Government: "Unlikely That Saudi Arabia Has Secured Genuine Independent Uranium Enrichment Rights"

Recently, as the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a new nuclear cooperation agreement, the South Korean government assessed on July 28 that it is difficult to view Saudi Arabia as having obtained genuine "independent enrichment rights." With the U.S. maintaining a strong stance on nonproliferation, close attention is also being paid to how this agreement might influence ongoing nuclear cooperation negotiations between South Korea and the United States.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Annex Building, Government Complex Seoul, Jongno-gu, Seoul. Yonhap News Agency

An official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said during a briefing at the Government Complex Seoul on July 28, "Because U.S. companies will build, operate, and control enrichment facilities in Saudi Arabia in what is termed a 'black box format,' it means that while enrichment occurs 'within Saudi,' it would be difficult to regard this as granting independent enrichment rights." The official also clarified that as the full text of the U.S.–Saudi nuclear cooperation agreement has not been made public yet, this assessment is based on information reported by various foreign media outlets.

According to information disclosed so far, the United States will conduct a two-year joint study with Saudi Arabia to assess the 'feasibility of uranium enrichment.' If the study does not recognize enrichment as feasible, Saudi Arabia will not be permitted to independently pursue enrichment, either alone or with a third country, for the next 10 years. On the other hand, even if the joint study determines that enrichment is necessary, any enrichment facilities must be operated in the so-called 'black box format.' This means that, although the facility would be physically located in Saudi territory, actual authority within the facility would be entirely under the control of the U.S. company. For these reasons, the official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, "It is premature to draw a clear conclusion on whether this agreement actually grants enrichment rights to Saudi Arabia."

Some analysts suggested that Saudi Arabia’s exclusion from signing the Additional Protocol (AP) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under this agreement means that it is also exempt from safeguards. However, the government explained that this is not accurate. The official noted, "It was announced that Saudi Arabia also agreed to a separate bilateral safeguards agreement with the United States," and added, "While it is unclear to what extent the IAEA will be involved, the United States is expected to ensure safeguards measures that meet its own nonproliferation standards and the requirements for congressional approval."

The reason the conclusion of the U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation agreement is attracting attention is because the South Korean government is also preparing for related negotiations with the United States. Some assessments assert that the Saudi case actually reaffirms the U.S. administration’s strong nonproliferation policy. The Foreign Ministry official stated, regarding the possible impact of this on future South Korea-U.S. nuclear cooperation negotiations, "It is difficult to comment on ongoing negotiations," but also said, "There are both opportunities and challenges," expressing a cautious stance.

However, if the United States were to propose similarly limited enrichment rights as provided to Saudi Arabia, it appears the South Korean government would find such terms difficult to accept. Unlike Saudi Arabia, which does not operate any nuclear reactors, South Korea already operates 26 reactors and has significantly more advanced civilian nuclear technology. Moreover, if an issue were to arise concerning the safety of enrichment facilities, operating under a black box format—like in Saudi Arabia—would make independent response extremely difficult. Such an agreement would also fail to align with the spirit of the November 2025 summit agreement between the leaders of South Korea and the United States, which supports procedures "leading to peaceful civilian uranium enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing for Korea."

Meanwhile, follow-up consultations on the Joint Fact Sheet (JFS) from the South Korea-U.S. summit, including the issue of nuclear cooperation, were first held in Seoul on June 2-3. The second round was expected to take place in Washington, D.C. this month, but has been indefinitely postponed. It is expected that once the first major U.S.-bound investment project, which is anticipated to be announced between August and September, is finalized, security-related agreements will also accelerate.

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