the actual asset value of 840 billion won, then a controlling shareholder’s 50% stake would be worth 420 billion won. But since the market inheritance value for listed companies is based on market cap, this drops to just 120 billion won. Applying a simple 50% tax rate, an individual inheriting assets worth 420 billion won (such as the building) would have to pay 210 billion won in taxes, whereas Company Y’s controlling shareholder only pays 60 billion won—a difference of 140 billion won. The actual tax may differ somewhat due to various inheritance deductions or premium taxation for controlling shareholders, but this example clearly shows how strongly the low share price incentivizes such shareholders from an economic standpoint.


Thanks to these perverse dynamics, an increase in the share price becomes a curse, and a decline becomes a tax-saving opportunity for controlling shareholders. There is no reason to pursue new business opportunities, sell idle assets for productive investment, fill building vacancies, or increase dividends to improve market valuation. On the contrary, it is more advantageous for the controlling shareholder to diminish the core business, hoard cash, and discontinue investor relations (IR) activities—moving further out of the market’s attention—to increase personal wealth. In this situation, the core driver of capitalism, "entrepreneurship," stalls, leading to what could be described as "capital sabotage." Currently, there are countless companies in Korea's stock market with circumstances similar to those of Company Y. During this process, minority shareholders suffer significant financial and psychological harm, and our society as a whole experiences meaningful economic opportunity loss.


However, on August 3, the Ministry of Economy and Finance announced a package of tax reforms to address such issues, and its content turned out to be somewhat shocking. For the past six years, companies in the bottom 25% of PBR by industry sector on KOSPI, or the bottom 10% on KOSDAQ, or cases where actions such as dual listing or issuance of exchangeable bonds have resulted in stock prices falling by more than 30% compared to the three-year average, are presumed to be engaging in stock price suppression. However, companies have the opportunity to be excluded from the list if they can provide adequate explanations. Even so, if a company is designated as engaging in stock price suppression, it only pays a roughly 30% surcharge in taxes. As this legislative proposal essentially serves as a "guideline" explaining how to avoid designation, many experts have criticized it as a "Stock Price Suppression Encouragement Act." In a domestic equity market crowded with companies whose PBR is below 0.4, even Company Y would be unlikely to be designated as a target.


Assemblywoman Lee Soyoung of the Democratic Party of Korea already submitted a significantly stronger version, the "Stock Price Suppression Prevention Act," as the main sponsor in May of last year. Its core concept is straightforward: if the PBR of listed shares does not reach 0.8 times, inheritance and gift valuations should not be determined solely by market price but, like unlisted shares, should reflect both asset and income value. If there is a large gap between book value and market value, assets are to be reappraised and included in the asset value, and the inheritance value may not fall below 80% of the recalculated asset value. If Company Y’s controlling shareholder were taxed under this method, the inheritence value would be set at 3.36 billion won (80% of the 420 billion won asset value), requiring a payment of at least 168 billion won and significantly reducing the current inconsistencies. Additionally, Assemblywoman Lee’s proposal eliminates the premium tax for largest shareholders, thus lowering the burden when the share price is formed through normal market mechanisms.


[Seojunsik Column: Achieving Tax Justice, Revitalizing the Stock Market, and Economic Recovery—Catching All Three] View original image

I fully support the basic intent of Assemblywoman Lee’s proposal. Numerous experts, including the President, have endorsed this bill. This legislation is not intended simply to increase taxes; it is fundamentally an issue of tax justice, designed to lower the tax burden on company owners who demonstrate strong "entrepreneurship" and normalize the burden on those who have participated in "capital sabotage." Thus, it is necessary to go a step further. We should also consider granting additional tax incentives to managers who consistently grow profits, increase dividends, retire treasury shares, and turn idle assets into productive investments—actions that meaningfully enhance enterprise value. Only then will the incentive structure for controlling shareholders be fundamentally altered.


If the majority of Korean firms focus on increasing corporate value and raising the share price to earn partial compensation through tax benefits—rather than intentionally suppressing stock prices to save on taxes—corporate innovation will increase, and the resulting impact on the broader economy will be substantial. Shareholder returns will also rise, contributing to a revitalization of the stock market. As capital grows and returns on capital improve, Korea’s tax revenues will increase over the long term to the extent that they will more than offset any tax incentives granted.


It would be mistaken to brand the Stock Price Suppression Prevention Act as merely a "tax hike on the wealthy." At its core, it is an efficient revenue policy to expand tax income alongside growth in the size of the economy and capital market; it is also a capital market revitalization measure, rewarding management and helping long-term investment capital flow into the market. Furthermore, it acts as an economic stimulus policy by encouraging capital from undervalued companies to move to productive areas. The government's plan was significant in acknowledging the issue, but it falls far short of eliminating the structural incentives that enable stock price suppression and delivering the intended policy effects. The National Assembly must revisit the issue carefully with the aim of accomplishing three objectives: tax justice, the revitalization of the capital market, and broader economic growth.



[Seojunsik Column: Achieving Tax Justice, Revitalizing the Stock Market, and Economic Recovery—Catching All Three] View original image

Junshik Seo, Professor of Economics at Soongsil University


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