Consent Rate of Guarantee Institutions at 15.7%, Down 16.5 Percentage Points Compared to Financial Sector
Preference for Selling Debt Increases Burden on KAMCO

The government is encouraging debt restructuring through the Saechulbal Fund to support the recovery of small business owners and self-employed individuals. However, the consent rate for debt restructuring from guarantee institutions, such as regional credit guarantee foundations, remains at just around 15%. Critics argue that these guarantee institutions, which were established to financially support small businesses, are focusing more on managing their claims than on providing actual support.


Regional Credit Guarantee Foundations Meant to Help Small Businesses... 8 Out of 10 Saechulbal Fund Debt Restructuring Cases Rejected View original image

According to Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO) on June 27, the cumulative number of intermediary-type debt restructuring applications submitted to the Credit Counseling & Recovery Service for 22 guarantee institutions reached 99,882 as of the end of May this year. Of these, creditor consent was obtained for only 15,708 cases. The consent rate stands at 15.7%, down 0.2 percentage points from 15.9% at the end of April.


Most of the 22 guarantee institutions are regional credit guarantee foundations, and their consent rate for debt restructuring is significantly lower than the average consent rate of 32.2% for all financial companies, including banks, savings banks, and credit finance companies.


Debt restructuring through the Saechulbal Fund is divided into two main types: 'purchase-type', in which non-performing loans are purchased and restructured, and 'intermediary-type', in which the Credit Counseling & Recovery Service mediates debt restructuring. The intermediary-type supports debtors whose delinquency period is less than 90 days, offering reductions in overdue interest, interest rate adjustments, and repayment period extensions of up to 10 years. If the creditor consent rate reaches 50% or higher, intermediary-type debt restructuring is finalized. If the consent rate is below 50%, intermediary-type restructuring is prioritized and then the relevant debt is purchased by the Saechulbal Fund.


There is analysis that economic incentives are behind guarantee institutions' reluctance to participate in intermediary-type restructuring. These institutions provide guarantees so that small business owners can obtain loans from banks, and in cases where the borrower defaults, they play the role of subrogation by repaying the loan to the financial institution in advance. Afterwards, they take over the claim and attempt to recover the funds themselves.


In this situation, if they agree to intermediary-type restructuring, they must recover the principal and interest in installments over up to 10 years. On the other hand, if they refuse, the Saechulbal Fund purchases the claim, allowing the guarantee institution to recover a certain amount all at once. This means they do not have to hold onto uncertain claims for a long time, reducing the burden of management and making capital operations more advantageous.


This structure is criticized for diverging from the original purpose of regional credit guarantee foundations, which is to support small business financing. For guarantee institutions, selling claims rather than restructuring them is more cost-effective and less risky. As a result, there is criticism that regional credit guarantee foundations are prioritizing claim management over helping debtors recover.


The more claims are purchased through the Saechulbal Fund, the greater the burden on KAMCO becomes. The fund was designed from the outset to absorb losses from principal write-downs for vulnerable borrowers, and its resources are 100% funded by KAMCO. As the scale of non-performing loan purchases grows, the government's fiscal burden also increases. The recent moves by financial authorities and KAMCO to strengthen the asset review and principal reduction standards for the Saechulbal Fund are seen as measures reflecting these fiscal concerns.



An official in the financial sector stated, "Financial companies and guarantee institutions inevitably weigh which option—restructuring or selling claims—is more economically beneficial. To uphold the intent of the policy, there is a need to introduce institutional incentives so that participating in intermediary-type restructuring is the more attractive choice."


This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.

© The Asia Business Daily. All rights reserved. Unauthorized AI training and use prohibited.

Today’s Briefing