The Essence of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)

From a Blunt Tariff "Shield" to a Universal Value and Economic "Blade"

International Backlash... Mandatory Carbon Tax Enforcement

Steel, Cement, Fertilizers, and More... An

The European Union (EU) has implemented the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) this year, targeting high-carbon products such as steel, aluminum, cement, fertilizers, electricity, and hydrogen. The EU describes this as a 'restoration of fairness for the global environment.' However, a close examination of the design and implementation process reveals it is difficult to deny that the strategic purpose of protecting EU industries has played a significant role. Whereas previous trade conflicts relied on direct measures such as tariffs, today the EU is building more sophisticated trade rules by leveraging the universal value of 'climate' as a means.


[Jung Ing-gyo Column Trade-Off] "Weaponizing Standards"...Climate Justice or Trade Barrier? View original image

Accordingly, EU importers must purchase and submit certificates corresponding to the carbon emissions embedded in their imported goods. In reality, this cost is a tariff (tax) that is effectively borne by exporting companies. The price of these certificates is linked to the auction price of the EU Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS), and importers must settle and submit this amount to the EU each year. Korean companies will have to pay the carbon tax for the current year by May next year, based on the settlement statements from importers. Carbon is now no longer just an environmental issue, but an accounting liability and a cost of survival.


The EU has already decided to gradually reduce the allocation of free carbon emission allowances to its domestic companies and to completely abolish them by 2034. As the amount (supply) previously distributed for free in the market is reduced and all allowances must be purchased via auction, the law of supply and demand will put upward pressure on the price (auction price) of carbon allowances. As a result, the carbon tax burden for non-EU companies will rise proportionally. Therefore, in eight years, CBAM is expected to become a complete 'carbon barrier.' This means that the standard for corporate competitiveness is shifting from simple price or quality to 'carbon efficiency.'


The international community has shown significant opposition to CBAM. The EU, fully aware of this, has advanced CBAM under a meticulous strategy. After announcing the 'European Green Deal' in 2019, the EU set the 2023-2025 period as a transition phase to establish the system internationally and began imposing payment obligations this year. By 2034, the EU will completely abolish free allocations and apply CBAM 100%. This is a step-by-step 'snare' and a design that minimizes opportunities for corporate backlash.


The EU claims that by applying the cost burden created by strong environmental regulations equally to both domestic and non-EU companies, it aims to prevent 'carbon leakage.' However, in reality, the core objectives are to protect domestic industries and to establish trade barriers by preempting global standards.


The EU's approach, which follows the sequence of 'values → standards → trade barriers,' demonstrates a consistent pattern. First, it preempts universal values such as human rights, environment, and ethics—values that are difficult for anyone to challenge. Second, it expands these values from internal EU norms to global standards and positions itself as a 'rule-setter.' Third, it weaponizes these norms through complex certifications and penalties, using them as non-tariff barriers. CBAM is the latest version of this strategy. Whereas past tariff wars wielded blunt weapons, the EU now brandishes an elegant shield of 'climate justice,' concealing its economic blade.


Traditionally, the EU has pursued a strategy of claiming 'moral superiority,' turning it into a 'global standard,' and ultimately transforming it into a 'powerful trade barrier.' This approach is not limited to CBAM. The EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR), for example, claims to protect the environment but has ultimately become a powerful tool for controlling raw materials, targeting Southeast Asian and South American countries. Meanwhile, domestic EU producers are protected, and only large global supply chains that can meet the standards have survived. The Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) also invokes human rights and environmental protection, imposing stringent due diligence requirements on both EU and non-EU companies and effectively making the EU the 'ethical prosecutor' of global supply chains. In this way, the EU is strengthening its regulatory capacity rather than its production capacity and pursues a strategy of dominating markets through norms.


[Jung Ing-gyo Column Trade-Off] "Weaponizing Standards"...Climate Justice or Trade Barrier? View original image

[Jung Ing-gyo Column Trade-Off] "Weaponizing Standards"...Climate Justice or Trade Barrier? View original image

Countries are responding in a dual manner of 'formal compliance and substantive checks.' On the surface, they comply with the regulations, but behind the scenes, they are considering responses such as WTO complaints or the introduction of similar systems. In particular, the United States is opting for institutional countermeasures, while India has chosen strong criticism and a WTO complaint.


CBAM is not merely a regulation but a mechanism that redefines the standards of industrial competition. In response, our government must use diplomatic negotiation to ease institutional burdens, and companies must transform carbon reduction from a cost into a source of competitiveness. If this is achieved, Korean industry will be able to pursue sustainable growth even within the new regulatory environment. Now, our companies must go beyond simply reducing emissions and address fundamental issues such as whether they can pass certificate purchase costs onto product prices and maintain competitiveness in the EU market.


Our response strategy must go beyond passive compliance. Specifically, we must first minimize double burdens through mutual recognition negotiations between Korea's Emissions Trading System (K-ETS) and the EU-ETS. Diplomatic efforts to ensure that costs already paid domestically are recognized by the EU are essential. Second, we should pursue mutual recognition of verification systems so that reports from accredited Korean institutions are accepted by the EU as they are. This is a practical support measure that reduces administrative costs for companies. Next, we should restructure our market portfolio, focusing on supplying eco-friendly, high value-added products to the EU, while pursuing a dual strategy of emphasizing price competitiveness in regions such as Southeast Asia and the Middle East.


Ultimately, our trade strategy must move beyond the flat paradigm of 'tariff reductions.' CBAM is not a simple tax, but a battlefield of normative competition. The government must be a diplomatic shield for companies, and companies must view carbon reduction as a window for survival. By seeing through the economic blade hidden beneath the dazzling wrapping of 'global environmental justice' advocated by the EU, and turning it into an asset for strengthening industrial competitiveness, Korea's manufacturing industry will be able to overcome the enormous waves posed by CBAM.



[Jung Ing-gyo Column Trade-Off] "Weaponizing Standards"...Climate Justice or Trade Barrier? View original image

Jung Inkyou, Professor of International Trade at Inha University (former Chief Negotiator for Trade)


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