U.S. Missile Stockpiles After Trump Halts Iran Strike... How Much Was Used? [Sisa Show]

Over 80% of THAAD Missiles Depleted
Iran’s Delaying Tactics Stall Negotiations

■ Broadcast: The Asia Business Daily 'So Jongsup's Current Affairs Show'

■ Host: Political Specialist So Jongsup

■ Director: Producer Park Sumin

■ Guest: Reporter Lee Hyunwoo

U.S. President Donald Trump once again threatened massive strikes against Iran, only to suddenly call off the attack and return to the negotiation table. The official reason presented was economic. As news emerged that an agreement over the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz with Iran was imminent, international oil prices, which had surged, declined again, and global stock markets, which had been volatile, also rebounded.

However, a completely different interpretation is being offered, particularly in the American media. According to reports, the real reason President Trump halted the attack on Iran was not due to economic factors such as oil prices or the stock market, but rather because U.S. interceptor missile stockpiles had in fact been depleted. In particular, it has become known that over 80% of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptor missiles—some of which are deployed in South Korea—had already been expended. This has triggered security alarms both inside and outside of the U.S.

U.S. Military Missile Stockpiles Plunge to 'Critical Levels'

Reuters Yonhap News Agency

The seriousness of the stockpile issue extends far beyond mere numbers. It’s been reported that the U.S. military directly told President Trump that missile stockpiles had fallen to a dangerous level, and that this briefing ultimately became the decisive factor in canceling the strike against Iran. Previously, it was believed that the U.S. still had sufficient Patriot missiles and about half its original THAAD missile inventory. However, an actual inspection revealed the situation was much worse than publicly known. Only 20% of THAAD missiles remained, and Patriot missile reserves stood at just 35%.

The magnitude of this shock becomes even clearer when compared to pre-war stockpiles. Before the Iran war, the U.S. reportedly had about 2,200 Patriot missiles and around 460 THAAD missiles. The fact that this massive inventory was nearly exhausted in a short time is telling. Moreover, these stockpiles were not just in the U.S. mainland but were distributed around the world. As the conflict in the Middle East escalated, reserves deployed in Asia and Europe were also pulled in. There were even reports that some THAAD missiles stationed in South Korea had been shipped out.

This rapid depletion of stockpiles was decisively influenced by Iran's method of aerial attack. Every time the U.S. launched airstrikes, Iran responded by deploying swarms of drones and ballistic missiles across the Middle East, prompting U.S. forces to intercept them using THAAD and Patriot systems at each base. The problem was that Iran unleashed these barrages in so-called “saturation attacks,” firing several hundred drones and missiles at a time. In the process of countering this, interceptor missiles were consumed at an unsustainable pace. Considering that the actual duration of U.S. combat operations during the Iran conflict was not that long, it means a vast number of missiles disappeared in a remarkably short period.

Ultimately, the U.S. military exhausted most of its interceptor missiles defending allied and domestic bases across the Middle East. This means that, if a separate and unrelated military crisis were to break out in Europe or Asia, the U.S. would now be hard-pressed to respond swiftly. This scenario raises significant concern that America’s global deterrence capabilities could be visibly weakened.

Missile Budgets Are Secure, But Not Enough Time for Production

AFP Yonhap News

This naturally leads to the question: Since the U.S.—sometimes referred to as a "trillion-dollar defense country"—has an overwhelming defense budget, can’t it simply rebuild its missile stockpile? The crux of the issue, however, is not money but time. The budget is already plentiful. Reports say the U.S. is set to nearly double next year’s defense budget to $1.5 trillion, exceeding even 2,000 trillion won. In line with this, the Department of Defense recently announced that it would increase orders for Patriot and THAAD missiles by three to four times the current level.

The resources are certainly available, but it is the time required to replenish missile inventories that is presenting a major obstacle. Even if U.S. defense companies immediately get to work on new orders, experts estimate that simply restoring depleted stockpiles will take more than three years. Currently, only about 100 THAAD missiles and roughly 600 Patriot missiles are produced per year. The production lines themselves have shrunk so much that it's structurally difficult to ramp up output quickly.

This manufacturing bottleneck wasn’t created overnight. Since the U.S. began implementing an exit strategy from the Middle East in the 2010s, defense contractors significantly scaled back production lines due to declining profitability. As military orders fell, so too did production capacity, and now that requests have suddenly spiked, the industry can’t keep up. Even attempting to expand production lines is no simple matter, as building new factories and securing skilled labor cannot be accomplished quickly.

