"Quincy Institute: Power May Shift from Clerics to Revolutionary Guard After Iran War"

An analysis has emerged suggesting that, as a result of a U.S.-Iran war, Iran's military and security apparatus—particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—could potentially rise to the center of power within the existing system and increasingly constrain the authority of the clerical establishment.

The Quincy Institute, a U.S. think tank, stated this in an article titled “Iran’s Next Transformation: How War Could Shift Power from Clerics to the Military,” published on its website on April 28 (local time). The Quincy Institute is a relatively new American think tank, established in 2019.

The following is a summary of the main points.

The outcome of a war involving Iran and the future of the Iranian government remain uncertain. Most analysts foresee one of two outcomes: the collapse of the regime, or its survival while maintaining most core features of the current system. However, analysts and policymakers should also consider a third possibility—a scenario involving a gradual internal transition in which Iran’s military and security apparatus, especially the IRGC, becomes the central locus of power within the existing system and increasingly limits the clerics’ authority.

The key difference lies not simply in the increased influence of the military, but in the actual center of authority shifting. In such a scenario, institutions that currently play significant roles within the system—especially clerical bodies, elected officials, and technocratic groups—would lose much of their ability to shape outcomes. While their official positions may remain intact, their influence would be increasingly constrained by security institutions that set strategic priorities and enforce political boundaries. As a result, existing institutions would not disappear, but would become subordinated within a more strictly controlled hierarchy.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a collection of institutions where sources of power and legitimacy—clerical, civilian, and military—overlap. Its internal legitimacy relies heavily on an ideological foundation, which enables religious clerics to maintain central authority in accordance with the revolutionary basis of the Islamic Republic. The IRGC acts as both a military and security institution and has become central in Iran’s broader regional strategy. The IRGC has also expanded its influence into key Iranian sectors such as infrastructure, energy, and communications. The interplay between military and religious authority allows the regime to adapt, endure external economic pressure, and interweave domestic and foreign policy.

War tends to elevate the stature of coercive institutions responsible for defense, coordination, and survival. In Iran, this trend particularly benefits the IRGC, which is best positioned to guarantee regime survival through the use of force. Thus, war shifts the axis of domestic legitimacy from ideology to security and survival. Iran’s current wartime posture suggests a gradual move toward a military-dominated governance model similar to that of Pakistan, where official political institutions continue to function, but operate within boundaries set and enforced by a powerful security apparatus that acts as the ultimate arbiter. Of course, such an outcome is neither inevitable nor predetermined. Iran’s political system is meaningfully different from Pakistan’s, and those differences could constrain such evolution. However, dismissing this possibility entirely would mean overlooking key dynamics of wartime politics. Prolonged conflict tends to empower the institutions best equipped to prosecute it.

As long as Iran maintains a wartime posture, the IRGC is likely to remain a central actor. There are several possible pathways toward a military-centric political order in Iran, all of which would unfold gradually without outright regime collapse. In any form, the clerical structure may be formally preserved, but its role in governance could become increasingly limited. While this is by no means a foregone conclusion, analysts and policymakers should prepare for the possibility of an Iranian state governed by a more centralized military authority—one that is motivated more by security imperatives than by ideological considerations, is more rigid, and is more resistant to diplomatic compromise.

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.