U.S. Missile Stockpiles After Trump Halts Iran Strike... How Much Was Used? [Sisa Show]

Over 80% of THAAD Missiles Depleted
Iran’s Delaying Tactics Stall Negotiations

■ Broadcast: The Asia Business Daily 'So Jongsub's Current Affairs Show'

■ Host: Political Specialist So Jongsub

■ Producer: PD Park Sumin

■ Guest: Reporter Lee Hyunwoo

U.S. President Donald Trump once again declared a large-scale strike against Iran, only to abruptly halt the attack and return to the negotiating table. On the surface, the reason given was economic. As news broke that an agreement regarding the opening of the Strait of Hormuz was imminent, surging international oil prices began to fall, and the previously volatile global stock markets recovered their upward trend.

However, a completely different interpretation is dominating the American media. They are claiming that the real reason President Trump stopped the attack on Iran was not economic factors like oil or the stock market, but rather because the U.S. military's interceptor missile inventory was virtually depleted. In particular, it has been revealed that more than 80% of the stockpile of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptor missiles — which are also deployed in Korea — had already been exhausted, sounding the security alarm both inside and outside the U.S.

U.S. Missile Inventory Plummets to 'Danger Level'

Reuters Yonhap News Agency

The seriousness of this inventory issue carries weight far beyond mere numbers. It has even been reported that the U.S. military directly notified President Trump that missile reserves had dropped to a critical level, and that this report became the decisive factor behind his decision to cancel the Iran strike. Until now, it was widely believed inside and outside the U.S. military that there were ample Patriot missiles remaining, and that about half the THAAD missiles were still in stock. However, when the actual inventory was checked, the situation turned out to be far worse than previously thought. Only 20% of THAAD missiles remained, and the inventory of Patriot missiles had also fallen to approximately 35%.

The shock of these numbers becomes even clearer when compared with pre-war stockpile figures. Before the Iran conflict, the U.S. possessed about 2,200 Patriot missiles and approximately 460 THAAD missiles. This means almost all of this vast quantity was consumed in a short period. Moreover, these inventories were spread across not only the U.S. mainland but distributed globally. As the war intensified in the Middle East, missiles that had been stationed in Asia and Europe were even reallocated to the region. In fact, rumors have surfaced that some of the THAAD missiles deployed in Korea were removed from the country.

The rapid depletion of inventories was largely due to Iran's airstrike tactics. Whenever U.S. airstrikes took place, Iran retaliated with barrages of drones and ballistic missiles across the Middle East, which the U.S. military attempted to intercept using THAAD and Patriot systems stationed at each base. The underlying problem was that Iran launched these attacks in so-called saturation waves — firing hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles at once. As the U.S. tried to block these waves, interceptor missiles were consumed at a rate that overwhelmed supply. Considering the actual duration of U.S. airstrikes was not very long, a massive volume of missiles essentially vanished in an extremely short time.

In the end, the U.S. military exhausted most of its interceptors while defending its allied and domestic bases across the Middle East. This means that if a separate, unrelated military provocation occurs in Europe or Asia, the U.S. would be hard-pressed to respond immediately. It is at this point that concerns have arisen about a noticeable decline in America's deterrence capabilities around the world.

Missiles With Budget But Not Enough Time to Produce

AFP Yonhap News

This naturally raises the question of why, given America's overwhelming defense budget, so-called "the country of a thousand trillion dollars," the gap can't simply be refilled by ramping up spending. However, the core of the problem is not funding, but time. The budget is already more than sufficient. There are reports that next year's U.S. defense budget could nearly double, reaching $1.5 trillion — exceeding 2,000 trillion won. In line with this, the U.S. Department of Defense recently announced plans to increase orders for Patriot and THAAD missiles by three to four times over previous levels.

While funds are certainly secured, the real bottleneck is how long it will take to replenish inventory. Even if orders are placed right now and U.S. defense companies begin maximum-speed production, estimates suggest it will take more than three years just to restore depleted missile stocks. Currently, only about 100 THAAD and 600 Patriot missiles can be produced annually. The production lines themselves have shrunk so much that it is structurally difficult to rapidly ramp up output.

