[Why&Next] "230 Calls" vs "Coupang's Lies"... The 'Mystery' of NIS Involvement Allegations

U.S. House Report: "NIS Involved in Retrieval Process"

National Intelligence Service: "No Orders Beyond Data Request"

Political Circles and Civic Groups Issue Rebuttal Reports

The controversy surrounding the so-called 'Coupang Discrimination Report,' released by the U.S. House Judiciary Committee earlier this month, continues to persist. The report, based on materials submitted by Coupang to the U.S. Congress and the testimony of Harold Rogers, Interim Representative of Coupang, identifies the South Korean government’s comprehensive investigation following the major Coupang personal information leak late last year as a representative example of discrimination against U.S. companies, emerging as a new point of contention in Korea-U.S. relations.

The Korean government expressed regret over the report, calling it “an unverified allegation,” while politicians and civic groups responded with a compendium of point-by-point rebuttals and, separately, a report titled the “Coupang Illegal Activities Report.” Notably, the South Korean and U.S. sides have been unable to narrow their differences, with conflicting claims about the involvement of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) in the process of retrieving equipment related to the Coupang data breach.

Coupang: "The NIS contacted us first...Requested cooperation on cyberterrorism"

The contents of the report, based on Coupang’s claims, are detailed.

According to the interim investigative report of the U.S. House Judiciary Committee, “Market Closed to Competition: Korea’s Discriminatory Attacks on American Companies,” the National Intelligence Service (NIS) first contacted Coupang on December 1, 2025, at around 2 p.m. The contact came ten days after Coupang reported the data breach on November 18, 2025, and the following day after a joint meeting attended by then-CEO Park Daejoon of Coupang and multiple government agencies, which convened after it became public that more than 30 million customer records had been accessed without authorization.

At that time, the NIS requested to hold a meeting at Coupang’s Seoul office and, about two hours later, two director-level officials visited. They asked Coupang to keep the details of the meeting confidential both internally and externally and cited the National Intelligence Service Act as the basis for Coupang’s “obligation to cooperate” in retrieving equipment held by a former developer in China, according to the report.

That evening, Coupang requested an official written statement citing the legal grounds. The next day, the NIS sent an official document to the Coupang CEO titled “Request for Cooperation on Work Related to Identifying and Investigating Cybersecurity Threats.” The document specifically referenced Articles 4 and 5 of the National Intelligence Service Act and requested materials required for analyzing and responding to the cause of the cybersecurity threat. According to the report, Coupang subsequently requested legal review from two large domestic law firms, and both concluded that there is indeed a statutory obligation to cooperate under the NIS Act.

The NIS refuted these claims, stating that they regarded the large-scale data leak by a foreign national as a national security threat and only conducted consultations to collect information and prevent further damage. They emphasized that there was “no direction, order, or coercion” in relation to the incident investigation.

From Shanghai business trip to equipment retrieval: A 'truth game'

The report noted that, between December 1 and December 26, there were more than 230 phone calls and multiple face-to-face meetings between the NIS and Coupang. During this time, the NIS is said to have provided specific instructions and advice regarding the content and tone of emails to be sent to the former developer, as well as methods for retrieving the equipment.

The most notable aspect centers on the retrieval of information related to hacking from Coupang’s former developer. On December 15, the former developer brought four hard drives (excluding a laptop), a desktop computer, and a graphics card to a local law office in Shanghai appointed by Coupang. Coupang claims to have notified the NIS of securing the equipment the following day.

The NIS, unable to operate directly in China as a foreign intelligence agency, reportedly told Coupang that an employee would have to receive the equipment locally. When Coupang raised concerns about employee safety and legal risks in China, the NIS is said to have promised to have a security support team nearby. Additionally, the NIS advised that it would be better not to inform the police until the equipment retrieval process was complete, according to the report.

Particularly, after receiving the equipment and a written statement from the former developer at the Shanghai law office on December 17, a Coupang employee was then instructed by the NIS to move to a location without closed-circuit (CC) TV. There, the Coupang employee handed over the equipment and the statement to an NIS official. The Coupang side and the report claim that the NIS official then took the equipment to the Korean diplomatic mission in Shanghai.

The next day, the NIS requested another written statement with the former developer’s fingerprint, and also asked Coupang to retrieve the laptop that had been discarded in a river using divers. After retrieving the laptop, Coupang handed over both the fingerprinted statement and the laptop to the NIS. It was claimed that the equipment and materials were brought back to Korea via diplomatic pouch the following day.

The NIS categorically denied all of the details noted in the report, including the overseas business trip, procedures for retrieval and transfer, fingerprint collection, and the request for retrieval of the discarded laptop.

"Due to the security nature of intelligence agencies, it is impossible to confirm NIS involvement solely through documents"

Rebuttals to the U.S. House report have also emerged. Kim Hanjung, a lawmaker from the Democratic Party of Korea, stated in his “Rebuttal Materials on the U.S. House Judiciary Committee Report on Coupang,” that “Due to the nature of intelligence and security matters, it is impossible to definitively determine the involvement, command structure, or statutory obligations of the NIS solely based on company documents, and there are fundamental limitations in reconstructing the entire factual relationship.” He went on to state that “the Coupang report uses these as if they are already proven facts to undermine the credibility of the Korean government, making it more of a political message leaning on Coupang’s claims than an objective analysis.”

People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) also submitted its own report to the U.S. House Judiciary Committee, titled “Coupang’s Indiscriminate Attacks on Korean Workers, Consumers, and Small Businesses by an American Company,” also known as the “Coupang Illegal Activities Report,” which detailed ten illegal acts by Coupang, including the recent personal data breach, hiding of work-related fatalities, and allegations of interfering with investigations. The report pointed out that “Coupang’s repeated illegal acts are the reason for investigations by Korean government agencies, and Coupang’s claim of being an ‘unjust target’ not only contradicts the facts but is also a serious distortion.”

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.