Ji-Soon Park, Professor at Korea University Law School

"Clarifying the Scope of Industrial Action Is Essential"

"Performance Bonuses Far Exceeding Annual Salaries Are an Abnormal Practice"

"Excess Profits Are an Internal Metric, Best

Editor's noteThe question of how to distribute corporate performance has become a central topic not only for labor-management negotiations but for the entire industry. The debate over performance-linked bonuses, which began in the semiconductor sector, has since spread to the automobile, shipbuilding, and information technology (IT) sectors, and has even led to demands from subcontractor unions for allocation by parent companies. However, discussions remain focused on how much more will be received, with little social consensus on who should distribute performance, and on what principles and procedures. While American-style performance rewards are often mentioned, the employment flexibility and industry-level allocation criteria that underpin them are largely left out of the debate. Distributing performance without clear principles risks widening disparities not only within companies but throughout the industrial ecosystem, potentially leading to broader social conflict. The Asia Business Daily examines the challenges posed by the ‘N% Performance Bonus’ debate for Korean society through interviews and columns featuring expert perspectives.

The so-called ‘N% performance bonus’ has sparked a debate on not merely a conflict over labor-management compensation, but on who will distribute the profits a company earns, and according to what standards and processes. This issue has exposed gaps in the existing system across areas such as employee performance rewards, corporate investment decision-making authority, shareholder rights, and the scope of union bargaining and strikes. In particular, it has been pointed out that, following the passage of the Yellow Envelope Law (amendments to Articles 2 and 3 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act), confusion has increased as specific standards for practical application have not been sufficiently established.


Ji-Soon Park, Professor at Korea University School of Law, said in an interview with The Asia Business Daily at the Graduate School of Labor Studies at Korea University on the 23rd, “If the president’s remarks are to be supported, the government must itself take the initiative in enacting supplementary legislation.”


Professor Ji-Soon Park of Korea University School of Law is being interviewed by The Asia Business Daily on the 23rd at Korea University Graduate School of Labor Studies in Anam-dong, Seoul. Photo by Cho Yongjun

Professor Ji-Soon Park of Korea University School of Law is being interviewed by The Asia Business Daily on the 23rd at Korea University Graduate School of Labor Studies in Anam-dong, Seoul. Photo by Cho Yongjun

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Earlier, President Lee Jaemyung stated during a cabinet meeting on the 21st, “Is dividing a certain percentage of operating profit a subject for industrial disputes? Even shareholders cannot demand such a thing,” drawing a clear line that performance-based bonuses are not a legitimate subject of dispute. On this, Professor Park commented, “The Supreme Court has declared that the legal environment is fundamentally different before and after the Yellow Envelope Law, and that a conversion of the legal framework has occurred.” He added, “However, concrete guidelines for applying the revised law on the ground have not been sufficiently established.”


He pointed out that the government has also contributed to confusion regarding whether corporate performance-based bonuses should be a subject of collective bargaining. During efforts to resolve the labor dispute at Samsung Electronics, the government’s involvement in mediation implied that such matters could naturally become subjects for collective bargaining.


He said, “In a situation where it is unclear whether performance bonuses are a typical subject for labor-management negotiation or for strikes, the government gave the impression that it was naturally a matter for mediation.” He continued, “From the union’s perspective, it was only natural to see this as part of normal bargaining.” He emphasized, “It should have been clearly stated that this is not a subject for negotiation or mediation.”


Professor Park stressed that supplementary legislation is necessary to provide concrete standards clarifying the scope of industrial action and the definition of ‘employer.’ He said, “If no supplementary legislation is enacted, guidelines issued by the executive branch cannot bind the judiciary,” and “Enforcement decrees and regulations cannot have legal effect without formal delegation from the main statute.”


"Bonuses Exceeding Salaries: An Abnormal Reward System"

Professor Ji-Soon Park of Korea University School of Law is interviewed by The Asia Business Daily on the 23rd at Korea University Graduate School of Labor Studies in Anam-dong, Seoul. Photo by Jo Yongjun

Professor Ji-Soon Park of Korea University School of Law is interviewed by The Asia Business Daily on the 23rd at Korea University Graduate School of Labor Studies in Anam-dong, Seoul. Photo by Jo Yongjun

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He diagnosed that the fundamental problem lies in the operating-profit-linked performance bonus system itself. Professor Park explained, “It’s not the existence of performance-based bonuses per se that’s problematic, but the excessive payments, which far exceed annual salaries, and the practice of fixing an abnormal rate of operating profit as the bonus amount.”


He described management performance bonuses as closer to a variable bonus—rather than guaranteed salary—that distributes additional profits after the fact. “When there is a surplus, it is of course reasonable for employees to share in corporate profits as a form of motivation. However, the issue is when the ‘belly button’ (bonus) is bigger than the ‘belly’ (salary),” he said. He added, “Ordinarily, performance bonuses have been paid at the level of one or two months, perhaps two or three months’ salary, but if the bonus is several times greater than the annual salary, it is questionable whether this can be called a normal compensation structure.”


Professor Park argued that the ordinary range of management performance bonuses should more appropriately be discussed through labor-management councils rather than collective bargaining based on the prospect of a strike. He cited the Act on the Promotion of Worker Participation and Cooperation as specifying ‘productivity improvement and profit sharing’ as a key item of consultation in labor-management councils.


He particularly warned that setting an excessively high rate for performance bonuses and fixing bonuses as a portion of operating profit could result in managerial inflexibility regarding corporate investment. “When a company generates profit, how those profits are used is a matter of management and investment strategy—decisions for which management must assume responsibility. If 10% or 15% of operating profit is set aside as a fixed payout, it could distort management’s investment planning and strategy,” he said.


Regarding the recent debate on excess profits, he objected to the government designating as ‘excess profit’ any amount above corporate targets—which are meant for investors and internal management assessment—and then using this as a policy standard. While he agreed with strengthening the social responsibility of parent companies and improving the welfare and working conditions of subcontractor employees, he argued that, rather than directly designating uses for company profits or mandating contributions to social solidarity funds, it would be preferable to promote voluntary corporate investment by providing incentives such as corporate tax reductions.


As another supplementary measure, he proposed amending both the Trade Union Act and the Commercial Act. Since it is difficult to list every matter subject to negotiation in the Trade Union Act, he explained that it would be practical to require that performance bonuses exceeding a certain size be subject to approval by the board of directors or the general shareholders’ meeting. “If a performance bonus requires the allocation of 5% or 10% of an operating metric, such as operating or net profit, a board resolution could be mandated,” he said. “And, if necessary, significant bonuses could also require the consent of the general shareholders’ meeting.”


Profile


Professor Ji-Soon Park


▲ Current: Professor, School of Law, Korea University


▲ Education: Master of Laws, School of Law, Korea University; Doctor of Laws, Faculty of Law, University of Augsburg, Germany


▲ Previous: Dean of the Graduate School of Labor Studies, Korea University; President, Korea Association of Employment and Labor Relations



▲ Served as a member of the Labor Policy Advisory Council at the Ministry of Employment and Labor; Public Member of the Seoul Regional Labor Relations Commission; Board Member, Korean Society of Labor Law, and more


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