On July 3, the court terminated Homeplus’s rehabilitation proceedings, but added a caveat: if the company secures 200 billion won in operating funds within two weeks and files an immediate appeal, the process may resume. Some are calling this two-week period a “golden time,” expressing hope that if the largest shareholder MBK Partners and the main creditor Meritz Financial make a decisive move, the company could be saved.


There is a precedent that foreshadowed the outcome of such hopes. In April last year, Curious Partners provided Homeplus with 60 billion won in emergency operating funds (DIP financing)—a loan similar in nature to the current 200 billion won under discussion. However, this loan became unrecoverable in just over a year, and on the day the rehabilitation was terminated, an Event of Default (EOD) was declared, shifting the repayment claim to Chairman Kim Byung-joo personally, who had guaranteed the loan. If 60 billion won ended this way, there is little reason for optimism regarding the fate of the 200 billion won. While overall retail sales are rising, large discount stores are the only sector seeing declining sales. The operating funds are being depleted to cover the drop in sales, inevitably leading to further requests for capital. After 200 billion won, 300 billion won or even 400 billion won may be needed.


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How different would Homeplus’s situation be today if not for MBK? While it is true that Homeplus’s aggressive leveraged buyout (LBO) structure weakened the company’s fundamentals, even unrelated competitors like Emart and Lotte Mart saw declining sales and closed stores during the same period. Just a few years ago, lawmakers vilified large retailers, claiming they would revive traditional markets. Now, the entire discount retail sector, squeezed between Coupang, Daiso, and Aliexpress, is shrinking. MBK may have accelerated the decline, but the direction had already been set.


An industry insider in the private equity fund (PEF) sector said, “I don’t know what more MBK can realistically do at this point.” MBK’s 2.5 trillion won in common equity has already been written off, and the 400 billion won it contributed or guaranteed is now coming due, starting with the Curious Partners case. Meritz is in a position to dispose of the stores held as collateral and recover its loans independently. With the company’s liquidation value now surpassing its value as a going concern, neither the largest shareholder nor the main creditor has any incentive to inject an additional 200 billion won.



The Financial Supervisory Service is reportedly preparing to impose stern disciplinary action, including suspension of MBK’s business activities. This could prompt MBK to make a more proactive decision. However, even if the funds are provided, it would be like pouring water into a bottomless pit. MBK should be held accountable; yet, judgment and relief are two separate matters. If all attention remains fixed on the “evil private equity fund” slogan and the source of the 200 billion won, the inevitable conclusion is simply delayed—while unpaid wages and accounts payable accumulate, increasing the pain that must eventually be borne. This is why “200 billion won within two weeks” is less a condition for revival and more an exercise in false hope.


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