"From Europe's Perspective, the United States Has Lost Its Way" - Elcano Royal Institute
"The United States has lost its way. First, the Trump administration operates more like a monarchy than a democratic government. Second, contrary to how the MAGA (Make America Great Again) camp sees things, China is winning the game against the United States. Third, the Trump phenomenon is a backlash against globalization and progressive agendas pushed by a grand coalition of the moderate right and moderate left in the United States. Fourth, the United States is trying to build a world that excludes China, but this will be very difficult in reality."
This is the conclusion reached by a European think-tank expert who recently visited Washington, D.C., and met with former and current senior government officials, as well as figures from the public and private sectors.
Miguel Otero-Iglesias, Senior Analyst at the Elcano Royal Institute, a Spanish think tank for international relations and strategic studies, made these points in an article posted on the institute’s website on February 6.
Otero-Iglesias was invited to visit Washington, D.C., along with 20 European China experts, as part of the "Transatlantic Dialogue on China" program organized by the University of Pennsylvania.
They held wide-ranging exchanges of views with senior officials, both incumbent and former, and with people from the public and private sectors. They met not only with the U.S. Department of Commerce, the Department of State, the U.S. Congress, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), and the National Security Council (NSC), but also with companies such as Intel, Nvidia, Rhodium Group, and JPMorgan. They also met European diplomats and journalists specializing in international relations, as well as New York Times columnists Thomas Friedman and Edward Wong, and The Washington Post’s Ishaan Tharoor.
The following is a translated and edited summary of Otero-Iglesias’s article.
1) There Is No Administration
First, the very expression "Trump administration" does not really hold. Donald Trump and a very small circle of people run the government, and their connection to the broader state bureaucracy is extremely limited. As a result, almost no one knows whether the White House has a clear strategy on major international issues such as China, Europe, and Russia.
European diplomats admitted that it is extremely difficult to gain access to the people who actually make decisions, and even those they do manage to meet confess that they themselves do not know much. In practice, everyone wakes up in the morning and checks Trump’s Truth Social account to gauge where things might be headed. Some have tried to reach the "inner circle" through connections with Trump’s family, but they openly acknowledge that this has produced little result. This is doubly worrying: it means a lack of access to core information, and it makes the United States look less like a liberal democracy and more like a Gulf monarchy.
This situation has many negative consequences, but the most immediate diplomatic problem is that Europe no longer knows how to act. In the past, whenever a serious issue arose in any European country, the first step was to understand Washington’s thinking and intentions, and then respond accordingly. Now that is no longer possible, and this creates a sense of disorientation and abandonment. For an already weakened "old Europe," having to decide how to act without knowing what the United States will do is like walking a tightrope without a safety net. The fear grows as the perception spreads that the world’s most powerful country is run as an overt "kleptocracy"—a political system in which those in power siphon off state resources—operated in a "Dubai-style" manner, as one seasoned international journalist put it.
2) China Is Winning
Second, contrary to the perception in the MAGA camp, in reality China is winning the game against the United States. The MAGA-style summary goes like this: thanks to tariffs, Trump forced Xi Jinping to the negotiating table and extracted concessions. As a prime example, China has already bought 80% of the soybeans it promised to purchase under a recent agreement. They acknowledge that China wielded rare earths as a weapon and exposed a chokepoint the United States could not avoid, but they argue that this is precisely why a temporary truce was possible. As Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has said, within 12 to 18 months the United States will reduce its dependence on China for critical minerals, and at that point it will be able to resume its offensive.
Furthermore, the MAGA camp sees China’s use of the rare-earth card itself as a positive development. By using it against the entire world, China has revealed its predatory nature, and as a result many countries, including those in Europe, will try to free themselves from Beijing’s influence not only in rare earths but also in other areas such as telecommunications and AI (artificial intelligence). From this perspective, this is good news for Washington.
