A Reality More Powerless Than the "Second Unit" of the Ruling Party
Slogans Without Reform Are Nothing But Self-Contradiction

[Insight & Opinion] The Collapsed Opposition Swallows Critical Public Opinion View original image

In Korean politics, the ruling administration and the ruling party take the lead. Not only are they at the center of political power, but the phenomenon has also been intensified recently by the collapse of the opposition and the resulting one-sided dominance by the ruling party. The two-party system has collapsed, and the opposition party, People Power Party, is so weak that it is hardly even worthy of being called a “1.5 party system.”


Still, the opposition continues to monopolize the institutional channel for critical public opinion. When criticism of those in power is mediated through an opposition party that has lost public trust, that criticism loses its force. Instead of fulfilling its role of criticizing and keeping the government in check, the opposition ends up acting as a buffer zone that neutralizes critical public sentiment. During past authoritarian regimes, some opposition parties were called the “second unit of the ruling party.” This was a derogatory term for parties that were either created at the ruling power's initiative or merely played a supporting role for the administration. Compared to that, today's opposition is in a state of near-warfare with the ruling bloc. Yet, in the end, they have become powerless entities that ironically aid the ruling party’s hegemonic politics. This is the paradox of a distrusted opposition and the failure of the messenger.


In the course of modern democracy’s development, political parties have served as the political focal point for civil society and as a channel for power struggles. This is also why parties have been regarded as essential mechanisms for representative democracy. However, parties have increasingly become political cartels that dominate civil society and monopolize both political participation and power. Like all organizations, once established, parties tend to become vested-interest groups. In Korea, established major parties are institutionally guaranteed monopoly cartel status through the election law, party law, and other statutes, which allow them to enjoy various privileges.


Within the cartel party system, competition among these parties remains the last vestige of democracy one can hope for in party politics. Yet now, the opposition is powerless—not because of the number of seats it holds, but because it has lost public trust. During the authoritarian era, opposition parties became the focal point of democratization through so-called civil movement methods, despite having limited space to operate, because they earned the people’s trust. But today’s opposition, even as it fails to fulfill its role, still monopolizes the institutional channel for criticism. When forces that go against public sentiment become the messenger, even the message itself is contaminated. This results in the opposition, ironically, neutralizing criticism of those in power. Even if they stage street marches or sit-ins, distrust toward them swallows up any criticism of the authorities. Without a viable alternative opposition, competitive democracy cannot revive. The ruling party’s hegemony is thereby entrenched.


Regarding the proposals for increasing the number of Supreme Court justices, introducing the crime of legal distortion, and adopting the right to constitutional complaint, the ruling party calls these the “Three Judicial Reform Bills,” while the opposition People Power Party refers to them as the “Three Judicial Destruction Bills.” These are major changes to the judiciary in a democratic republic. Moreover, since all three bills are not unrelated to the judicial risks faced by President Lee, there is a real danger that they could become a “Procrustean bed” that shakes the very order of constitutional government. The ruling party uses the critical mood toward former President Yoon Suk Yeol, who is under judgment, as justification for judicial reform. It is crucially important to recognize that, without reflection or remorse regarding the issues surrounding former President Yoon, the opposition’s condemnation of the “Three Judicial Destruction Bills” is likely to be tainted as well.


The upcoming local elections could serve as an opportunity to awaken awareness of these issues. Yet, instead of fundamental change, only calls for unity are being made. Even these become self-contradictory confessions due to internal power struggles. Without sacrifice and dedication akin to cutting away the flesh to save the bones, it will not be easy to escape this quagmire. Reform or restructuring is necessary. If the opposition cannot reform itself, stepping aside may be the only way to revive the momentum of democratic politics.



Kim Manheum, former Director of the National Assembly Research Service


This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.

© The Asia Business Daily. All rights reserved. Unauthorized AI training and use prohibited.

Today’s Briefing