"Trump Was Wrong"...A Major Shift in U.S. Strategy Is Coming [Economic Policy Zoom-In]
The War as a Wake-Up Call for the Importance of Allies
Republican Lawmakers May Distance Themselves from Trump
Prospects for a U.S.-Centered Liberal Coalition
South Korea: Strength in Semiconductors, Shipbuilding, and Nuclear Power
U.S. Think Tank Alliance Assessment Report:
"South Korea Has Capability, but Lacks Commitment"
Time to Raise Its Voice as a Mediator and Bridge
Jeon Jaesung, Director of the East Asia Institute, is being interviewed on the 6th at the East Asia Institute in Jongno-gu, Seoul. Photo by Jinhyung Kang
View original imageIn the era of globalization and during times of peace, the economy operated within a relatively independent sphere. However, since the first Trump administration ushered in a period of U.S. containment of China, and with the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and the U.S.-Iran war, the economy now appears to be a dependent variable of international politics and geopolitics. Today, without analyzing international politics and geopolitics, it has become impossible to properly understand the economy.
The U.S.-Iran war has entered a two-week ceasefire, with negotiations for an end to hostilities now underway. It remains unclear whether a peace agreement will be reached easily, or if disagreements over Iran’s denuclearization, war reparations, and control of the Strait of Hormuz will instead prolong the war.
Nevertheless, the war will eventually end in some form, and significant changes are expected to follow. South Korea must adapt and respond effectively to these changes. On April 6, we spoke with Jeon Jaesung, Director of the East Asia Institute (EAI) and professor of political science and international relations at Seoul National University, to discuss these issues.
-There are widespread assessments that the United States made a mistake in starting the war with Iran.
▲President Trump was able to implement many policies at a rapid pace—signing 137 executive orders within his first 100 days in office on January 20 last year—because he had spent four years preparing for office. According to the Heritage Foundation’s “Project 2025” and similar reports, most of these policies were already signaled in advance. The Western Hemisphere and oil were considered important, and regime change in Venezuela was regarded as necessary. However, regime change in Iran was never mentioned. While denuclearization and pressure on the dictatorship were highlighted, the use of military force was not foreseen. It seems President Trump acted on impulse, rather than as a result of a carefully calculated strategy for U.S. national interests. Since many things were unprepared, the likelihood of increasing failures is high.
-If this was Trump’s own improvisation rather than a broad conservative plan or strategy, are even conservative circles in the U.S. critical of the Iran war?
▲Today (the 6th), I saw on CNN that Fareed Zakaria, the host of an international affairs program, had a conversation with Richard Haass, former president of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Haass, a Middle East expert and a conservative Republican advisor, was highly critical. There is broad agreement that the war was wrong both in terms of legitimacy and execution. With 70% of the American public opposed, there is likely to be significant backlash even within conservative circles.
-A two-week ceasefire agreement was announced on the morning of the 8th (Korean time). When do you think the war will actually end?
▲At this point, the conditions for ending the war are more important than the timing. In terms of timing, the U.S. has reportedly postponed the U.S.-China summit, originally scheduled for mid-April, in order to conclude the war first. Engaging in talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping during a war would severely weaken the U.S. negotiating position. In the minds of Americans, the likely timeframe is late April to early May. However, it will be difficult to end the war without reaching a certain level of agreement regarding the Strait of Hormuz.
-Regardless of how the war ends, criticism of President Trump is likely to intensify.
▲When President Trump’s complete failure reaches its lowest point, the U.S. will enter a period of major strategic realignment. At that time, South Korea will have a crucial role to play.
-Will the Republican Party also change?
▲What matters most is the Republican Party. If, starting with the upcoming midterm elections, Republican lawmakers realize they can only win by distancing themselves from President Trump, and actually do so, that would be the most decisive indicator. If Republican lawmakers distance themselves from President Trump—not just because of MAGA sentiment—then even impeachment or legal restrictions may become possible.
-If there is a strategic realignment, in what direction will it go?
▲For the past 30 years, the United States has maintained the world’s strongest hegemony through unilateralism, yet the lives of ordinary Americans have not improved much. They endured the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the global financial crisis in 2008. Maintaining hegemony is costly, so public support for such endeavors is essential, but that support has weakened.
Furthermore, today’s international politics have become too complex for a single nation to play a hegemonic role. The era when America could act alone is over. The most desirable future world order is a form of collective leadership—a coalition of liberal states. This could be the Group of Seven (G7), or something like former President Joe Biden’s “Summit for Democracy,” though that was somewhat loose in structure.
The key going forward is how the U.S.—as the preeminent power—forms a leadership coalition with its allies. But the U.S. still appears reluctant to share responsibility and authority, preferring to act alone. Eventually, however, it will realize this approach is unsustainable. The formation of a U.S.-centered liberal coalition that distributes responsibilities and authority is most desirable, and there is a real chance this will happen.
Jeon Jae-seong, Director of the East Asia Institute, is being interviewed on the 6th at the East Asia Institute in Jongno-gu, Seoul. Photo by Kang Jin-hyung
View original image-You mentioned South Korea’s role.