However, among more independent officials and analysts, especially in the private sector, the interpretation is completely different. They believe the United States is losing the competition, and this has become clear over the past year. When Trump imposed 145% tariffs in an attempt to bring China to its knees, the administration was flooded with calls. These came not only from large corporations like Ford, but from mid-sized and family-owned firms across all industries whose operations are impossible without Chinese inputs. The case of a mattress manufacturer that cannot substitute a specific Chinese fabric illustrates the desperation well.
The reality is that China can squeeze the U.S. economy through rare earths, and even if the United States manages to reduce that dependence (the private sector believes achieving this within five years is impossible; Japan has been trying for 15 years and still has not secured self-sufficiency), China can simply move to another chokepoint—for example, active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) for antibiotics. This would be an even more powerful weapon, striking directly at public health.
Even in soybeans, U.S. gains are limited. China has pledged to buy 12 million tons in 2025 and 25 million tons annually by 2028, but its average annual purchases between 2020 and 2024 were 29 million tons. After COVID-19, China increased its soybean purchases from Brazil and sharply reduced its dependence on the United States.
China’s strength is also evident in advanced technologies. From Trump’s first term through the Biden administration, the United States has tried to slow China’s progress in semiconductors through export controls, but the results have been poor or even counterproductive. The industry consensus is clear: if you do not sell to China, you lose revenue, and worse, you actually accelerate China’s capabilities in advanced design and manufacturing. Huawei and SMIC are investing hundreds of millions of euros in semiconductors, the gap is steadily narrowing, and open-source AI models could further tilt the field in China’s favor. As one industry figure put it, "If you want to stay ahead of your competitors, you have to be in China." This is also why Trump allowed exports of Nvidia’s H200 chips to China while demanding a "cut" for himself.
The current paradox is this: both Europe and the United States are internally troubled and thus less competitive than China, whereas China is the opposite. Serious domestic problems—such as the bursting of the real-estate bubble, debt, aging, and weak consumption—are actually reinforcing its focus on industry and technology and thereby strengthening its external competitiveness. A trade surplus of 1.2 trillion dollars in 2025 illustrates this. By around 2030, China’s share of global manufacturing is expected to reach about 45%. Ironically, the weaker it is internally, the stronger it becomes externally. Meanwhile, in Washington, almost no one believes that real reindustrialization of the United States will take place under Trump.
3) Reactionary Capture
It is unclear whether Trump and the MAGA movement have a grand strategy, but conversations in Washington suggest that they might. This strategy has both an ideological and a material pillar.
Ideologically, it is a clear rejection of liberalism and free trade. According to someone who worked with Trump during his first term, from the MAGA perspective the political and public space in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the EU has been dominated for the past 40 years (since Bill Clinton) by a "(neo)liberal single party." In the United States, "liberal" means the left.
In other words, they see a grand coalition of the moderate right (Republicans) and moderate left (Democrats) that has promoted globalization and progressive agendas. It is also described as the party of "wokeness." Borrowing David Goodhart’s distinction in his book "The Road to Somewhere," this is a clash between "anywheres"—elites who can live anywhere—and "somewheres"—rooted local patriots. The MAGA goal is to dismantle this single party and build a new hegemony based on traditional values. "Reaction takes power" could be their slogan. The new National Security Strategy urges movement in this direction.
There is also a material dimension. There is a belief that competing with China requires a much larger scale. This is spelled out in the new National Defense Strategy. Hence the argument that Washington must dominate the entire Western Hemisphere, from Greenland to Tierra del Fuego at the southern tip of South America, including the United Kingdom and the EU.
Greenland is, unsurprisingly, the most sensitive part of this debate. Officials were adamant in defending Trump’s claim that Greenland must become U.S. property, whatever the cost. When the possibility of NATO fragmentation was raised, they dismissed it, saying that the military, commercial, investment, human, and value ties across the Atlantic are too strong to break. When differences in values concerning separation of powers, civil rights, press freedom, international law, and sovereignty were pointed out, they replied that these are merely differences in perspective and that the same values are being upheld. Even so, they defined Greenland and the entire Western Hemisphere as part of their own security space, thereby fusing ideology with material interests.
