[KOSPI 10,000 Era] Dual Listings to Be Curbed: "A Practical Compromise... Effectiveness and Existing Listings Remain Challenges"
Experts Weigh In on Dual Listing Guidelines
Stronger Protection for Ordinary Shareholders While Allowing Corporate Exceptions
Boston Dynamics, Hyundai Motor Subsidiary, Expected to Proceed Smoothly with Listing
The financial authorities' recently released guidelines on dual listing are being evaluated in the market as a "practical compromise" that strikes a balance between protecting minority shareholders and addressing the realities faced by companies. While the guidelines fundamentally prohibit dual listings—a key factor behind the so-called "Korea discount"—they also allow for exceptions and differentiated regulations on a case-by-case basis, so as not to excessively stifle companies’ fundraising and initial public offering (IPO) activities. However, the guidelines do not include measures for companies that are already dual-listed, and questions remain regarding the effectiveness of the review process and the adequacy of penalties.
According to the Financial Services Commission (FSC) on July 7, the "Detailed Standards (Guidelines) for Banning Dual Listings in Principle and Allowing Exceptions," released the previous day, require that when a physically separated subsidiary is listed, the approval of the parent company's general shareholders must be obtained, and the voting rights of the largest shareholder and related parties are capped at 3% under the "3% rule." In contrast, for ordinary subsidiaries, listing is allowed even without shareholder approval, provided the company passes the exchange’s rigorous individual review. Furthermore, the guidelines specify five key obligations for the board of directors of parent companies, such as conducting shareholder impact assessments and developing shareholder protection measures, by clarifying the duty of loyalty to shareholders under the amended Commercial Act.
"Significant Progress"... Divergent Opinions on Details Like the 3% Rule
Capital market experts unanimously agree that the mere establishment of these guidelines is "significant progress." Lee Namwoo, Chair of the Korea Corporate Governance Forum, commented, "Prohibiting dual listings in principle and imposing shareholder protection duties on the parent company’s board is a step forward for minority shareholder protection." Lee Junseo, Professor of Business Administration at Dongguk University, said, "It is positive that the guidelines not only maintain the basic policy of prohibiting dual listings but also clarify and specify the exceptions."
Professor Lee especially noted that compared to previous proposals, the scope of exceptions in the new guidelines has been broadened. He explained, "The guidelines have provided breathing room for companies by allowing dual listings when necessary, such as when the parent and subsidiary operate in different business areas." He added, "While upholding the principle of restraining dual listings, the guidelines appear to have incorporated some input from companies." An industry official also agreed, saying, "It is desirable to take a case-by-case approach."
Boston Dynamics, part of Hyundai Motor Group, is likely classified as a low-weight subsidiary exempt from shareholder approval due to its revenue scale. Essex Solutions, part of the LS Group, which was previously at the center of a dual listing controversy, is an ordinary subsidiary and thus does not require shareholder approval, but must still pass an individual review. In contrast, HD Hyundai Robotics, as a physically separated subsidiary from its parent, must obtain shareholder approval.
However, there are differing opinions regarding the application of the 3% rule when determining shareholder approval. Some argue that, given the uniquely high level of control exerted by owner families and chaebols in Korea, a "Majority of Minority" (MoM) system that reflects only the will of minority shareholders—excluding controlling shareholders and related parties—would be a more appropriate mechanism.
Chairman Lee stated, "Dual listings are a prime example where the interests of controlling and minority shareholders conflict, making the protection of minority shareholders crucial. However, under the dual listing guidelines, even the minority shareholders—the intended beneficiaries—end up having their voting rights limited to just 3%. Immediate revisions, such as adopting the MoM system, are necessary." Im Sungyoon, CEO of Dalton Korea, also expressed regret that the guidelines adopted the 3% rule instead of MoM and placed more weight on independent committees than on the MoM system. In response, the financial authorities noted that the Ministry of Justice previously found it difficult to recommend the MoM system on the grounds that it would conflict with the principle of shareholder equality, as outlined in its own guidelines on the duty of loyalty to shareholders.
The Challenge of Resolving Existing Dual Listings... Is a 1 Billion Won Penalty Effective?
It is also considered a limitation that the new guidelines apply only to future dual listings. This is because the system does not address the destruction of corporate value or the conflicts of interest between parent and subsidiary shareholders that occur in companies that are already dual-listed. CEO Im pointed out, "In addition to preventing future dual listings, policies that can resolve those already in place are also needed." According to the FSC, as of the end of last year, Korea's dual listing ratio—measured by the ratio of cross-shareholdings among listed companies to total market capitalization—was 11.2%, far higher than that of the United States (0.05%), China (2.4%), Taiwan (2.7%), and Japan (4.0%).
The need for post-listing management mechanisms has also been raised. A representative of the Korea Capital Market Institute explained, "In major overseas markets, the focus is not so much on regulating new dual listings, but rather on managing inefficiencies and conflicts of interest that arise afterward. This is because even if shareholder consent is obtained at the time of the subsidiary’s listing, controlling shareholders can continue to enjoy the benefits of dual listings thereafter."
Ultimately, the success or failure of the system depends on the effectiveness of the review process. Since current review standards are still abstract, it will be necessary to build up case studies to enhance predictability going forward. Professor Lee emphasized, "Assigning responsibility to the parent company’s board is meaningful, but at present, there are still many procedural and formal elements. Robust exchange reviews and post-listing management are needed to ensure that minority shareholder protection is actually achieved." In the business community, there is both relief that "the worst uncertainty has been avoided" and concern that the burden on companies may increase as they are required to demonstrate their efforts to protect shareholder interests going forward.
There are also growing calls for clearer penalties and incentives to prevent abuses of dual listings. The maximum penalty of 1 billion won, and a one-day trading suspension imposed on parent company boards that fail to fulfill their obligations, are criticized as being insufficient. Ko Youngho, Director of the Capital Markets Division at the FSC, responded, "We plan to continually update specific review cases in the guidelines to improve predictability," and added, "(To prevent regulatory circumvention) we will review and revise the guidelines every six months."
The draft guidelines, which entered a week-long official public comment period starting today, as well as the proposed amendments to Korea Exchange regulations, are expected to go into effect as early as July after deliberation and approval by the Securities and Futures Commission and the FSC’s regular meetings.
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