Dual Listings Must Mandate Investor Protection
Mandatory Tender Offer System Should Be Introduced Gradually
Preventing Share Price Suppression Requires Incentive Measures

[Economy Pulse] The Final Piece for Strengthening Shareholder Rights View original image

The rights of ordinary shareholders have been strengthened. Shareholders can now deliberate on meeting agendas online, and when several directors are being elected, they can concentrate their voting rights on a single candidate. Above all, directors’ duty of loyalty to shareholders has been explicitly enshrined in law, and the cancellation of treasury shares has been made mandatory. Amendments to the Commercial Act aimed at protecting shareholder rights and making corporate governance more transparent were enacted at lightning speed. Discussions that had long been deadlocked were wrapped up within a matter of months.


It seems we have reached the final destination in strengthening shareholder rights. Once we have started, we should bring the process to a conclusion. The final pieces of the puzzle may be a ban on dual listings and a mandatory tender offer system. We have repeatedly seen cases in which the value of ordinary shareholders’ holdings was undermined when only controlling shareholders’ stakes were acquired in dual listings or corporate takeovers. When an already-listed parent company spins off a core business into a subsidiary, lists that subsidiary separately, and monopolizes its shares, ordinary shareholders of the parent company are left owning little more than a shell. When a stake in a company is acquired at a premium by buying only the controlling shareholder’s shares, ordinary shareholders are left with shares trading at a low market price.


Accordingly, financial authorities have decided in principle to prohibit dual listings. They will be permitted only as an exception when operational independence, managerial independence, and investor protection are ensured. While there are differing views on the thresholds, price, and scope of the mandatory tender offer system, authorities are pursuing a requirement that anyone acquiring 25% or more of a company must buy all of its remaining shares.


Dual listings are not a major concern in leading economies. In the United States, parent companies typically own 100% of their subsidiaries, so cases of dual listing are rare. In Europe, strict corporate governance regulations have kept dual listings uncommon. In Japan, delistings of dual-listed companies are increasing as capital market reforms restrict cross-shareholdings. Banning dual listings is in line with global trends. However, if exceptions are allowed, the criteria for assessing operational and managerial independence must be clearly defined. The conditions for approval should also vary by type, such as a physical split or a spin-off. Investor protection is most important. A process requiring the consent of ordinary shareholders should be mandatory. They should either receive priority allocations of shares in the public offering or, alternatively, be granted appraisal rights. The duty of parent-company directors to act loyally toward shareholders is essential. Meanwhile, exceptions should be considered for dual listings that promote growth or efficiently attract investment through overseas subsidiaries.


The global standard for mandatory tender offers is the European model. When an investor acquires a 30% stake, they must make a tender offer for all shares at the same price. The United States, by contrast, has no mandatory tender offer system. It would be difficult to adopt the European model outright under a corporate governance system centered on large business groups. But we cannot simply follow the United States, where a market-based system is firmly established, either. As a starting point, I propose requiring an investor who acquires 25% or more of a company’s shares to make a tender offer for 50% plus one share of the company’s total shares. The scope of the tender offer could then be expanded in stages. Compared with the European model, this proposal sets lower thresholds and a narrower scope, taking into account the interests of both companies and ordinary shareholders. Exceptions would apply in cases of corporate restructuring or industrial reorganization.


The true final piece of the puzzle is preventing the artificial suppression of stock prices. Bans on dual listings and mandatory tender offer systems offer little benefit if stock prices are low. However, proposals currently under discussion in the National Assembly to address stock price suppression need to be revised. It is illogical to apply a uniform price-to-book ratio (PBR) threshold of 0.8 across industries, even though PBRs vary according to industry characteristics. Given the nature of taxation, incentives may be more effective than penalties. I believe a more reasonable approach would be to lower the tax rates under the Inheritance and Gift Tax Act for companies whose PBR is above the industry average, as I have consistently advocated. Both incentives and penalties are needed to achieve the policy objective.


From the perspective of controlling shareholders, a series of measures to strengthen shareholder rights may seem likely to dampen business activity and constrain growth. But stronger rights for ordinary shareholders will promote greater management transparency and better corporate governance, ultimately leading to higher corporate value. After all, controlling shareholders and ordinary shareholders alike want their companies to succeed.



Lee Junseo, Professor of Business Administration at Dongguk University


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