[Stones and Stories] "Risks Posed by Iran's Potential Attacks on Gulf Countries' Desalination Facilities" - CSIS
As U.S. President Donald Trump issued a final ultimatum, threatening to devastate Iran's power plants if the Strait of Hormuz is not reopened, Iran declared that if its power plants are attacked, it would strike U.S.-related energy targets, information technology (IT) facilities, and desalination infrastructure in the Persian Gulf region.
David Michel, non-resident senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a U.S. diplomatic and security think tank, expressed deep concern over the risks posed by potential Iranian attacks on Gulf countries' desalination facilities in an article titled "Could Iran Disrupt the Gulf Countries’ Desalinated Water Supplies?" posted on the CSIS website on March 19 (local time).
The following is a summary of the main points.
All six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), located along the southern coast of the Persian Gulf, are heavily dependent on desalination facilities that process seawater from the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. The anti-Iran war that began on February 28 this year has put these essential water supply systems at risk. In the early stages of the conflict, desalination facilities in Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) suffered indirect damage from missile and drone attacks. Later, reports emerged that desalination facilities in Bahrain and Iran were deliberately targeted. Deliberately targeting desalination infrastructure could lead to a significant escalation of war, potentially threatening water supplies that are vital for the survival of millions of people in the region.
Strategic Vulnerability
In GCC countries, large-scale desalination systems are indispensable core infrastructure. Desalination meets 77.3% of Qatar's total water demand, 67.5% for Bahrain, 52.1% for the UAE, 42.2% for Kuwait, 31% for Oman, and 18.1% for Saudi Arabia. The importance of desalination facilities is even greater in supplying drinking water. Qatar obtains 99% of its drinking water from the desalination network, while Bahrain relies on it for over 90%. For Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, these figures are 90%, 86%, 70%, and 42%, respectively. Cities such as Doha, Dubai, Manama, and Kuwait City cannot exist without desalination. Especially in Qatar and Bahrain, the dependence on desalination is high even for industrial water, with more than half of the production supplied to sectors such as petrochemicals and data centers. If regional desalination infrastructure is damaged or disrupted, the core water resources for businesses, industries, and populations ranging from thousands to millions throughout the Persian Gulf could be threatened.
So far, the Persian Gulf war has not actually disrupted the region's water supply, but the potential risk is clear. The GCC's desalination plants are large, stationary, outdoor industrial complexes. Most are concentrated within 350 km of the coast from the Islamic Republic of Iran, making them as vulnerable to Iranian weaponry as other civilian infrastructure that has been targeted, such as oil and gas terminals, airports, and hotels. Desalination plants also have a fundamentally linear structure—meaning the process of converting seawater to freshwater proceeds in a fixed sequence of stages. If sensitive components, such as high-pressure pumps or membrane buildings, are damaged, the entire production can come to a halt, with repairs potentially requiring several weeks.
Similarly, GCC desalination infrastructure is exposed to a range of complex vulnerabilities, spanning energy and seawater supply, distribution networks, and operational systems. For example, desalination is an energy-intensive process. Because of this characteristic, approximately three-quarters of desalination facilities in GCC countries are integrated plants that produce both electricity and water. As a result, desalination production at these plants can be halted not only if water treatment equipment is attacked, but also if the supporting power plants or grid connections are targeted. Cutting off electricity is effectively the same as cutting off water supply. Likewise, water produced at central desalination facilities must be distributed to consumers. Iran could attempt to weaken the GCC water supply system by targeting pumping stations and pipelines that deliver desalinated water to end users.
Weaponizing Water
Deliberately attacking the Gulf region's core desalination systems would represent a major escalation in hostilities. Article 54(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions explicitly prohibits attacks or destruction of "objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as drinking water installations and supplies." Targeting such essential civilian infrastructure constitutes a violation of international law and could amount to a war crime.
Nevertheless, Iran may believe that threatening the GCC's water supply could be an effective asymmetric strategy in an existential struggle for regime survival. Iran cannot militarily defeat the U.S. and Israel, nor can it prevent them from attacking Iranian territory at will. Instead, Tehran is pursuing both "horizontal" and "vertical" escalation campaigns. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz, disruption of global energy and fertilizer markets, and missile and drone offensives against vulnerable targets in the GCC and other countries are all measures to broaden the scope of the war and increase its costs. These actions raise the ongoing costs of the conflict for governments, economies, and the public far beyond the Persian Gulf. The goal is not military victory, but expanding strategic leverage. Iran believes it can outlast the U.S. in a war of political attrition. Until now, GCC countries have not been direct belligerents in this war, nor have they taken offensive action against Iran. However, if their water supply sources are targeted, the situation could change. Even so, Iran may see attacks on key water resource infrastructure as a means of sowing discord between Gulf governments, who see such attacks as enabling the conflict, and the U.S. and Israeli governments, who would carry them out—while simultaneously pressuring GCC capitals to end a war they do not want.
Although GCC countries have significantly expanded their desalinated water production capacity, most have not secured adequate storage to prepare for supply disruptions. For example, the UAE announced the "2036 Water Security Strategy" in 2017 to improve water efficiency and increase national water storage capacity. However, even if this plan is fully realized, it would only allow the country to store two days' worth of water under normal conditions, and in extreme emergencies, rationing would only enable 16 to 45 days of survival. Saudi Arabia has established limited strategic reserve reservoirs, but Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar have not developed sufficient storage to buffer against meaningful supply interruptions.
Rising Anxiety
If Iran attacks GCC desalination systems, the ultimate impact will depend on specific circumstances: which country is targeted, which facilities are hit, the nature and scale of the damage, and how long the disruption lasts. However, the most significant effect may actually be psychological. For decades, GCC countries have built their business models on a reputation as islands of prosperity and stability amid seas of geopolitical turbulence. Iran's sustained coercive capabilities, which could trigger a potential water crisis across the GCC, undermine this premise. As one analyst put it, "The real weapons are not drones, but canceled insurance, rerouted oil tankers, and hesitant investors." If insurers, investors, and even residents begin to imagine having to rely on oil tankers and water trucks for water for their homes, hospitals, schools, and businesses, confidence in the sustainability of the business model could disappear well before the last drop of water dries up from the faucet.
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More than 40 years ago, a declassified CIA analysis from 2010 had already pointed out the security vulnerabilities stemming from Gulf countries' reliance on desalination. The current conflict strongly demonstrates that this dependence has only deepened, and the vulnerabilities remain. Once the guns fall silent, perceptions of water security and national security in GCC countries are likely to have changed dramatically.
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