This bottleneck has not emerged overnight. Since the U.S. began actively pursuing an exit strategy from the Middle East in the 2010s, defense companies closed down many of their less profitable production lines. As orders from the U.S. military fell, they drastically downsized their lines. Now, with an explosion in new orders, the capacity simply cannot keep up. Attempting to rebuild these production lines requires building new factories and hiring skilled workers, a process that cannot be completed quickly.

Even bypassing this problem by licensing production to allied nations and importing from them is not an easy workaround. Although there are ongoing talks with Korea regarding cooperation in the warship sector, even that would require amendments to U.S. domestic law. Because weapons are directly linked to national security, there are strict distinctions between items that can be jointly produced with even the closest allies and those that cannot under any circumstance. The higher the importance of the weapon system, the higher these barriers become.

Concerns over technology leaks further fuel this cautiousness. Once technology spreads abroad, it becomes impossible to control how far it proliferates. China, in particular, has repeatedly either copied significant quantities of U.S. weapons transferred overseas, or imported certain items and then reverse-engineered them. America cannot ignore such precedents. For this reason, defense companies have further tightened hiring standards: individuals with connections to countries effectively classified as adversaries, like China and Russia, are completely excluded — and for China, even those who have frequently traveled there are filtered out of production lines. This makes securing necessary talent extremely difficult, presenting another obstacle to expanding production capacity.

U.S. Focuses on Diplomacy... Iran Adopts Delaying Tactics

Reuters Yonhap News

The stumbling block is the issue of tolls for passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has steadfastly refused to budge from its long-standing position on this matter. Currently, the U.S. is said to be negotiating the issue with Iran through Oman's mediation, with Iran reportedly insisting on levying fees for ships entering the strait and demanding a so-called joint control system, where Oman manages outbound shipping. Within the U.S., there is considerable internal debate on how to respond to these demands.

The concern is that if Iran enforces these tolls and effectively gains control over the Strait of Hormuz, the ripple effects could be significant. Should a precedent be set for an internationally recognized Iranian right to tolls and control, other countries with major straits could rush to follow suit.

Separate from this issue, Iran's internal situation is also far from smooth. Discord between the Iranian President and Supreme Leader is being aired through both domestic and international media. President Pezeshkian is said to have submitted resignation letters as many as 28 times since the war began, with reports that he did so again recently. As the Revolutionary Guard repeatedly overturned negotiations with the U.S. and resumed attacks, President Pezeshkian expressed dissatisfaction and repeatedly attempted to resign. Now, reportedly, the Supreme Leader has declared that "one more resignation will be accepted without delay." This highlights the deep differences in perspective among the Iranian government, the Revolutionary Guard, and the Supreme Leader in negotiations with the U.S.

Considering all these circumstances, the outlook ahead is far from optimistic. The greatest concern is that Iran could relentlessly exploit the gap in U.S. missile inventories and overall military strength. Unlike the Iranian government, the Revolutionary Guard and Supreme Leader may take an even harder line in U.S. negotiations, dragging them out. This is because Iran now clearly recognizes that the longer the process drags on, the more unfavorable the situation becomes for the U.S.

Meanwhile, internal American politics are fueling this trend. With midterm elections about three months away, the U.S. political landscape is now completely dominated by campaign season. Recently, President Trump has not been posting about Iran on social media as frequently as he did before. His focus is consumed by the elections. Ultimately, given that public sentiment is most influenced by prices and economic issues, President Trump finds himself compelled to end the war before the elections. As time runs short, some expect that, if necessary, he may rush to conclude the conflict by making significant concessions to Iran. If such a hasty deal is made, concerns arise that the burden could fall not only on the U.S. but on the entire international community.

On a global scale, the weakening of U.S. military power seems inevitable for the time being. This also means that America's deterrence against both China and Russia will be weakened in parallel. As a result, both countries may find themselves with more leeway for additional military provocations in their respective spheres. There are concerns that regions like Taiwan and Europe could face even greater security threats than before.

However, some analysts suggest that this crisis could present an opportunity for Korea. Through the Iran conflict, the U.S. has revealed gaps in multiple aspects of its military posture, and to fill those holes, it will inevitably have to pursue joint weapons production with allied countries. When considering all-around production capability, economic strength, military clout, and manufacturing speed, Korea is emerging as America's most reliable partner. In this sense, the current situation can be seen as a double-edged sword for Korea — both an opportunity and a potential burden.

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.