How to Enhance the Effectiveness of the Stewardship Code: Experts' Recommendations for Improvements
"Need to Subdivide Holding Purposes in Large Shareholding Reporting System"
Calls to Abolish Cooling-off Period in Proxy Solicitation
It has been pointed out that, in order to improve the effectiveness of the Stewardship Code, the legal uncertainties of the Large Shareholding Reporting System (the 5% Rule) under the Capital Markets Act must be resolved. In addition, there is a growing need to remove structural barriers that inhibit stewardship activities, such as abolishing the cooling-off period for proxy solicitation and easing requirements for shareholder proposals.
On the afternoon of the 31st, participants are taking a commemorative photo at the seminar on 'Improvements to the General Meeting of Shareholders System to Enhance the Effectiveness of the Stewardship Code' held at the Korea Financial Investment Education Center in Yeouido, Seoul. Photo by Seungwook Park
View original imageNamwoo Lee, chairman of the Korea Corporate Governance Forum, stated at the seminar on 'Measures to Improve the Effectiveness of the Stewardship Code through Shareholders' Meeting System Improvement' held on the afternoon of the 31st at the Korea Financial Investment Education Institute in Yeouido, Seoul, "If the Stewardship Code is to function effectively in the market, revising the 5% Rule and similar regulations is essential."
There has been continued criticism that the ambiguous standards for joint holding under the 5% Rule discourage institutions from cooperative shareholder activities. The 5% Rule requires shareholders who jointly hold more than 5% of shares, including related parties, to disclose their holding purposes and transaction details within five business days. Sangnyeong Yoon, an attorney at Truston Asset Management, pointed out, "Because joint holding can be recognized even based on implicit agreement formed during discussions, institutions are exposed to legal risks from the very beginning of contact." He proposed, "It is necessary to subdivide holding purposes into categories such as control, engagement, general investment, and simple investment. In addition, for cooperation limited to specific agenda items unrelated to control, the obligation to aggregate joint holdings should be exempted by creating a 'Safe Harbor' provision."
There were also calls to abolish the cooling-off period in the proxy solicitation system. Proxy solicitation is a system whereby shareholders are asked to assign their voting rights to others ahead of a general meeting to secure votes, with a cooling-off period prohibiting solicitation activities for two business days after disclosure to ensure sufficient time for investors to review agenda items. Changhwan Lee, CEO of Align Partners Asset Management, explained, "If the company, which has the right to determine the timing of related disclosures, posts the proxy solicitation disclosure just before the Wednesday submission deadline ahead of the shareholders' meeting, the institution can only make its own disclosure as soon as Thursday." He emphasized, "The company can begin solicitation activities starting the following Saturday, after the cooling-off period, but institutions, due to the cooling-off period and the weekend, are delayed and can only start their solicitation on the following Tuesday, which puts them at a disadvantage."
The need for reforms in the scheduling and operation of shareholders' meetings was also raised. Hyunyoung Hwang, senior research fellow at the Korea Capital Market Institute, noted, "Notices for shareholders' meetings are sent two weeks in advance, and business reports are disclosed just one week beforehand. This gives institutions limited time to review hundreds of agenda items and business reports." He suggested, "Like Japan, it is necessary to mandate disclosure of the shareholders' meeting agenda, including the business report, three weeks in advance."
There were also concerns that the requirements for shareholder proposals are too high for large-cap stocks. To make a shareholder proposal, one must either own 3.0% or more of the shares, or own at least 1% (0.5% for large listed companies) for more than six months. Jiyeol Kim, director at Quad Asset Management, commented, "If only the shareholding ratio is considered, small-scale management firms or individual investors cannot make shareholder proposals to companies with high market capitalization." He recommended, "The requirements should be relaxed by allowing shareholders with at least 0.1% voting rights, provided the shares have been held for more than six months."
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Additionally, the seminar addressed the unfavorable structural environment for foreign investors. Yura Ahn, director at the Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA), remarked, "The effectiveness of the Stewardship Code depends on foreign investors having timely access to information and being able to actually exercise their rights." She noted, "Currently, shareholder meeting disclosures in English are often delayed or unavailable, meaning foreign investors lack sufficient time to analyze proposals."
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