Granting production licenses to allied nations to quickly manufacture and import missiles is also not a straightforward workaround. For instance, while the U.S. is looking to collaborate with South Korea in the naval sector, even this would require changes to U.S. domestic law. Given the direct connection between weaponry and national security, there is strict separation between systems that can and cannot be jointly produced with even the closest allies; the threshold is especially high for core strategic weapons.

These precautions are fueled by concerns over leaks of sensitive technology. Whenever technology is transferred to a foreign country, it is difficult to control how far and wide it may spread. China, in particular, has extensively cloned or reverse-engineered U.S. weaponry previously transferred overseas, or imported certain items and then acquired the technology through so-called reverse engineering. The United States is acutely aware of such precedents. Against this backdrop, defense companies have made their hiring criteria much more stringent—anyone with ties to countries like China or Russia, now classified as virtual adversaries, is excluded, and in China’s case, even employees who frequently travel to the country are filtered out of production lines. This makes it hard to secure necessary personnel and presents yet another barrier to scaling up production.

U.S. Leans on Diplomacy... Iran Engages in Delaying Tactics

Reuters Yonhap News

The hurdle is the issue of transit fees through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has long insisted on this matter and refuses to budge. The U.S. is reportedly negotiating the matter with Iran through Omani mediation, but Iran is demanding that it impose its own fees on ships entering the Strait and that Oman manage those leaving—a so-called joint oversight arrangement. There is division even within the U.S. on how to respond to these demands.

The worry is that if Iran pushes ahead with the transit fees and effectively secures control over the Strait of Hormuz, the repercussions could be severe. If international precedents are set recognizing Iran’s right to impose such fees and exercise control, it is foreseeable that other nations bordering strategic straits will rush to impose similar tolls.

Separate from this, Iran’s domestic situation is also unstable. Conflict between the Iranian President and the Supreme Leader is being exposed in domestic and international media. President Pezeshkian is reported to have tendered his resignation no less than 28 times since the outbreak of the war, with yet another resignation said to have been recently submitted. As the Revolutionary Guard repeatedly undermined negotiations with the U.S. and opted for escalation, President Pezeshkian—displeased—has continued to offer to step down. This time, the Supreme Leader reportedly declared, "If you submit your resignation just one more time, I will accept it." This highlights the profound differences in perspective inside the Iranian government, the Revolutionary Guard, and the Supreme Leader regarding negotiations with the United States.

Taking all these developments into account, the outlook remains decidedly bleak. The primary concern is that Iran may persistently exploit the current U.S. missile stockpile problem—that is, the gap in American military strength. Unlike the Iranian government, both the Revolutionary Guard and the Supreme Leader are likely to take an even tougher stance during negotiations and drag out the talks. Iran understands all too well that the passage of time only favors their position.

Domestic U.S. political dynamics are also exacerbating the situation. With around three months to go before the midterm elections, the U.S. political sphere has entered full campaign mode. President Trump has stopped posting Iran-related updates on social media as frequently as in the past, with the focus now squarely on the election. Ultimately, given how strongly public sentiment is influenced by inflation and economic issues, President Trump finds himself in a position where he must end the war before the election. Pressed for time, he may be tempted to quickly conclude hostilities with Iran, even if it means making major concessions. There is concern that if such a rushed settlement is reached, it may create significant burdens not just for the U.S., but for the international community as a whole.

The weakening of U.S. military strength on a global level also appears inevitable for the time being. This means that military deterrence towards China and Russia will similarly decline. As a result, China and Russia could find themselves in a position to carry out additional acts of military provocation in their respective spheres of influence, raising the level of security threats facing regions such as Taiwan and Europe.

However, there is also analysis suggesting that this crisis could actually be an opportunity for South Korea. After experiencing the Iran war, the U.S. has revealed gaps in military capabilities across multiple fronts and now finds itself in a position where it must rely on joint arms production with allies to compensate. Considering production capacity, economic power, military strength, and manufacturing speed, South Korea is seen as the most reliable partner for the U.S. From this perspective, the current situation is being evaluated as a double-edged sword, presenting both opportunities and burdens for South Korea.

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.