▲The Trump-style strategy of maximizing U.S. interests has proven ineffective. If we reflect on what went wrong, it becomes clear that the core approach should be to join forces with key allies and, based on collective strength, overwhelm competitors and negotiate from a position of advantage. In other words, the U.S. will eventually realize the importance of strengthening alliances on specific issues such as the semiconductor alliance or supply chain restructuring. The U.S. will consider which alliances to prioritize: Europe, East Asia, Australia, and other Western countries. Former President Biden highlighted semiconductors, batteries, rare earths, and biotechnology as key sectors, and except for rare earths, South Korea is strong in all of them. South Korea also excels in shipbuilding and nuclear power.
There is a report from a U.S. think tank on “re-evaluating alliances” that ranks the most essential partners. Japan is ranked first. While Australia and the Philippines demonstrate commitment, they lack sufficient strength; South Korea has considerable capability but there are lingering doubts about its willingness to align fully with the U.S.
But that is not necessarily a bad thing. Rather than making an unconditional commitment, it is better to maintain leverage and negotiate to secure gains. While the current order is said to be transactional, in reality, ongoing transactions are inevitable. To sustain such relationships in a positive, trust-based manner, South Korea must strengthen its position. That time is coming. During the period of strategic realignment following President Trump’s failures, when the U.S. seeks greater input from its allies, South Korea may quickly emerge as the most reliable and essential partner.
-You have long advocated a coalition of middle powers. At this year’s Davos Forum, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s speech on this topic attracted attention. But isn’t this difficult to achieve in reality?
▲Since the early 2000s, the concept of “middle powers” has been publicly discussed, but there was much criticism at the time. From the U.S. perspective: “Why do you call yourselves a middle power? You are our ally; allies should not mediate.” Others asked, “Has any middle power ever influenced great power diplomacy? Aren’t they ultimately powerless?” These criticisms have merit.
Even today, there is some truth to those points. However, the actual influence of middle powers has grown—both as intangible soft power and, in some respects, as hard power. The gap between the influence of middle powers and that of great power politics has narrowed.
-What do you mean by soft power and hard power?
▲In terms of hard power, even the U.S. can no longer maintain a fully self-sufficient supply chain for critical minerals and manufacturing. The U.S. outsourced what it deemed unnecessary as part of globalization, but this has had negative consequences. Because supply chains were built solely according to economic logic, the process of restructuring them based on political and geopolitical considerations has made the position of middle powers more important.
In the soft power domain, neighboring countries’ perspectives on international issues have become much more prominent and communication has increased. As a result, messages delivered by neighboring countries have come to influence American voters’ choices. Even if President Trump appears reckless, he is sensitive to international opinion. Thus, it is important for middle powers to raise their voices with both the U.S. and China, offer alternatives for the world order, act as mediators to mitigate great power politics, and serve as bridges to the Global South. Although their influence is not decisive, it is certainly greater than before.
-President Trump has argued that because the U.S. is now an oil-producing country, the Middle East is no longer as important, and that stakeholders such as European countries, South Korea, Japan, and China should address issues in the Strait of Hormuz themselves.
▲Even during former President Biden’s administration, the sentiment was: “America wants to leave the Middle East, but the Middle East won’t let America go.”
-Especially from Israel’s perspective, the U.S. cannot leave.
▲That is simply not possible. When Hamas (an armed Palestinian group) attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, there was much speculation as to why. At the time, there was talk of a “Middle East detente”—Saudi Arabia and Iran had established diplomatic relations, and ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia were improving. In an article for Foreign Affairs, former National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan explained that Hamas resorted to violence because the Palestinian issue was being sidelined by these developments.
Jae-Sung Jun, President of the East Asia Institute, is being interviewed on the 6th at the East Asia Institute in Jongno-gu, Seoul. Photo by Jin-Hyung Kang
View original image-President Trump is reportedly seriously considering withdrawing from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
▲For the U.S. to withdraw from NATO, two-thirds of the Senate must approve, or Congress must pass a separate law authorizing withdrawal. Realistically, this is difficult, and public opinion is in favor of NATO, with 68-70% support. Among Republicans, support is about 50%. Rather than abandoning Europe, the U.S. is likely to push for increased European responsibility and defense spending. If the U.S. withdrew, Russia could exert more influence in Europe.
-International organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) are barely functioning. The U.S. has withdrawn from several international organizations, and some believe it is even undermining them. Does this mean the U.S. is abandoning multilateral order?
▲President Trump and the MAGA movement prioritize American interests, and they oppose existing institutions that they believe work against those interests. This does not mean that the U.S. will withdraw from all international organizations, or from those that serve its interests.
Just as U.S. think tanks evaluate alliances, they also assess international organizations based on whether they advance U.S. national interests. The WTO is based on free trade, but the U.S. argues that free trade is unfair to America because of China and other allies. What the U.S. wants is fair trade, not just free trade. The U.S. is willing to pursue fair protectionist trade over unfair free trade, so trade agreements that ensure fairness, as agreed by all parties, are important.
-Outside of China, few countries have imposed retaliatory tariffs against U.S. tariffs.
▲All countries remain strongly committed to free trade, so for now, they are trying to appease the U.S. However, if this situation persists, things will change. There is now talk of “World Minus One”—globalization without the U.S.
Currently, countries are appeasing the U.S. in the hope that it will eventually return, but if they become convinced that the U.S. will not come back, they will begin to design a global economic order without American participation. Whether it is alliances or free trade, after this period of transition and some compromise, a multilateral order will inevitably be restored.
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