Korea Capital Market Institute Symposium on Improving the M&A System for Shareholder Value Enhancement

"Need for the Right to Request Maintenance of a Merger and Introduction of a Mandatory Tender Offer System in M&As"

In the process of mergers and acquisitions (M&A), recommendations have been made to strengthen the procedures for calculating merger prices, enhance disclosures related to voluntary delisting, and introduce a mandatory tender offer system in the form of a full tender offer, in order to protect the rights and interests of ordinary shareholders. Financial authorities announced that, while promoting the mandatory tender offer system, they will also select and release a list of low price-to-book ratio (PBR) companies in October, encouraging these companies to make their own efforts to enhance corporate value.


The Korea Capital Market Institute held a symposium titled "Directions for Improving the M&A System to Enhance Shareholder Value" jointly with the Korean Securities Association at the Financial Investment Center in Yeouido, Seoul, on June 17.


Hyunyoung Hwang, a research fellow at the Korea Capital Market Institute, who gave a presentation at the event, stated, "After three amendments to the Commercial Act and revisions to the Capital Markets Act Enforcement Decree, the next task is to protect shareholders’ interests in the M&A process, where shareholder value could be damaged." She emphasized the need to introduce measures such as strengthened disclosure, the right to request maintenance of a merger, and the system of merger inspectors.


First, Research Fellow Hwang said, "Disclosures related to mergers should include detailed explanations from the board of directors regarding the necessity of the transaction and the appropriateness of the merger price." She added, "For tender offers aimed at delisting, it is also necessary to regulate disclosures on advantages and disadvantages, as is done in foreign countries."


She also called for systems to ensure fairness when a merger may harm shareholders’ interests. Hwang suggested, "If shareholders, after checking merger disclosures, determine that they would be disadvantaged, they should be able to exercise the right to request maintenance of the merger. New systems should also be considered, such as appointing external experts as merger inspectors to evaluate the appropriateness of the merger price."


Although an amendment to the Capital Markets Act, focusing on fair merger pricing in intra-group M&As, passed the National Assembly's Political Affairs Committee in May, she argued that to ensure effectiveness, strengthened disclosure of the board's opinion and follow-up legislation are needed. Currently, merger prices for listed companies in Korea are mainly calculated based on the reference market price.


There was also criticism that the criteria for small-scale mergers need to be revised. Small-scale mergers allow mergers without a general meeting of shareholders if the surviving company issues new shares or transfers treasury shares amounting to 10% or less of its outstanding shares. Over 90% of mergers among listed companies are small-scale mergers, and dissenting shareholders cannot exercise appraisal rights. She argued that the criteria for small-scale mergers should be changed from the number of shares issued to net asset value, and that the system should be improved to allow for the granting of appraisal rights.


Kim Woochan, a professor at Korea University Business School, raised the necessity of introducing a mandatory tender offer system for M&As. He stated, "The mandatory tender offer system implements the principle of equal treatment of shareholders by giving ordinary shareholders the same opportunity and price to sell as controlling shareholders when there is a change in control." The mandatory tender offer system means that when a specific acquirer purchases shares of a listed company and becomes the largest shareholder, ordinary shareholders are also given the opportunity to sell their shares at the same price.


In particular, Professor Kim, citing empirical analyses of 41 countries that have adopted the mandatory tender offer system, concluded that the argument that the system shrinks the corporate acquisition market is unfounded. He explained, "The claim that M&A activity contracts due to increased acquisition costs upon introduction of the system is based on the erroneous assumption that the control premium is fixed. If there is a genuine intention to complete the transaction, the premium can be adjusted downward, so there is no evidence that control transactions are reduced."


He also criticized the "50% plus one share tender offer proposal" that the Financial Services Commission has been reviewing, pointing out that it only partially realizes the principle of equal shareholder treatment and weakens incentives to lower the control premium. The 50% plus one share proposal requires a tender offer only up to the point where the acquirer can secure a majority of the company’s shares. Professor Kim argued that this system is limited because only some shareholders, not all, can sell under the same conditions as the majority shareholder, and recommended adopting a full tender offer for all remaining shares.



Kwon Daeyoung, Vice Chairman of the Financial Services Commission, stated in his congratulatory remarks, "We will promote the mandatory tender offer system so that ordinary shareholders can also benefit from control premiums." He also confirmed that, in order to encourage low PBR companies to make voluntary efforts to enhance their corporate value, the selection and release of a list of such companies will proceed in October.


This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.

© The Asia Business Daily. All rights reserved. Unauthorized AI training and use prohibited.

Today’s Briefing