Military Reconnaissance Satellite No. 5 Set for Deployment... Is Surveillance and Reconnaissance Ready? [Yang Nakgyu's Defence Club]

Low Rate of Domestic Production and Shortage of Specialists Remain Challenges
Multiple Ultra-Small Satellite Manufacturers Under Consideration

The military reconnaissance satellite No. 5, developed by the South Korean military as part of the "425 Project," is scheduled to become operational in June 2026. As the final satellite in the 425 Project, once all five satellites are fully operational, they will enable more rapid and accurate identification of signs of provocations from North Korea through cluster operation. The South Korean military is expected to acquire the capability to collect satellite photos and videos of key facilities in North Korea, such as missile bases and nuclear test sites, at approximately two-hour intervals.

In 2023, the United States SpaceX's space launch vehicle 'Falcon 9' carrying our military's first reconnaissance satellite No.1 was launched from Vandenberg Space Force Base in California, USA. Yonhap News Agency

The 425 Project is a program to deploy a total of five high-resolution, medium-to-large reconnaissance satellites by the end of this year: one electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) satellite (No. 1) and four synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites (Nos. 2–5). Satellite No. 1 was launched in December 2023, No. 2 in April the following year, No. 3 in December last year, and No. 4 in April last year.

Half of Military Reconnaissance Satellite Components Sourced Overseas... 51% Localization Rate

There are still challenges to resolve before satellite No. 5 becomes fully operational. There is a need to increase the localization rate and to strengthen the pool of specialized personnel. The localization rate for satellite No. 5 stands at only 51.3%. Components procured domestically for the military reconnaissance satellites amount to 121.2 billion won, while those sourced from overseas total 58.9 billion won. The SAR sensor was imported at a cost of 30.2 billion won, resulting in a low localization rate of 45%. Furthermore, the transmitter and antenna parts for the data link are completely dependent on overseas suppliers, with a 100% reliance on foreign imports.

Acute Shortage of Specialized Personnel for Distributed Ground Stations

There is also a severe shortage of specialized personnel. The main ground station responsible for controlling the satellites is located at the Intelligence Command in Anyang, which handles image analysis. The auxiliary ground station is at the Air Force Operations Command in Osan, and the backup system includes a mobile ground station. The main issue is the manpower. Currently, the military has only around 210 surveillance and reconnaissance specialists. Although the plan is to increase this number to about 280 by next year, this would still be far from sufficient if even microsatellites are eventually made operational.

During the operational test and evaluation of the 425 Project conducted in June 2024, one out of seven assessment criteria was not met. When the satellite takes photographs, they are transmitted to the ground station. Based on these photographs, the ground station prepares an analysis report and sends it to the Multi-Source Image Fusion System. This system is linked to the Military Integrated Management System (MIMS), which is operated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Intelligence Headquarters and others. MIMS is a system that comprehensively manages military secrets through integration with the Army, Navy, and Air Force's tactical command and control automation systems (C4I) and various sensors. It is primarily used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to manage confidential information related to North Korea.

New Interfacing Equipment Developed to Address Satellite Image Transmission Errors

However, a malfunction occurred in which the ground station was unable to transmit satellite images to the Multi-Source Image Fusion System. During pre-launch ground station simulator testing, only the transmission and reception of up to 10 satellite images were evaluated, with a data volume of several gigabits (Gb) considered sufficient. In reality, after the launch of up to satellite No. 4, the number of images sent by the satellites exceeded 100, with total capacity reaching several hundred Gb, resulting in transmission failures. As a result, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration had to not only build a dedicated server but also develop new interfacing equipment for multi-source integration. LIG Nex1 was in charge of this project and completed it in December last year.

The military is also proceeding with the Reconnaissance Satellite-II Project to prepare for the eventual expiration of the five already-launched satellites. The plan is to launch one EO/IR satellite (No. 1) and four SAR satellites (Nos. 2–5), with a total budget of 1.3 trillion won to be invested from next year and full operational capability targeted for 2031.

Multiple Companies May Be Selected for Microsatellite Program: KAI and Hanwha Systems

After the 425 Project, around 40 small and microsatellites using solid-fuel space launch vehicles are slated for launch. Once these satellites become operational in the late 2020s, the South Korean military will be able to monitor North Korea and other areas of the Korean Peninsula at 30-minute intervals. Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) and Hanwha Systems have entered this defense project. Each company plans to launch one test satellite in December 2026. Although the military initially intended to select a single company to handle the launch of all 40 satellites, the possibility of choosing multiple contractors is now high. This means KAI and Hanwha Systems could each be responsible for producing about 20 reconnaissance satellites. The military is concerned that excessive competition between contractors could cause project delays.

Microsatellite Ground Stations to Be Developed for Dual Military and Civilian Use

The ground stations for small and microsatellites are to be developed by LIG Nex1, with completion expected within this year. As the small and microsatellites will be used jointly by the military and civilian sectors, the military has decided to build separate ground stations. However, since civilian ground stations are not equipped with encryption devices, integrating them with military ground stations would pose a high risk of security breaches. Therefore, a ground station that can be jointly used by both the military and civilians will be developed and operated. The military ground station will be established at the Air Force Operations Command, and the civilian ground station will be set up at the National Satellite Operations Center in Jeju.

The missions for the small and microsatellites are expected to be divided 60% for military-related purposes, such as surveillance of North Korean regions, and 40% for civilian applications, such as disaster response. However, to ensure the conditions for military operations, the authority for integrated mission planning will be retained by the military.

A military official stated, "There were issues with customs and other frictions when transporting reconnaissance satellite No. 5 to the U.S. mainland for launch," adding, "Various risks will need to be reviewed in advance when launching microsatellites in the future as well."

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.