Opposition to Introducing "Chinese Wall" Information Barrier Requirement
Citing Low Risk of Conflicts of Interest and Cost Burden for Small and Mid-Sized Managers

Institutional Private Equity Funds (PEFs) have voiced their opposition to the legislative proposal for a "Chinese Wall," a mechanism that restricts the sharing of sensitive information within an organization to only those who need it for internal control purposes. They cited the relatively low risk of conflicts of interest compared to financial firms and the fact that effective internal controls are already in place.


[Exclusive] Private Equity Funds Oppose Legislative Institutionalization of Internal Controls View original image

According to The Asia Business Daily's coverage on April 3, the Council of PEF Management Companies recently conveyed its opposition to the Chinese Wall legislation to the National Assembly. Specifically, they objected to an amendment to the Capital Markets Act proposed by Assemblyman Yoo Dongsoo of the Democratic Party of Korea, which would introduce a requirement for information barrier systems as a condition for the registration of institutional PEF management companies (GPs). The Council also expressed concerns about the burden of appointing a compliance officer to oversee internal controls, especially for small and medium-sized management firms, due to the associated costs.


The Chinese Wall refers to a system that blocks information exchange between departments or affiliates within a company. In simple terms, it is designed to prevent conflicts of interest among various stakeholders, such as limited partners (LPs), by restricting information sharing. For GPs, there are concerns that they could use undisclosed information from multiple companies for other investments or engage in insider trading, thereby harming the interests of LPs. This is why the introduction of the Chinese Wall has been discussed.


The Council argued that the risk of conflicts of interest is low because PEF management companies simply receive collective investment assets and manage them, rather than engaging in activities that could raise such conflicts. For example, in the case of securities companies, if they underwrite an initial public offering (IPO) and obtain internal information, they could buy or sell the stock using the firm's own capital. Alternatively, an employee in charge of the IPO could trade the stock in their personal account or allocate a large amount of shares to a particular client. The industry claims that even if they obtain inside information while reviewing a company for acquisition, they only invest in that company and have no reason to use or sell the information externally, so there is no inherent conflict of interest structure.


[Exclusive] Private Equity Funds Oppose Legislative Institutionalization of Internal Controls View original image

Another point raised was that internal controls are already functioning effectively through corporate charters and investor oversight mechanisms. In fact, the PEF industry has introduced self-regulatory measures. Last month, the Council of PEF Management Companies, together with the Financial Supervisory Service, announced the "Standard Internal Control Guidelines for GPs." The key points include clearly defining the CEO's responsibility for internal controls and establishing obligations regarding the management of undisclosed information and compliance with information barriers.


The Council also explained that building such systems could significantly increase the management burden for small and medium-sized management companies due to the costs involved. Most management companies operate as project-based organizations with only a few staff, so adopting these systems would inevitably require hiring additional personnel. As a result, there are concerns that they may lose competitiveness in the market compared to larger overseas management firms.


However, some argue that explicit regulation is necessary, especially since there were related controversies in the management rights dispute between MBK Partners and Korea Zinc. There were concerns that the Chinese Wall could be rendered ineffective if the top decision-maker is involved in multiple deals simultaneously. In 2024, suspicions arose that MBK had used confidential information related to new business that it received from Korea Zinc for a hostile merger and acquisition (M&A). Specifically, it was alleged that MBK Partners Chairman Kim Byungju crossed the Chinese Wall and accessed information he should not have seen, influencing decision-making. At the time, MBK denied these claims, arguing that the entities that received the confidential information and those conducting the hostile M&A were separate legal entities and that the information was not used for the M&A.



There is also a counterargument that the cost issue raised by the Council is not a significant problem, as LPs already invest only in GPs that have a certain level of assets. An aide to Assemblyman Yoo noted, "We are considering various options, such as applying the requirements differentially based on asset size or management scale." The proposed amendment is currently under review by the National Assembly's Political Affairs Committee's Legislative Review Subcommittee.


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