Evaluation of Implementation Levels and Penalties Announced
Voluntary Commitments Turn into Government Control

[Reporter’s Notebook] Inclusive Finance: All Stick, No Carrot View original image


The financial authorities have announced that they will evaluate the implementation level of inclusive finance among banks and impose penalties if it is found to be insufficient. Although the nation's five major financial groups (KB, Shinhan, Hana, Woori, and NH Nonghyup) voluntarily pledged to invest 70 trillion won in inclusive finance over the next five years, what they received in return was a stick, not a carrot. As these voluntary commitments, which were premised on self-regulation, are now subject to grading and punishment, critics point out that the reality of 'government control' is being revealed behind the name of 'inclusive finance.'


The essence of inclusive finance lies in financial institutions fulfilling their social responsibilities by taking on risk. The system can only be sustainable if the government sets the direction and financial institutions are left to make decisions and carry them out—a virtuous cycle. However, the moment evaluation and penalties are combined, 'inclusion' becomes an obligation and finance is relegated to something to be managed. In other words, the domain of autonomy and guidance is turning into one of supervision and discipline.


The costs of public service already borne by the banking sector have reached their limit. Through various funds such as contributions to the Korea Inclusive Finance Agency and deposit insurance premiums, banks are already shouldering enormous costs. Recently, even the contribution rate for inclusive finance has been raised from 0.06% to 0.1%. As a result, the additional burden on the banks will amount to 200 billion won annually. Given that the banking sector currently accounts for more than half—2.473 billion won (56%)—of the Korea Inclusive Finance Agency’s total annual contributions of 4.348 billion won, imposing further penalties based on the implementation of inclusive finance would go beyond voluntary responsibility and could rightly be criticized as a de facto 'quasi-tax.'


This approach by the authorities stands in stark contrast to overseas cases. Policy financial institutions such as France's BPIfrance or Germany's KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau) directly carry out policy finance while encouraging participation from private banks through incentives, in order to avoid infringing on the commercial judgment of private institutions. Japan serves as a cautionary example for Korea. In the past, Japan was the epitome of 'convoy system' government-led finance, and excessive government intervention led to increased insolvencies and the creation of zombie firms—a painful lesson learned.


The financial authorities explain that they will also offer incentives, such as lowering contribution rates, based on evaluation results. However, this is less a genuine reward and more a conditional offer along the lines of 'if you do well, we will reduce your penalty.' It is not a true 'carrot,' but rather a differential exercise of supervisory power—merely an adjustment of the 'severity of the stick.'



Even if the policy’s objective is good, that does not justify its means. Although the policy is labeled ‘inclusive,’ the way it operates is closer to government control. No one denies the value of inclusive finance. However, the moment inclusion is forced, the vitality of the policy inevitably begins to fade. It must be remembered that true inclusion comes not from punishment, but from incentives based on trust.


This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.

© The Asia Business Daily. All rights reserved. Unauthorized AI training and use prohibited.

Today’s Briefing