[Insight & Opinion] The Current State of Prosecutorial Reform and the Controversy over Supplementary Investigative Powers

Reduced to Tools of Political Strife... Restoration of the System Must Come First

Transferring Monopoly Power from Prosecution to Police Could Be Even More Dangerous

Beyond Factional Logic, Toward Normalizing the Justice System

"What is this? Aren't we just fools now? I feel like a fool."

This was the self-deprecating remark made by comedian Kang Sungbeom—known for his unwavering support of the ruling bloc's prosecution reform—during a YouTube broadcast. He had believed there was a safety mechanism in place to resolve public grievances if the investigative authority of prosecutors was completely stripped away, but upon reflection, he realized that such a mechanism does not exist. Now, the prosecution reform, which has charged ahead since the Moon Jae-in administration, is facing reassessment amid the controversy over the abolition of the supplementary investigative authority.

Prosecution reform under President Moon Jae-in gained momentum through "prosecution-police investigative authority adjustment" and the establishment of the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials (CIO), focusing on dismantling the monopoly of judicial power and privileges held by the prosecution. Institutional reforms were implemented to restrict the prosecution's authority to initiate direct investigations to six major crimes, and to set up the CIO as an agency tasked with investigating crimes by high-ranking officials, including prosecutors. Even the fast-track legislative process in the National Assembly was utilized.

During a New Year's press conference in 2020, President Moon stated, "Now that the institutional framework for prosecution reform is in place, the only remaining task is to improve practices." However, when Cho Kuk was appointed as Minister of Justice, suspicions of legal violations involving him and his family arose. Some responded by blaming the prosecution and countering with more calls for prosecution reform.

From there, prosecution reform further devolved into a tool for partisan power struggles. The slogan "complete deprivation of the prosecution's investigatory rights" ("prosecution investigation complete deprivation") emerged, leading to an amendment of the Prosecutors' Office Act, which reduced the scope of crimes eligible for direct investigation by prosecutors from six to two categories. Even within those two, boundaries were not strictly defined. Crimes such as corruption and economic crimes were specified, but the authority to designate investigative targets was delegated to presidential decrees, allowing flexibility in operation. This loophole in the legal text was later exploited by Han Donghun, the Minister of Justice under President Yoon Suk Yeol, who revised the enforcement decree to expand the prosecutor's direct investigative authority.

The Democratic Party and the Lee Jae-myung administration launched a counteroffensive. Plans are underway to abolish the Prosecutors' Office altogether, and to restructure the system so that the Prosecution Service would handle only indictments, while a new Major Crimes Investigation Agency would take charge of investigations. This change is scheduled to take effect in October. Whether to abolish or revise the supplementary investigative authority stipulated in the current Criminal Procedure Act is now the final contentious issue. Having charged forward in a politically driven manner for so long, the realities of prosecution reform are now being reconsidered. The Democratic Party has already proposed a bill to abolish the supplementary investigative authority, including some partial safeguards, but immediate legislative passage appears unlikely given the internal disagreements within the party.

Yonhap News

The worry is over the scenario in which the police, rather than prosecutors, conclude all criminal investigations. This has been a point of contention since the initial phase of adjusting the investigative authority between police and prosecutors. In particular, transferring the monopoly of investigative power from prosecutors to the police, rather than reforming to prevent monopoly in the first place, could be even more dangerous. The reform was originally intended as part of a broader overhaul of power institutions, predicated on simultaneous prosecution reform, police reform, and the introduction of autonomous policing. In reality, however, the transfer of investigative authority proceeded separately from efforts to reform the police.

The example of the UK's Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), often cited to advocate for separation of investigation and indictment, is actually an illusory comparison. In the UK, where there was never a prosecutorial system to begin with, the police historically held both investigative and prosecution powers. The CPS, established in 1986, served as a check on this arrangement by introducing a prosecutor’s office. If investigation and indictment are not methodologically integrated, then prosecutors responsible for upholding indictments could be reduced to the role of public defenders.

Despite the president's view that supplementary measures are needed to balance the police's authority to conclude investigations, the Democratic Party's push for complete abolition has played out like a clash between separate factions running in parallel. There have even been unusual scenes of Minister of Justice Jeong Sungho failing to form consensus with the ruling party and instead asking the opposition in parliamentary discussions to convey his concerns. The government and the ruling party should collect differing opinions and present responsible alternatives. Now, those alternatives should transcend political and emotional retribution toward prosecutors and focus on genuine reforms to the criminal justice system.

Kim Manheum, former Director of the National Assembly Legislative Research Office

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.