Common Misconceptions and Truths About Korea's Real Estate Market
Home Price Growth Mirrors GDP Rise
Over 50% of Population and Businesses Concentrated in the Capital Area

Transaction Taxes Are 5.5 Times OECD Average
High Taxation

[Kim Sangcheol Column Economic Focus] The Issue Is Not a Home Price Surge, But "Capital Area Concentration" View original image

A National Real Estate Policy Discussion Forum, presided over directly by the president, was held on July 23. Many of the claims raised during the forum are based on assumptions that are widely accepted as common sense. However, what is considered common sense in real estate markets does not always align with reality. Let's begin with a fundamental question: Are housing prices in Korea really rising too much, as many people believe?

In principle, homes are not assets that should increase significantly in value. In the United States, real house prices have hardly risen in the long term. Robert Shiller, a professor at Yale University and Nobel laureate in economics, tracked house prices from 1890 and revealed this result. Home prices have only kept pace with the overall growth of the economy and inflation. When you combine the growth rate with the inflation rate, you get the nominal GDP growth rate. If housing prices increase in line with the rate of nominal GDP growth, they are effectively standing still.


In fact, the average housing price growth rate in Korea is not much different from that of the United States. Twenty-five years ago, Korea's nominal GDP was in the 600 trillion-won range, or about 45 billion US dollars. Over the last 25 years, Korea's nominal GDP growth has averaged about 5% to 6% per year, and it is now around 2,400 trillion won, or roughly 2 trillion US dollars—about four times higher than before. During the same period, the nationwide average house price also increased about fourfold. Twenty-five years ago, the hourly minimum wage was 1,865 won, a bowl of black bean noodles was 3,000 won, and Seoul city bus fare was 600 won. In the long term, the national average house price growth in Korea has also moved closely in line with nominal GDP growth.


The real issue, however, lies in Seoul and the greater metropolitan area. Housing prices in these regions structurally tend to outpace economic growth. According to KB Kookmin Bank, the average price of small and mid-sized apartments (with exclusive floor areas of 65 to 84 square meters) in Seoul increased from 190 million won in January 2000 to 1.23 billion won in January 2025—more than a six-fold increase. This year, too, Seoul apartment prices rose by 6%, three times the national average of 2%.


Ultimately, the issue with Korean housing prices is not a nationwide phenomenon, but rather a unique situation caused by structural concentration in the Seoul metropolitan area. This is not as strange as it seems. While the capital region accounts for only 12% of Korea's land area, it is home to 26 million people, or 50.7% of the national population. The region comprises 51.6% of all workers and 49.1% of businesses in the country. Compared to other advanced nations, Korea's level of concentration is extreme. In France, the Paris metropolitan area accounts for about 18% of the population, London's metropolitan area in the UK accounts for 13%, and Tokyo's metropolitan area in Japan accounts for 30%. With such a high concentration of education, jobs, and infrastructure in a single area, it is rational for Seoul home prices to be particularly high.


Reaching a conclusion about the proper level of taxation is not easy either. Is Korea's property holding tax really lower than in other countries? In fact, Korea's holding tax is relatively low. In the United States, the effective property holding tax rate averages 0.8% to 1.2% of the home price nationwide, and in Japan it is around 0.2% to 0.5%, while in Korea it usually remains between 0.1% and 0.3%. However, looking at the holding tax alone can be misleading. Real estate-related taxes fall into two main categories: holding taxes that are paid while owning a property (such as property tax and comprehensive real estate tax), and transaction taxes that are paid when acquiring or selling a property (such as acquisition tax and capital gains tax).


While it is true that Korea's holding taxes are low, in terms of total real estate-related taxes, Korea actually collects more than other countries. When measuring real estate tax revenues as a percentage of GDP, Korea's figure is 3%, almost twice the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) average of 1.6%. The key difference lies in collecting less from holders and more from transactions. Transaction taxes account for 50.4% of Korea's real estate tax revenue, while holding taxes make up just 29.4%. By comparison, the OECD average for holding taxes is about 56%.


Korea's real estate transaction tax is about 5.5 times the OECD average, the highest within the group. The impact of holding and transaction taxes differs in the market. Higher holding taxes increase the incentive to put properties on the market and discourage speculative holding. In contrast, higher transaction taxes lead to "lock-in" effects, where owners are reluctant to sell because of excessive tax burdens. The extent to which increased holding tax is passed on to tenants as higher rent depends on market conditions. If rental demand is strong, it is reasonable to expect more of the tax burden to be transferred to tenants.


Finally, the impact of jeonse loan programs also merits consideration. Have jeonse loans really driven up house prices? In fact, jeonse loans have increased significantly. The outstanding balance of jeonse loans at the five major commercial banks was only 23 trillion won in 2012, but now exceeds 120 trillion won. These additional loans have increased tenants' purchasing power, allowing them to pay higher jeonse deposits, thereby indirectly lowering the operational costs for gap investors.


However, there are limits and criteria for jeonse loans. Typically, the loan cap is 80% of the deposit, up to a maximum of 300 million won in the Seoul metropolitan area. The impact on the high-priced jeonse market in Seoul’s Gangnam district is structurally limited. While there is an effect on the mid- to low-priced jeonse market, the claim that jeonse loans are the main cause of high house prices in Seoul and Gangnam is an exaggeration. Research suggests that the direction of causality is stronger from rising home prices leading to higher jeonse deposits, rather than the other way around. In other words, when house prices go up, jeonse deposits follow—not vice versa.


As most expected, the overall direction of the forum was toward reinforcing taxation. Increases in holding taxes for ultra-high-priced homes and for single homes that are not owner-occupied are expected to be the core of the upcoming tax reform bill. However, policies based on incorrect assumptions are unlikely to yield the desired effects. Policies that target only a subset of the market, no matter how sophisticated, often result in the so-called balloon effect. Many of the current challenges in the Korean real estate market are, in fact, the result of such balloon effects.



Sangcheol Kim, Economic Commentator


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