The Justification for Service Fees Remains Unclear
Hardliners in Iran Voice Strong Opposition





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As the memorandum of understanding (MOU) marking the end of hostilities between the United States and Iran takes effect, fierce controversy is erupting on both sides over the provision in the agreement concerning the opening of the Strait of Hormuz. The dispute centers on the clause stating that Iran will open the Strait of Hormuz free of charge for 60 days, after which a so-called 'service fee' will be imposed. This has sparked widespread interpretation that it amounts to a de facto toll, leading to criticism within the U.S. that the Trump Administration conceded too much, while in Iran, hardliners are simultaneously attacking negotiators for giving up a core national right.

Iran Renames Transit Fee as 'Service Fee'

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Reuters Yonhap News

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Initially, the Iranian side referred to this charge as a 'transit fee.' However, after strong backlash from the international community, including President Donald Trump, Iran changed the term to 'service fee.' Nonetheless, the prevailing view is that only the label has changed, and in substance, there is no real difference from a toll. The controversy is further fueled by the fact that the Strait of Hormuz is a naturally formed waterway, not an artificial structure built by any one country, and there is no precedent for any nation imposing tolls or fees on its passage.


According to experts, the only significant example globally of a separate fee for passage through a strait is the Bosporus Strait in Istanbul, Turkey. The Bosporus has long charged for safety services under the 1936 Montreux Convention due to its narrow width and hazardous currents, which have caused frequent accidents. By contrast, the Strait of Hormuz has seen no major incidents over centuries of use, and recent vessel damage was caused directly by Iranian missile and drone attacks during the war, making the justification of a 'safety service' fee highly questionable.


Overseas experts are also criticizing the move, asking, "What services is Iran actually providing?" Some even cynically suggest Iran is demanding payment simply for not attacking oil tankers or merchant ships. In the U.S., there is a growing consensus that this issue could become an even bigger political flashpoint.


President Trump has repeatedly declared that the Strait of Hormuz would be reopened "for free," "as before," but news that it will only be toll-free for 60 days before charges are imposed has led to sarcastic criticism within the U.S., with some comparing the arrangement to a "Netflix subscription service." There is also mounting criticism that President Trump may have made excessive concessions to Iran in his rush to finalize the MOU.

Iranian Hardliners Slam the MOU as a Humiliating Deal

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AP Yonhap News Agency

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The internal reaction within Iran is particularly noteworthy. While external observers are calling this agreement a "practical victory" for Iran in securing Hormuz fees, hardliners within Iran are claiming the exact opposite: that Iran has actually lost, and forfeited its rights over the strait. Hardliners argue that since the Strait of Hormuz has always been Iran's territorial waters, agreeing to open passage and seeking U.S. consent for this is, in itself, an act of self-imposed restriction on Iran's sovereignty.


The criticism from hardliners extends to the issue of frozen assets. They object to the fact that the MOU does not guarantee the immediate release of half of Iran's frozen funds, as previously promised by the U.S. Although the agreement mentions the creation of a $300 billion reconstruction fund, it is conditional on the finalization of the agreement, making it uncertain whether Iran will actually receive any funds. Given Iran's severe economic difficulties, the lack of clarity around the timing and procedures for fund inflows is a major source of dissatisfaction among hardliners.


The MOU has already been signed and approved by the Supreme Leader, making it difficult to overturn the agreement itself. Nevertheless, hardliners are sharply criticizing negotiators, accusing them of "selling out the country," and some are even demanding the resignation of President Masoud Pezeshkian and Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who led the negotiations.


Analysts suggest that this hardline offensive is rooted in a power struggle over political responsibility. As the war effectively winds down, hardliners and the Revolutionary Guards could face blame for failing to prevent the U.S. attack. To preemptively avoid this, they have turned their criticism toward the negotiators and government. While the Iranian government hopes the Supreme Leader will rein in the hardliners, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has not appeared in public due to health issues, leaving a power vacuum that hardliners are exploiting to escalate their attacks.


The problem is that this internal power struggle could negatively affect the follow-up negotiations that must be concluded within the short 60-day window. President Trump has already mentioned the possibility of military options—including renewed airstrikes—if negotiations are not completed within 60 days. Within the U.S., there are concerns that the MOU is overly vague on key issues and that even within the White House, disputes over the interpretation of the agreement's language are likely to arise during further negotiations.


The main issues for the next round of negotiations are threefold: the opening of the Strait of Hormuz and the fee structure, how to handle Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium, and the release of frozen assets. The agreement stipulates that Iran's enriched uranium will be diluted locally under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supervision, but this is provoking fierce backlash even within the U.S. Republican Party. Since President Trump's stated war objective was the destruction of Iran's nuclear capability, there is growing skepticism in U.S. political circles about what the war achieved if the U.S. is not even able to take direct custody of the enriched uranium. There are also doubts about whether Iran can be trusted with on-site dilution and international monitoring.


The issue of frozen assets remains a major sticking point. For the assets to be released, the U.S. would need to lift sanctions on Iran and restore Iran's access to the global payment system, which requires the cooperation of Western allies and cannot be accomplished by the U.S. alone. The U.S. wants to wait until all follow-up negotiations are concluded before releasing funds, while Iran claims the U.S. had promised to release half of the frozen assets up front. The MOU itself does not specify any concrete timeline or procedure for the release of funds, making this issue a key variable in the upcoming second round of negotiations.

Uncertainty Over Limited 60-Day Window Raises Fears of Indefinite Extension

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Under these circumstances, most observers believe that it is unlikely all issues will be resolved within the 60-day timeframe. President Trump himself has indicated that while the second round of talks is scheduled for 60 days, this deadline is not set in stone and could be extended. In reality, the U.S. military has lifted its naval blockade of Iran but has not withdrawn its forces from the Middle East, signaling that military action could resume at any time if negotiations collapse. This underscores the extremely unstable balance on which the talks rest.


The U.S. is also concerned that Iranian hardliners with military power could topple the current government, which is relatively conciliatory toward the U.S. There is widespread unease in Washington that the current negotiators and government could be replaced at any moment. Given that the 2015 Iran nuclear deal under the Obama Administration took over two years of working-level talks, many believe that the current 60-day deadline is far too short, and that resolving all core issues will require at least the rest of the year. As a result, there is growing expectation that, while both sides may avoid all-out war, sporadic low-intensity clashes could persist under a tenuous ceasefire.


This situation clearly demonstrates that the implementation of a ceasefire agreement does not automatically lead to a stable peace. While the agreement itself contains the framework for a truce, its key clauses are left vague, without specific figures or procedures, leading to political aftershocks on both sides even before the details are worked out. Particularly, the inclusion of unprecedented provisions such as the 'service fee' clause for the Strait of Hormuz suggests that both parties prioritized a quick deal at the expense of leaving technical matters for later negotiations. As a result, this ambiguity is now providing ammunition for political attacks within both the U.S. and Iran.



Experts point to changes in Iran's internal power dynamics as the most important variable to watch during the follow-up negotiations, which could last for 60 days or even longer. With persistent rumors about the Supreme Leader's health and intensifying hardliner attacks on moderates, there are fears that if the negotiating faction loses power or if the government changes, the hard-won momentum to implement the MOU could evaporate. The U.S., too, cannot ignore bipartisan criticism within Congress, and there is speculation that the Trump Administration may demand even tougher terms in the follow-up negotiations than in the original agreement.

Iran to Charge 'Service Fee' Instead of Toll at Hormuz... "First 60 Days Free" [Current Affairs Show] View original image


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