More worrying still is that senior officials in the Biden administration publicly expressed frustration that cooperation with Europe on China has yielded few tangible results. Their interpretation is that Europe has not taken the China threat seriously and, despite repeated efforts, has failed to align with the United States in forming a common front. They even contrasted the talks with Japan on 5G and Huawei, which took three weeks, with those with Germany, which took 24 months.
Some of us countered that this comparison is inappropriate, since Japan perceives the China threat much more acutely. We also argued that Europe (or individual European states) has autonomy and that the transatlantic dialogue cannot be a matter of U.S. imposition and European obedience. It was also clear that, unlike the United States, which sees China as a rival for hegemony, Europe does not necessarily see it that way. This angered the officials, and led them to conclude that it is reasonable for a Trump administration not to spend time and effort on dialogue and coordination. For them, this justifies Trump’s abrasive stance.
4) A World Without China
The "Plural South"—the global South—hardly came up in the discussions, and when it did, it was mostly raised by the European side. On the U.S. side, India was mentioned, but described as a multi-vector player that is hard to trust and deeply integrated into China’s value chains. The most striking exchange took place in the U.S. Congress. When Europeans argued, "We in Europe understand that the United States does not want European countries to buy Chinese technologies and products, but today many Chinese industrial goods and technologies are as good as or better than European ones and cheaper. So it is normal that the Plural South and parts of Europe buy them," the answer was this: "That may be so, but it is very shortsighted. One day they will realize that China is a dictatorship and cannot be trusted." It is an interesting reaction at a time when authoritarianism is on the rise and, from a European perspective, doubts about the robustness of U.S. democracy are growing.
The desire to build a world that excludes China goes even further. A White House trade adviser stated bluntly that the WTO is dead for the United States because it was designed for market economies, not for China’s form of state capitalism. He also expressed frustration that years of negotiations with China have failed to change it, and said that almost no one in Washington now believes this is possible. Another adviser said that in Trump’s first term the goals were to reduce the trade deficit (phase one) and to reduce the role of the state in China’s economy (phase two), but that now the approach is pure transactionalism. China must buy more, the United States must sell more, and China must not develop in ways that threaten the United States.
Within this logic, Trump’s priorities are trade, trade, trade, and deterrence. He wants allies—Europe, Japan, and South Korea—to buy more U.S. products, spend more on defense, and align themselves to counter China. Some even argue that by wielding tariffs as a hammer, he forced countries from Japan to Europe to lower tariff and non-tariff barriers and to increase defense spending. This is seen as phase one: a global rebalancing of trade. Phase two, which could come in a second term, would be a proposal for a new global trade organization without China. The rationale is that many countries feel their own industries are threatened by China’s industrial might.
The European participants could not hide their surprise and disbelief. They pointed out that a trade organization that excludes the world’s second-largest economy, the world’s largest economy by purchasing power parity (PPP), and a country that accounts for about 30% of global manufacturing (soon 40–45%) is a fantasy. The prevailing sense is that Washington has lost its way. At the same time, this also reflects MAGA’s own self-confidence.
Conclusion: Between Draghi and Carney
Both Chinese and U.S. leaders believe they are winning, and this brings the world closer to the Thucydides Trap. Thucydides saw the cause of war not in fear, but in the hubris of both sides—the conviction that "our system and our country are superior." This is the MAGA belief, and it is increasingly shared in Beijing as it watches the United States change. This is extremely dangerous. Either side could trigger confrontation by acting in ways that humiliate the other, and both could escalate conflict to cover up their own domestic weaknesses.
Trump and Xi Jinping could meet as many as four times this year. We will have to see what comes of it. For the EU, it would be desirable to take the Draghi Plan seriously—a package to strengthen EU competitiveness centered on massive European investment and a complete overhaul of industrial strategy—and to adopt the Carney Doctrine, a realist line arguing that, in response to U.S. "America First" policies and the end of a rules-based international order, middle powers must strengthen their own survival strategies and mutual cooperation. Pressure from the two great powers will intensify this year and beyond.
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About Miguel Otero-Iglesias
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